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The introduction of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 dramatically increased
the utilization of health care services, especially hospital care, and, at the same
time, increased the costs of health care to the Federal government.

By the

1970s, health care cost inflation and an imminent deficit in the Medicare Trust
Fund prompted the adoption of a number of regulatory (health planning,
Professional Review Standards Organizations, health care fee freezes) and
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competitive (HMO development) strategies designed to contain costs. None of
these public policy iniatives worked, however, as the portion of GNP devoted
to health care continued to escalate to 10.796 by 1983.
The health care cost battle shifted to new ground with the election of
Ronald Reagan in 1980. In recognition of the inherently inflationary nature of
retrospective reimbursement, the Reagan Administration enacted legislation
that substantially changed Medicare's hospital reimbursement system.

The

Prospective Payment System (PPS) mandated paying hospitals a fixed payment,
set in advance, based on the patient's diagnosis rather than retrospectively
paying for all services delivered to a patient. Critics of the program contend
that PPS introduces incentives for hospitals to conserve resources during the
hospital stay (e.g., provide fewer ancillary services, shorten length of stay) and
to shift care to less costly settings (e.g., community-based care, outpatient
settings); both potentially affecting quality of care to the elderly. The question
addressed by this dissertation concerned the issue of "quicker and sicker"; that
is, whether there were changes in the discharge health status and post-hospital
placement of Medicare beneficiaries as a result of the implementation of PPS.
Using a quasi-experimental time-series PRE/POST design, data was
collected from the medical records of 2,619 Medicare beneficiaries (1,2.58 in
the PRE-PPS period; 1,361 in the POST-PPS period) hospitalized between 1981
and 1986. Two large (300+ beds) and two medium-sized (100-300 beds) hospitals,
similar in organization and type of services provided and representative of
hospitals in the Portland metropolitan area, served as data collection sites.
Medical records were selected from five Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs):
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three medical DRGs (stroke, heart failure, and pneumonia) and two surgical
DRGs (hip replacement and major joint pinning) in the PRE or POST periods.
Analysis of the data show that overall length of stay declined from 11.3
days in the PRE-PPS period to 8.6 days in the POST-PPS period, a reduction of
2.7 days and significant at the p =

<.OOllevel.

Application of the Dependency

at Discharge Measurement Instrument to each medical record to derive a
Dependency score showed that average Dependency ·for the PRE-PPS period
was 8.9 while average Dependency for the POST-PPS period was 9.7, a
difference significant at the p =(.001 level. The results also show a significant
increase in Dependency between the PRE and POST periods for four of the five
DRGs studies (Stroke, Pneumonia, Heart Failure, and Hip Replacement).
Finally, an analysis of differences in post-hospital placements; e.g.,
placements to home alone, home with another (spouse, relative, home health),
group home (retirement community, adult foster care), nursing home, or
transfer to another facility,

were conducted. The results show a significant

increase in POST-PPS placements to home alone (p
.01), and for hospital transfers (p

= ( .001).

=( .0.5),

home health (p

=

Finally, an analysis was conducted

comparing Dependency at Discharge by post-hospital placement PRE and POSTPPS.

Results showed that there was a significant increase (p = ( .01) in the

level of Dependency for Medicare patients being discharged requiring home
support services (home health). Though limited in its generalizability, the data
presented in this dissertation supports the contention that Medicare patients
are leaving the hospital sooner, in more dependent states of health than before
PPS, and that greater numbers of potentially high care patients are being
discharged to home and to home health.

CHAPTER I
THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM IN TRANSITION

The medical care system today is balanced on a knifeedge. On the one hand, if leaders make the right moves
over the next 10 years, this nation will make a marked
leap forward in the quality, accessibility and efficiency of
medical care and coverage received by all Americans-rich and poor, old and young. On the oth~r hand, there is
grave danger that, if leaders make the wrong moves, the
quality, accessibility and efficiency of medical care and
coverage in this country will be reduced sharply (McClure,
1985, p. 43).
This dissertation is a policy evaluation of one of the more controversial
health care policies today: Public Law 98-21 - Medicare's Prospective Payment
System (PPS).

For this dissertation, policy is understood to mean measures

which the government (i.e., the public sector) can adopt or has adopted to
advance a given end.

Ends are desired states or outcomes reflecting some

degree of society's values or some sector of society's values while measures
means government programs. Defined this way, policy comprises a vast realm
of concerns, possibilities, commitments, actions, and outcomes. Thus, a public
policy cannot be examined productively without attention being paid to the

concerns, possibilities, actions and outcomes surrounding a particular policy
initiative (Brown, 1988b).

It is to these areas of policy evaluation that this

dissertation is addressed. The evaluation which comprises this dissertation will
include the following elements: the context in which the federal initiative was
enacted; the relevant actors and organizations involved; the concerns raised by
the policy and the resulting federal program; and finally, the policy itself will
be evaluated in light of recent data concerning its impact.
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This document will utilize original research and recently published national
data to examine the impact of PPS on the quality of care to the Medicare
beneficiary; that is, whether there have been changes in the discharge health
status and post-hospital placement of Medicare beneficiaries as a result of the
changes in the way Medicare pays for hospital care to the elderly.
The Medicare program enacted in 1965 to provide health insurance to the
elderly and, after 1972, the disabled is in financial trouble. Part A of Medicare,
the hospital insurance trust fund (or HI program), which provides insurance
protection for inpatient hospital services, skilled nursing facility services, some
home health care services, and hospice care, is financed by payroll taxes. A
Congressional report in 1983 estimated that the HI program would go bankrupt
by 1990 and would produce a deficit of between $200 to $300 billion by 1995
(Demkovich, 1983a). In addition, Part B, the supplementary medical insurance
trust, which provides voluntary supplementary insurance to cover the costs of
most physician's services, including hospital outpatient services, laboratory
services, and certain other services not covered in Part A, was also under cost
pressures. However, because Part B is funded by premiums and revenues from
the general treasury, it was in less danger of bankruptcy. In 1983, Congress
estimated that it would have to appropriate $31.9 billion in 1988, compared to
$14.2 billion in 1983, to cover SMI's costs (Demkovich, 1983a). Thus, the crux
of Medicare's financing problem appeared to be the hospital insurance fund.
Since the beginning of the program, the hospital insurance fund spent as
much as it took in.

Outlays grew at an average annual rate of 17.7%

(Demkovidl, 1983a).

An aging population and rising health care costs,

especially the higher cost of hospital care, have been identified as the source of
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Medicare's fiscal problems. Although Medicare had historically been protected
from budget cuts in previous years, the Reagan Administration was able to get
Congress to cut $1.4 billion from the Medicare budget in 1981 by raising
beneficiaries' contributions to the program and again in 1982 when another $2.4
billion was "saved" by imposing stringent limits on how much the government
would reimburse hospitals for costs exceeding a norm set by the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA), the agency that runs the Medicare program
(Demkovich, 1983a). Even with these expenditure limitations, costs continued
to rise. By 1983, Medicare's projected deficit prompted Congress to initiate
legislation overhauling the program's hospital payment system, converting the
HI payment system from a retrospective to a prospective system.
Under the old system, the government reimbursed hospitals for their costs
of treating the elderly after the services were delivered.

This system, in

effect, encouraged wastefulness and the over-servicing of Medicare patients
since the more services delivered, the more money the hospital or physician
would make.

Under the new system, the government, i.e., the Health Care

Financing Administration, set payment rates in advance based on the average
cost of treating 467 Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs).

Hospitals that could

deliver services for less than the established reimbursement rate were to be
allowed to keep the difference whereas hospitals whose costs exceeded the rate
would have to absorb the loss.

The new system was expected to save $1.5

billion in fiscal 1984 and $20.2 billion over five years (Demkovich, 1983a).
The current situation is one in which the shift in federal health care policy
in the Medicare program has created a tension between a medical care system
geared toward expansion and the state requiring control over expenditures
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(Starr, 1982).

It is this transition period between expansion and cost-

containment that current federal health policy is being implemented. However,
there is a dearth of information and very little theory to guide research
concerning the myriad changes occurring in the health care sector. For example,
PPS has been implemented in a "vacuum" of knowledge and experience in
national prospective payment systems.
prospective

hospital

rate setting

Though several states had introduced

programs

before

PPS,

they

were

all

substantially different in design from the national program and none had been
adequately evaluated for impacts on the quality of care (Wagner, 1986).
Furthermore, the methods for measuring quality of care are not well
developed and the data are not readily available even for existing measures
(GAO, 1986; OTA, 198.5).

One reason for the lack of information about the

quality of care provided to Medicare beneficiaries is that there is little
agreement about what is meant by quality of care • Quality can be viewed from
the provider's perspective, the patient's perspective, and the payer's perspective
and these may be divergent. In addition, measures of quality have been limited
to somewhat ambiguous proxy measures that are often difficult to interpret on
an individual or group level. Finally, the effects of PPS on the quality of care
are likely to emerge gradua!ly and the more serious effects may not appear for a
number of years. That is, PPS impacts on quality may be small initially because
of the gradual transition from cost-based reimbursement to PPS and the ability
of hospitals to achieve savings through management and clinical efficiencies that
have little effect on outcomes. Over time, PPS could force economies that are
inconsistent with maintaining quality of care.
Consequently, this dissertation is presented with the following caveats:
one, it is a preliminary examination of a new area of research in health care,
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that is, quality of care.

Given the absence of information and/or theory

regarding the changes occurring in the health care system, this dissertation is a
critical first step in a long-term process of data generation and theory building
regarding quality of care in a new health care market. Two, the local focus of
the original research utilized in this dissertation limits its generalizability to
the larger Medicare population while the use of five Diagnosis Related Groups
(DRGs) to assess beneficiary impact limits its generalizability to the full DRG
system. And three, this dissertation presents the historical development of the
American health care system as a basis for understanding the current changes
occurring in the health care sector and presents original data as well as
recently published national data as a means of identifying patterns of response
to a revolutionary change in federal health care policy, the Prospective
Payment System.
Chapter I begins the analysis by describing the historical evolution of the
medical profession and the role of the federal government on health care
policy. Specifically, Chapter I examines the influence of the medical profession
and the federal government on the organization and delivery of health care and
on health care costs. Information concerning how physicians came to dominate
the American health care system and how federal health care policy since
World War II (especially the Medicare and Medicaid programs) has reinforced
the

system

established

by

the

medical

profession,

provides a

more

comprehensive understanding of the contemporary American health care
system; a system that focuses on curing illness rather than preventing disease,
is highly technological, is biased toward institutional versus other forms of
care, and is very expensive.
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Chapter II examines the response to escalating health care costs by the
federal government and presents a description of the current situation in the
health care sector.

A number of regulatory (PSROs, health planning) and

competitive (HMO legislation) were passed during the 1970s in an attempt to
contain rising costs. However, none of these public policy initiatives worked.
A new approach to health care costs was instituted by the Reagan
Administration in 1983: Medicare's Prospective Payment System (PPS). PPS
pays hospitals a fixed payment rather than retrospectively paying for all
services delivered to a patient. PPS radically alters the fin,?ncial incentives for
the amount and mix of inpatient services provided to the elderly and encourages
early discharge of the patient to community-based care providers.

At issue,

then, is whether quality of care to the Medicare beneficiary has been adversely
affected under PPS.
Chapter III presents a discussion of the methodological issues surrounding
an evaluation of this major public policy initiative and delineates the original
research conducted for this dissertation.

Chapter IV presents the data

generated from the research design and presents recently published data
(national and local) on the impact of PPS for hospitals, physicians, the Medicare
beneficiary, and other health care providers, particularly community-based
providers (e.g., Home Health, Nursing Homes). Finally, Chapter V presents a
discussion of the significance and policy implications of the data presented and
identifies a number of areas of needed research for a more comprehensive
understanding of the impact of PPS on the quality of care provided to the
Medicare beneficiary.
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IH!OSPITALS, PHYSICIANS AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
IN THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM

The post-nineteenth century health care system in the United States has
been shaped by two equally important forces:

a powerful medical profession

and, since World War IT, by the federal government.

Since the turn of the

century, American physicians have acquired broad cultural authority, social
privilege, economic power, and wide political influence. American physicians
have been able to maintain professional independence, control access to their
profession and institutionalize their authority to a degree of social and
economic power unknown to any other occupational group in the United States
(Starr, 1982). In addition, the federal government has increasingly influenced
the planning, direction, and financing of health services since 1945.

While

government's role has been limited to financing care for needy groups, this role
has grown to the point where publicly financed health programs account for
approximately 40 percent of the nation's- personal health care expenditures.
Furthermore, almost 65 percent of all health research and development funds
are provided by the government and most non-profit community and university
hospitals have been built or modernized with government aid (Torrens, 1988).
Physician Dominance of American Health Care Delivery
Four developments, largely occurring between 1870 and 1910, laid the
foundation for physician control of the American health care system. The first
development was the public acceptance of the hospital as the best place to
receive medical care. Up to that time, hospitals had been formed mainly to
take care of people who did not fit into the traditional system of family care in
the home.

The second and third developments enhancing the importance of
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physicians in the health care delivery system were the incorporation of
professional nurses as the primary care giver within the hospital and scientific
and technological advances in medicine (such as the development of antiseptic
surgery which drastically reduced infectious diseases). As a result of these two
developments,

hospitals moved from the periphery of medical care to the

center of medical education and practice. The last major contributors to the
dominance of physicians were the reform of medical education and the resulting
licensure of physicians.

The institutionalization of uniform educational

standards began to improve care and state licensure for physicians began to
limit access to the profession.

All these factors increased the efficacy of

medical treatment, institutionalized much of medical practice within hospitals,
and aided in establishing physicians as the most effective health care
practitioners.
The Acceptance of Hospitals. From their origins in pre-industrial society,

hospitals had been primarily religious and charitable institutions for tending,
rather than curing, the sick, dying or helpless. Hospitals in the United States
emerged from this same religious and charitable tradition, performing as
almshouses and serving the general welfare function of housing the homeless
poor, the aged, the disabled, the chronically ill, the mentally incompetent, and
orphans.

Caring for the sick was a secondary function in the almshouse and

treatment was often provided in infirmaries isolated from the rest of the
facility. It was not until the late 1700s that the infirmaries of city poorhouses
broke away to become medical care institutions in their own right (Haglund &
Dowling, 1988; Knowles, 1973; Rosen, 1963; Rosenberg, 1987; Starr, 1982).
Starr (1982) divided the evolution of the American hospital system into
three fairly coherent phases. In the first phase, roughly between 1751 and 1850,
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two kinds of institutions developed: public and voluntary hospitals.

Public

hospitals evolved from the almshouses. They were operated by municipalities,
by counties, or, in the case of merchant marine hospitals, by the federal
government. The second phase of hospital development, beginning around 1850,
saw the emergence of religious and ethnic institutions and specialty hospitals,
such as children's hospitals, as a consequence of the discrimination non-elite
physicians and ethnic groups faced in the established public andvoiuntary
hospitals. This discrimination forced immigrants to build facilities of their own
and to staff them with their own physicians.

The growing importance of

hospitals and the control over them by a few, elite physicians led to the third
phase of hospital development, beginning around 1890 and ending around 1920,
which saw the emergence of the modern profit-making hospital.

These

hospitals were primarily operated by physicians who had been excluded from
existing general hospitals or small town doctors who wanted a place to
hospitalize their own patients to prevent big-city doctors from taking them.
During these phases of hospital development, the advent of professional
nun;ing and the discovery and application of antiseptic surgery, furthered the
acceptance of the hospital as part of the medical care system by the American
public and helped establish the clinically-trained, licensed physician and the
primary provider of acute medical care in the United States (Knowles, 1973).
Professicnal Nursing. Trained nurses were virtually unknown before 1870.
Nursing was menial occupation for lower class women who could work nowhere
else or for inmates of the almshouses. The only trained nurses were Catholic
sisters or Protestant deaconesses who were dedicated to caring for patients by
their religious orders. Some religious orders founded their own hospitals and
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occasionally provided nursing services in public institutions (Haglund &: Dowling,
1988; Knowles, 1973; Rosenberg, 1987). The professionalization of nursing has
been attributed to Florence Nightingale, a middle class English woman trained
as a nurse in a German Protestant religious order.

In 18.54, the British

government sent Florence- Nightingale and 38 other nurses to the Crimea to
take charge of nursing wounded soldiers. The nurses instituted sanitation and
dietary reforms, humane care of patients, and discipline and organization
resulting in a dramatic drop in mortality.

Back in England, Florence

Nightingale wrote of the contributions sanitation and formal treatment routines
made to the recovery of the wounded. In 1860 she founded the Nightingale
School for Nursing.
Impressed by the example of Florence Nightingale, President Lincoln called
upon the Catholic sisterhood to nurse wounded soldiers during the Civil War.
However, more nurses were needed than were available. He appointed Dorthea
Dix to be Superintendent of Nursing for the Union Army. She began recruiting
and training new nurses and, by the end of the war, there were 2,000 lay nurses
in the country (Haglund & Dowling, 1988). Although opposed by physicians and
hospital administrators, nurse training was established in three professional
nursing schools by 1873 and was soon incorporated into more and more hospitals
as student nurses became the unpaid mainstay of the hospital's labor force
(Rosenberg, 1987). By 1883, there were 22 nursing schools and 600 graduates;
by 1898, there were 400 schools and 10,000 graduates (Haglund &: Dowling,
1988).
Nursing contributed to the public's acceptance and use of hospitals by
increasing the efficacy of treatment, clea111iness, nutrition, and formal
treatment routines of patients, all of which contributed to the patient's
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recovery. In addition, nurses' considerate, skilled personal care made hospitals
more pleasant and more acceptable to all classes of patient, not just the poor.
Both factors contributed to the general acceptance of hospitals as an
appropriate place to receive medical care (Haglund & Dowling, 1988;
Rosenberg, 1987).
Antiseptic::: Surgery.

The second medical care development was the

incorporation of antiseptic and sterilization procedures in hospital care, which
drastically reduced infectious diseases and death during surgery. Very little
surgery was done before the advent of anesthesia because of the high death toll
from infections (Rosenberg, 1987). "Surgery had a small repertoire and it stood
far behind medicine in the therapeutic arsenal" (Starr, 1982, p. 1.56).

While

enough was known about anatomy and physiology to do surgery, the inability to
deaden pain and the probable development of a life-threatening infection meant
that what surgery was done had to be done with extreme speed and skill. Ether
was first used as an anesthetic in surgery in 1842 and its use spread rapidly
afterward. With advances in anesthesia, followed by antisepsis (1867, but not
generally applied until the 1880s), and asepsis (1884), surgeons began to be able
to control infections and, combined with advances in diagnostic techniques
(e.g., the x-ray and microscope), the amount, scope and success of surgery
vastly increased.
Surgeons began to operate earlier, more often and for a larger variety of
ills, many of which, like appendicitis and stomach ulcers, had been considered
medical rather than surgical cases (Starr, 1982). By the late 1800s, successes in
surgery promoted a new emphasis on surgery and the relief of acute illness in
the hospital and specialization in the medical profession (Rosenberg, 1987). By
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1900, 40 percent of all hospitalizations were for surgery (Haglund & Dowling,
1988).

The shift in emphasis in medical care altered the function of the

hospital from social welfare to acute medical care as the sick began to use the
hospital, not for the "entire siege of illness, but only during its acute phase to
have some work performed upon them" (Starr, 1982, p. 146).

In addition, medical technology began to proliferate during the late 1800s.
The first hospital laboratory opened in 1889 and the first x-ray films were used
for medical diagnosis in 1896. The discovery of blood types in 1901 made blood
transfusions safe; the electrocardiogram (EKG) was first used in 1903; and the
electroencephalogram (EEG) was first used in 1929 (Haglund & Dowling, 1988).
In addition to increasing the efficiency of medical care, these technological
advances influenced the site and organization of medical care.

Hospitals

became the central resource where the equipment, facilities and personnel
required by modern medicine were housed.

Consequently, as scientific

medicine advanced, it tended to be concentrated in the hospital with the result
that patients and physicians alike used the hospitals for the technology to be
found there and no where else (Rosenberg, 1987; Torrens, 1988).
As hospitals became central to the care of curable, short-term illnesses
which responded quickly to medical intervention, control over access to them
became a strategic basis of power within the medical community. Although
hospitals had not been particularly important to medical practice before, access
to them became vital after the advances in diagnosis and surgery. Exclusion
from a hospital position seriously handicapped a physician and, since only a few
elite practitioners had hospital appointments, this caused great discord within
the profession (Rosenberg, 1987).

Starr (1982) reported that in 1907 only
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10 percent of all physicians in the Bronx and Manhattan areas held hospital
positions and that in Cleveland, 25 percent of the medical profession controlled
80 percent of all the hospital beds.

Blacks and ethnic groups were almost

completely unrepresented on hospital staffs at this time. Furthermore, there
was intense competition for patients as hospital staff physicians were seen to
steal private practitioners' patients once they entered a hospital.
Physicians were interested in building hospitals in order to develop medical
education and to increase the prestige of their private practices. "The status
and iniluence {physicians) derived from hospital positions were of such value to
them that they gave their services to the hospitals without pay" {Starr, 1982, p.
152).

Although physicians derived enormous advantage from hospitals, they

were unable to establish them under their own control, partly for lack of money
but also because the public mistrusted the medical profession. The poor feared
being used for medical experiments while the middle and upper classes
associated hospitals with the almshouse and death. Under these circumstances,
most hospitals had to be built with philanthropic funds and were managed by
boards of trustees, governors, or commissioners, rather than by the physicians
who practiced in them. Physicians did retain control of two important aspects
of hospital operations; one, they controlled who gained admitting privileges to
the hospital (that is, which physicians) and two, they controlled who was
admitted (that is, what type of patient). This arrangement set the stage for the
division of power within the developing hospital, a division between the
administrators of the hospital and the physicians practicing within it and one
that continues to exist today {Rosenberg, 1987).
The Reform of Medical Education. The second major factor that enabled
the medical profession to dominate the U.S. health care system occurred after
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the turn of the Century.

Medical care in the United States was largely a

cottage industry until the 20th century (Renn, 1987).

While physicians

succeeded in organizing medical schools and, in some fields such as obstetrics
and surgery, gained distinction over rival practitioners during the 1700 and
1800s, prior to 1900, doctors were just one of many competing health care
practitioners (Starr, 1982).

Strong democratic ideals and the fact that

professional medicine could offer no more successful diagnosis or treatment
than lay practitioners impeded physicians from establishing themselves as an
exclusive and privileged profession until very late in the 1900s.
The final step in the transformation of professional medicine from a
competing to a dominating profession, and its corresponding influence on the
shape and character of the American health care system, came about as a
result of advances in medical science and technology, which identified
successful therapies, made the hospital a safe place to receive treatment and
paved the way for medical specialization. The institutionalization of uniform
educational standards began to improve medical care and state licensure for
physicians began to limit access to the profession. The result was physician
dominance of health care by 1900.
The social structure of medicine in eighteenth century England reflected
the hierarchical nature of society.

Physicians, as members of a learned

profession, formed a small elite, distinct· from the lower orders of surgeons,
who practiced a craft, and from apothecaries, who followed a trade. Each of
these professions had its own guild organization, which licensed its practitioners
and defined their functions and privileges (Rosenberg, 1987; Starr, 1982).
Licensure and education standards were consolidated under the control of the
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professional elite (Rosenberg, 1987; Starr, 1982). This was the key step in the
emergenc.e of an autonomous, unified, and powerful medical profession in 18th
and 19th century Great Britian and served as a model for many in the American
medical profession.
However, others in the American medical system had little use for the
rigid guild system that characterized British medidne.

With no centralized

government or aristoc.ratic elite in Americ.a to serve as gatekeepers to the
profession, "all manner of people took up the prac.tice of medicine and
appropriated the title of doc.tor" (Starr, 1982, p. 39). The boundaries between a
trade and a profession, so well defined in 18th century Europe, were blurred in
America.

It was common for

Colonial clergy to practice medidne;

homeopathies and other medical sectarians flourished in the nineteenth century.
The result was a totally informal and disconnec.ted system of medical practice,
with care provided by physicians and lay persons, all with various levels of
training. By 1850, the fragmentation in service delivery had become so firmly
entrenched in the structure of the U.S. health care system that unific.ation
under any government agency or structured association seemed impossible. The
adoption of the boundaries that defined English medicine proved very difficult
in the United States.
Professional boundaries c:-ould have been drawn in America, as they had
been in Europe, in three ways:

graduates versus non-graduates of medkal

schools; members versus non-members of medical soc.ieties; or licensed versus
unlicensed practitioners (Starr, 1982).

For example, proprietary medical

schools were founded as early as 1815 and were intended to raise medical
standards. However, only a few of the hundreds of schools that opened in the
19th and 20th centuries were affiliated with hospitals or any other cliniral
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setting; they had few admission requirements other than the ability to pay and
rudimentary skills in reading and writing; and apprenticeship remained the
primary means of obtaining a medical education.
Furthermore, there was no standardized curriculum among schools while
systematic clinical instruction and medical investigation, hallmarks of a
European medical education, were all but ignored in most American medical
schools. The result was not a strengthening of medical education standards but
rather their degradation; a proliferation of proprietary medical schools where
"length of study was minimized, requirements sacrificed, and fees driven down";
and a plethora of proprietary medical school graduatec; who competed with
clinically-trained physicians (Starr, p. 44). Thus, the boundaries that American
physicians attempted to establish during the 19th century (only medical
graduates could be licensed and only licensed physicians could practice) were
rapidly eroded by practitioner competition, dissension among differing medical
sects, and contempt for profesc;ional medicine by the general public.

Under

such circumstances elite medical practitioners could generate little collective
organization or power.
While the need for medical education reform was recognized before the
turn of the century, it was not until after 1900 that the newly consolidated
medical profession could make system-wide changes in medical education
(Starr, 1982}.

Even though some university-based medical schools, such as

Johns Hopkins, upgraded their curriculum and facilities to meet the changes in
medical science, most proprietary medical schools did not.

Moreover, there

was no central licensing authority nor accrediting institutions for medical
colleges. Consequently, alternative practitioners and poorly trained physicians
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continued to be a source of competition to the profession. While this situation
was not so important before the revolution in medical science, by 1900, medical
advances made the gap between education and practice critical.
By the turn of the century medical professionals agreed that uniform
medical education standards were needed to upgrade American medical
practice.

The American Medical Association (AMA), which had struggled to

represent the profession since its founding in 1846, had become powerful enough
in 1904 to establish a Council on Medical Education with the express goal of
defining the training criteria for professional physicians.

Although the AMA

believed that the standards (four years of high school, four years of medical
training, and passage of a licensing test) were vital to upgrading the profession,
they did not believe they could generate the political support necessary to
implement the standards until the gap between medical education and medical
practice was exposed to the general public (Starr, 1982). ·
The AMA had other reasons to reform medical education. Higher standards
would permit physicians to control access to the field, eliminate rivals, improve
the social and economic status of physicians, and help repel all threats to the
profession's autonomy (e.g., corporate medicine using salaried physicians)
o=.hert, 1987). The watershed between the informal medical education of the
past and the twentieth century medical education came about as a result of a
Carnegie Foundation study of medical education practices conducted by
Abraham Flexner.

Flexner's report, Bulletin 10 of the Carnegie Foundation

published in 1910, revealed a large gap between advances in medical science
and current medical education. Flexner found that most of the medical schools
were inadequate and that most physicians were improperly and insufficiently
trained. Flexner recommended that the best schools be strengthened and the
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rest closed, that physician training become a university function and that
medical education be based on a firm scientific foundation (Torrens, 1988).
The Flexner Report had three immediate effects on the health care system
(Wolinsky, 1980). First, the number of medical schools was drastically reduced.
Thirty-nine percent of the 1.55 schools open at the time of the Report's
publication closed within five years and 45 percent dosed within ten years. By
1920, there were only 107 medical schools still open and over 80 percent of
those had begun to require a college degree before admission.

However,

medical schools affiliated with universities thrived under these new conditions
as competitors closed down and demand increased (Wolinsky, 1980).
Second, there was a substantial decrease in the number of physicians and,
at the same time, a corresponding increase in the quality of physicians
graduated.

However, the new education and licensing requirements also

became effective prohibitions to the profession. Proprietary medical schools,
which had admitted all social classes and groups including women, immigrants,
and Blacks, were dosed after the Flexner Report.
The high costs of a medical education, fewer accredited medical schools,
reductions in class size and more stringent entry requirements limited the
number of middle and lower class students admitted. "Admission committees
became class conscious: social position became as important as grades; white,
Anglo-Saxon Protestants were preferred; few women were admitted, and there
were quotas established for Blacks and Jews" (Ebert, 1987, p. 150). Medical
education changed into a demanding, expensive, full-time and lengthy process
which deterred those who could not afford the luxury of a full-time education.
As a result, minorities and the lower socioeconomic groups rapidly became
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under-represented in the medical profession; a bias that continues today. For
example, 11 percent of the total population is Black, yet Blacks constitute only
2.2 percent of the physician work force (Wolinsky, 1980).

Consequently,

medical education reform changed medicine from a democratic, egalitarian
trade to an elite profession (Ebert, 1987).
A third consequence of medical education reform was the new emphasis

placed on research and medical practice and their incorporation into an
application-oriented, university and hospital-based curriculum (Wolinsky, 1980).
Physicians were now trained by scientists and researchers rather than
practicing physicians, and the values and standards of academic specialists
came to dominate the profession. Eventually, these changes directed medical
education away from an emphasis on private practice and toward an emphasis
on science and research.
The Flexner Report also affected hospitals. Changes in medical education
expanded the role of the hospital to include education and research as
internships and residencies became common requirements for a medical license.
By the 1920s, medical education requirements necessitated expansion of
hospital facilities, services, and the addition of more equipment and personnel.
Hospitals also assumed a greater responsibility in coordinating community
health care activities.

With these changes, the hospital became the

organizational hub of the American health care system, central to patient care,
to professional training, and to health related research (Haglund & Dowling,
1988).
Summary. American physicians have been able to control the environment
in which they practice largely as a result of the remarkable advances in
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medicine, which incorporated the hospital as the focal point for medical care
delivery and to the reform of medical education, which controlled access to the
medical profession. By the middle of the 20th century, physicians had become
powerful, prestigious and wealthy professionals. They also succeeded in shaping
the organization of health care (hospital-based) and controlling the financing
mechanisms (fee-for-service) of American medicine. More recently, physicians
have been successful in defeating all forms of national health insurance, save
that of Medicare and Medicaid. "Nowhere else in the world have physicians
been as successful in resisting national health insurance or maintaining a
predominantly private and voluntary financing system" (Wolinsky, 1980, p. 6).
In just the last 100 years, physicians have rid themselves of competition,
created a monopoly on medical practice, and shaped the hospital system. These
power relations have been reinforced since the Depression by an expansionist,
yet non-interventionist, federal health policy. The next section describes the
role of the federal government io health care.
The Federal Government's Role in Health Care

National health care policy since the Depression has resulted in an
expanded government role in health care. What was, before the 1930's, the
province of

the

medical

profession, charitable

institutions,

and

local

government, has increasingly become the responsibility of the federal
government.

Although the government's role in health care has grown

dramatically, the U.S. government is considerably less involved in health care
than the governments of many industrialized countries (Lee &: Benjamin, 1988).
Whereas most of the countries of Europe established extensive hospital systems
and public insurance programs by the late 1800s, the federal government's role
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in health care has been, until the 20th century, primarily concerned with
controlling the spread of contagious diseases. The 1798 Marine Hospital Service
Act established a system of compulsory hospital insurance and a federal system
of hospitals for merchant seamen (Haglund & Dowling, 1988; Shonick, 1988;
Starr, 1982). The Act also established cooperative agreements with the states
in enforcing state and local laws of ship quarantine.

However, quarantine

authority was retained by the states. In 1876, a surgeon general was appointed
to head the Marine Hospital services and authorized to impose quarantine
within the states.

This marked the first time that the federal government

assumed a public health responsibility for an economic: sector previously held by
the states. Nothing more was done on a federal level until after 1900 (Lee &
Benjamin, 1988).
Local health departments were formally organized by municipalities after
the Civil War to deal with broader public health issues such as sanitation,
communicable disease control, collection and analysis of vital statistics, and
public health laboratory maintenance.

By 1909, public health agencies were

established in all the states. In 1912, the Marine Hospital Service was renamed
the U.S. Public Health Service but continued to focus primarily on medical care
for seamen and on foreign quarantine.

Between 1915 and 1935, two other

sources of federal influence over state and local public health activities were
put in place:

grants for venereal disease control and maternal and child

hygiene. For the period up to 1935, the role of the federal government was
limited to support and technical assistance to the states.

The federal

government worked with the states to perform quarantine services at major
ports, providing modest amounts of aid to localities, and providing hospital and
quarantine services to merchant seamen (Shonick, 1988).
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During the Depression, however, the role of the federal government shifted
to one providing a strong federal presence that took precedence, for the first
time, over the states (Lee & Benjamin, 1988). The Social Security Act of 1935
exemplified this new role and was surely the most significant domestic social
legislation ever passed by Congress. The Social Security Act established the
principle of federal aid to the states for a variety of programs, including public
health and welfare assistance. Title V of the 1935legislation gave grants to the
states for maternal and child health programs and crippled children's services
while Title VI funded general public health programs. The Act also provided
cash assistance for the aged, blind, and destitute families with dependent
children.
The Depression so significantly reduced health care utilization that
hospital revenues and physicians' incomes were affected. Due to most people's
economic plight, heath care was either postponed or medical bills went unpaid.
This created a crisis in hospital financing {Richardson, 1988; Torrens, 1988).
According to one study, average hospital receipts per person fell from $236 to
$59 and average hospital deficits rose from 15.2 percent to 20.6 percent just

one year after the Crash (Starr, 1982).

Moreover,

a study of non-profit

hospitals in 1935 showed that total income was 3 percent less than total
expenses and that the total number of hospitals had dropped from 6,852 in 1928
to 6,189 by 1937 (Haglund & Dowling, 1988).
Hospitals began offering prepaid contracts to employers to cover the
hospital expenses of their employees on a group basis as a way to fill empty
beds (Starr, 1982). This contractual arrangement between individual hospitals
formed the basis for the first Blue Cross hospital insurance plans.

With the
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success of the first hospital insurance plans, commercial carriers began
emulating Blue Cross and, by 1940, both commercial insurers and Blue Cross
had extended hospital and surgical insurance coverage to over 10 million
subscribers (Starr, 1982).
After World War II, the federal government encouraged expansion of health
care in three major ways: (1) by favorable tax and other policies, it encouraged
the purchase of increasingly comprehensive private health insurance; (2) by
financing biomedical research programs and building hospital facilities, and
after 1963, by funding medical education, the federal government expanded the
supply of physicians and medical professionals; and (3) by legislating and
financing national health insurance programs, the federal government provided
direct health coverage to the elderly, veterans, and large numbers of the poor
and indigent (Starr, 1982).
Government Encouraged Health Insurance.

As

a

result

of

judicial

interpretations of the National Labor Relations Act, known as the Wagner Act,
the federal government began encouraging the spread of private health
insurance and other employee benefits through collective bargaining.

Passed

the same year as Social Security, the Wagner Act included a provision stating
that "wages and conditions of employment" were subject to bargaining but it
left unclear whether conditions of employment included such benefits as health
and welfare (Starr, 1982, p. 312). In a landmark 1948 case involving Inland Steel
the Supreme Court ruled that benefit plans did, indeed, come under conditions
of employment and were therefore subject to collective bargaining (Renn, 1988;
Sapolosky, 1986). In the next few years after the Inland Steel decision, most of
the major unions concluded agreements for greatly expanded health benefits.
Between 1948 and 1950, the number of workers covered by negotiated health
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plans jumped from 2.7 million to more than 7 million. Over 12 million workers
and 17 million dependents were enrolled in collectively bargained plans as of
19.54 (Starr, 1982). By the mid-fifties, health insurance, particularly hospital
insurance, was widely used and, due to federal support, became a significant
factor in wage/benefit negotiations (Feigenbaum, 1988).
The favorable tax treatment that employee health benefits received
ensured its widespread acceptance by both employees and employers.

The

Internal Revenue Code of 19.54 exempted employer paid health insurance
benefits from the employee's taxable income and from earnings subject to
payroll taxes. In effect, this exemption constituted a massive subsidy to people
who had private health insurance (Starr, 1982).

As Meyer (1983b) explains it:

Employers 'duty to bargain' interacted with the favorable
tax treatment of business oulays for employee health
insurance to stimulate the enrichment of group health
insurance
purchased
through
the
workplace.
Additionally, under the Internal Revenue Code of 19.54,
employees were permitted to exclude the full amount of
their employer's contributions, without limit, from their
own incomes for federal tax purposes (p. 9).
Collective bargaining for health services expanded the scope of coverage
as well. By 19.54, over 60 percent of the population had some type of hospital
insurance, .50 percent had some type of surgical insurance, and 2.5 percent had
medical insurance (Starr, 1982). By 1982, three-quarters of the U.S. population
was covered by private health insurance for hospital care, compared to one-half
in 19.50, an increase of 14 percent per year (Senate Finance Committee, 1986).
Today, almost 80 percent of the population under 6.5 have some form of
voluntary health insurance and about 80 percent of employees in the U.S. work
for firms where they are eligible for health insurance (Koch, 1988). In 1986, the
National Center for Health Services Research (NCHSR) reported that 97.7
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percent of the population under 65 who had private health insurance were
covered for hospital room and board; 97 percent had coverage for surgeon's
costs; 95.7 percent for physician and inpatient medical services; 93 percent for
outpatient diagnostic services; 83.3 percent for physician's office vistis; 81.3
percent for perscription drugs; 80.9 percent for emergency outpatient services;
71.4 percent for mental health/outpatient physician services; 48.7 percent had
coverage for nursing facility services; 25.4 percent for dental services; and 24.2
percent had coverage for home health care services (Koch, 1988).
Biomedical Research. Expansion in the health sector was also encouraged
by federal support of biomedical research. In recognition of the advances being
made in medical research, Congress transformed the old Public Health Service
Hygiene Laboratory, established in 1901, into the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) with broad authority to conduct basic research. During World War II, the
development of radar, the atomic bomb, and penicillin, as well as other
dramatic advances in medical treatment produced by science and technology,
demonstrated that support of science and medicine was in the national interest
(Starr, 1982). Whereas, before the War, the primary sources of financing for
medical research had been private foundations and pharmaceutical companies
(only $180,000 in federal funds were allocated to biomedical research); over $4
million in federal funds were dedicated to research in 1947.
After World War II, NIH established new institutes focused on specific
classes of diseases such as cancer, heart disease, and arthritis. Appropriations
to biomedical research had increased to $46 million by 1950 and to $400 million
by 1960 (Sorkin, 1986). "In the 15 years immediately .after World War II, NIH
grew from a small government laboratory into the most significant biomedical
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research institute in the world" (Lee & Benjamin, 1987, p. 469). From 1975 to
1985, funding for basic research increased steadily, from $4.7 billion to $12.8
billion. However, due to financial pressures, health research and development
spending as a percentage of health expenditures have actually decreased in
recent years. In 1984, health research accounted for 3.1 percent of health care
expenditures, versus 3.9 percent in 1972, a 21 percent drop (Luce, 1988).
The Hill-Burton Act.

Similarly, the government sought to increase the

supply of health services available to the consumer through a variety of federal
health programs. The Public Health Service Act of 1944 revised and brought
together in one statute all existing legislation concerning the public health,
including Title VI of the Social Security Act which provided grants to the states
for public health programs (Wilson & Neuhauser, 1982).
In 1946, Congress passed the Hospital Survey and Construction Act (HillBurton Act) to address the huge post-war demand for hospital construction and
to meet the growing demand for health care services caused by the return of
millions of veterans, the rise in personal incomes and the rapid spread of health
insurance.

Among the most important amendments to the Public Health

Services Act, Hill-Burton's purpose was to pay for hospital construction to
overcome a perceived shortage of hospital beds (Lee & Benjamin, 1988).
Through grants and loans for hospital construction, the program aimed at
increasing bed capacity from the national rate of 3.2 beds per 1,000 population
to a ceiling of 4.5 beds for each state (Alpha Center, 1986). The legislation,
supported by virtually every health care lobby in the country, stimulated a
massive hospital construction program with federal and state subsidies going
primarily to community, nonprofit and voluntary hospitals.

Public hospitals,
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supported largely by local tax funds to provide care for the poor, received little
federal support.
Hill-Burton became a model of federal-state-private sector cooperation in
the distribution of federal resources (Rohrer, 1987). Between 1946 and 1958,
approximately 600 hospitals were built in communities that previously had not
had one. In addition, 250 projects had been completed in communities with an
inadequate supply of beds prior to Hill-Burton.

Testimony before Congress

estimated that only 59 percent of the hospital beds needed were available in
1948 but that the figure had increased to 75 percent by 1958 (Rohrer, 1987).
Between 1947 and 1971, $3.7 billion was disbursed under the program and
accounted for an average of about 10 percent of the annual cost of hospital
construction. The Act also generated an estimated $9.1 billion in local and
matching funds, contributing to over 30 percent of all hospital projects during
that period (Morris, 1984 ).

Total Hill-Burton expenditures had reached an

estimated $6.5 billion in government grants and loans by 1986 (Dowell, 1987).
After the mid-1950s, the emphasis shifted from rural hospital construction
to modernizing larger, existing institutions. The assumption that more medical
care wasdesirable was now being challenged, primarily because Hill-Burton had
been so successful in expanding hospital beds. Largely because of Hill-Burton,
the supply of hospital beds nationwide approached the stated goal of 4.5 beds
per 1,000 by the mid-1970s.
Although Hill-Burton did offer funding for outpatient clinics and public
health centers, political pressure led the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (DHEW) to release these funds so they could be used for hospital
projects (Dowell, 1987). In effect, Hill-Burton put the power of public finance
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behind hospitals rather than other medical services, such as primary care, or
other types of providers, such as community-based nurses, and reinforced the
historical bias in the American health care system toward the most costly form
of health care delivery, physician-based inpatient hospital care (Davis, 1985).
By the 1970s, most Hill-Burtcm funds were being expended for additions,
alterations, and replacements of existing facilities (Rohrer, 1987).
New

priorities

for

Hill-Burton

had

been

identified

during

its

reauthorization in the early 1970s. In keeping with the government's emphasis
on access to health care, the new priority of Hill-Burton was to develop
"equity" in the delivery of health care services (Rohrer, 1987). While the stated
focus of the second phase of Hill-Burton was to provide equal access to hospital
and physician care to those who could not afford it, the goal has largely
remained an illusion (Dowell, 1987).

Hospitals receiving grants-in-aid for

construction under the Act were required to make a "reasonable volume of free
or reduced cost care" to people unable to pay (uncompensated care) and to
make their services "available to all" (Dowell, 1987, p. 155). Nearly 60 percent
of all hospitals have received Hill-Burton funds and are governed by its
regulations concerning the provision of care to the poor and uninsured.
However, the Hill-Burton legislation did not define how much uncompensated
care hospitals were required to provide and did not designate how hospitals
were to ensure their services would be made available to all. Further, although
states were required to designate a single agency responsible for the
administration, monitoring and enforcement of Hill-Burton regulations, no state
had an active program for monitoring facility compliance prior to the the
1970s. It was assumed that hospitals were meeting their obligations (Dowell,
1987).
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Advocates for the indigent brought a series of lawsuits against the
government intended to force DHEW to spell out hospital uncompensated care
regulations.

In 1972, DHEW issued the first administrative standards and

procedures for quantifying "reasonable volume' of free care as a person's
inability to pay equal to 3 percent of the facilities annual operating budget or
10 percent of total federal assistance to pay for services to the poor. Some
hospitals had an "open-door" option; that is, they could accept anyone coming to
the hospital for care.

However, volume of uncompensated care did not

increase. State agencies failed to establish eligibility criteria or procedural
guidelines and neglected to monitor facility observance of the provisions
(Dowell, 1987).
Subsequent litigation prompted further revisions in the regulations.

A

General Accounting Office (GAO) report in 1974 criticized the government's
enforcement ·of Hill-Burton, and in 1975 revised regulations were issued that
strengthened the requirements for hospitals (Dowell, 1987).

Still, volume of

uncompensated care did not increase. Additional court cases and Congressional
hearings were needed before further revisions to the regulations finally became
specific. In 1979, revisions to the law went into effect eliminating the "open
door" option and requiring a specific amount of dollars of uncompensated care
to be delivered annually for 20 years from the opening date of the facility or
receipt of federal funds under the Act (Dowell, 1987).
Although nearly 5,000 general hospitals have received Hill-Burton funds,
many of these hospitals no longer fit into the regulations, due to the 20-yearfrom-opening-date provision, and others only have a few years left to go. The
result has been a dwindling availability of uncompensated care. Barely 2,500
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hospitals still have Hill-Burton obligations as of 1985. By 1990, only 1,000 will
still be under the Act and by 1995, only 400 hospitals will have any Hill-Burton
uncompensated care obligations (Dowell, 1987). Moreover, enforcement of HillBurton obligations has been lax at best.

The major problem with the

enforcement of the Hill-Burton regulations is that there is no incentive for
hospitals to comply and no incentive for HHS to enforce compliance. "Without
fear of statutory or regulatory punitive measures, hospitals may cut as many
corners as they wish. If they are caught, they will merely be reprimanded and
told to do better next time" (Dowell, 1987, p. 167).

With increasing cost-

containment pressures, hospitals may choose to limit even more stringently the
amount of uncompensated care they provide.
Physician Supply.

The government also moved to increase the supply of

physicians and other health professionals through large scale subsidies for the
creation of medical schools, the education of doctors, and support of medical
research.

The first federal legislation specifically addressed to health

manpower was The Health Amendments Act of 1956 (Wilson & Neuhauser,
1982). The law authorized traineeships for professional public health personnel
and for advanced training of professional nurses under Title III of the Public
Health Service Act.

Formula grants to schools of public health were

established in 1958 and, in 1960, a program of project grants to schools of
public health and schools of nursing funded graduate public health training.
The Health Professions Educational Assistance Amendments of 1965 and
the Allied Health Professions Personnel Training Act of 1966 added more
support, including support

for

physicians (Sorkin,

1986).

Finally, the

Comprehensive Health Manpower Training Act and the Nurse Training Act, both
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passed in 1971, extended previous legislation designed to expand the pool of
health manpower (Wilson & Neuhauser, 1982). The program reached its peak in
the early 1970s and accounted for approximately 55 percent of the total
revenues of medical schools (Muscovice, 1988).
By the mid-1970s, it was clear that this policy of supporting health
manpower education had worked.

In 1965, when the funding of health

professionals began to see results, there were 145.5 physicians per 100,000
population. By 1975, the ratio had dimed to 171 per 100,000 (Morris, 1984). By
1982, there had been

a:

62 percent increase in the supply of physicians and by

1985, the number of medical school graduates had more than doubled in the
intervening 20 years (Muscovice, 1988). Surveys of medical schools regarding
enrollment indicated that there no longer was a shortage of health professionals
and that there would soon be a surplus of doctors.
The Health Manpower Act of 1976 removed a number of federal incentives
to medical schools and began restricting the inflow of foreign medical
graduates into the U.S. as a means of reversing the trend set by previous health
manpower legislation.

Both the Carter and Reagan Administrations have

recommended curtailment of federal support for health manpower training and,
by 1979, the percentage of total medical school revenues accounted for by
federal funds had been reduced to 29 percent (Ginzberg, 1985). The Health
Manpower Amendments, contained within the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1981, substantially cut federal expenditures for health manpower
training and by 1983, federal support of health training had largely been
dismantled. In spite of these cutbacks, the physician ratio is expected to jump
to 220 per 100,000 population by 1990, and if the trend continues, it could reach
245 physicians per 100,000 population by the year 2000 (Morris, 1984).
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Medicare and Medicaid. The implementation of Medicare and Medicaid,
perhaps two of the most important programatic breakthroughs of the 1960s,
epitomize the federal emphasis on expanding access within the health care
sector.

Medicare is C"omprised of two parts. Part A, the Hospital Insurance

Program (HI), provides insurance protection for inpatient hospital services,
skilled nursing facility services, some home health care services, and hospice
care required by beneficiaries. Part B, Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI),
provides voluntary supplementary insurance to cover the C"Osts of most
physidan's serviC"es, inrluding ho'5pital outpatient services, laboratory services,
and certain other services not covered in Part A. The program does not cover
out-patient drugs, long-term nursing home care, dental care, routine eye
examinations, or preventive services.
The 1972 Social Security Amendments expanded Medicare to cover,
beginning July 1, 1973, disabled persons receiving Social Security and persons
suffering from end-stage renal disease (GorniC"k, et al., 1985). Over 95 perC"ent
of the aged population in the U.S. are enrolled in Part A of Medicare (HI) and 97
perC"ent of Part A beneficiaries are enrolled in Part B (SMI).

Furthermore,

about 70 percent of all medicare beneficiaries also purchase private medicare
supplemental insurance policies (i.e., Medigap policies) designed to reimburse
the deductibles and coinsurance associated with Medicare coverage (Koch,
1988).
Medicare is financed in part by payroll taxes on both employees and
employers, in part by premiums paid by the beneficiaries, and in part by
contributions from the general revenues of the U.S. Treasury. The HI program
is funded 100 percent from a trust fund established for that purpose. Under
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current law, general revenues cannot be used to make up for any short fall
between outlays required to pay benefits and the balance in the HI trust fund.
In contrast, SMI revenues are obtained from premiums and general revenues
with the premium amount increased by law every year and general revenues
making up any difference between premium income and outlay (Sorkin, 1986).
Of the funds for SMI, 74 percent are derived from the general treasury and 24
percent come from beneficiaries who elect to enroll in Part B (Koch, 1988).
Under the HI program, the patient is required to pay an inpatient hospital
deductible in each benefit period. The deductible approximates the cost of one
day of hospital care; over $500 in 1986 (Sorkin, 1986). Coinsurance based on the
inpatient hospital deductible is required for the 6lst to 90th day of
hospitalization (one-fourth of the deductible); for the 21st to lOOth day of
skilled nursing facility (SNF) care (one-eigth of the deductible); and for the 60
lifetime reserve days for inpatient hospital care (one-half of the deductible).
Under the SMI program, in addition to paying a monthly premium (currently
$15.50 per month versus $3.00 in 1967) the beneficiary must meet a deductible

of $7 5 per year.
In contrast to Medicare, Medicaid is a grant program in which the federal
government shares the cost of health care services with the states for certain
welfare recipients, such as those who receive cash assistance under existing
Social Security welfare programs including Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI).

States run the

program, within the guidelines set by the federal government, paying those who
provide the care directly. The Medicaid program. replaced several other health
programs for the poor (e.g., the Kerr-Mills bill of 1960) and became the primary
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device by which the federal government sought to ensure that the poor got
adequate medical care (Ginzberg, 1985). Medicaid provides health financing for
over 27 million low-income people, induding nearly 4 million elderly poor.
Medicaid fills two roles for the elderly: for the 3 million elderly poor living
outside of institutions, Medicaid supplements Medicare's acute care benefits
and pays for the cost-sharing required by the program and for the 1 million
elderly in nursing homes, Medicaid pays for care once personal assets and
income are depleted (Rowland, 1987).
Medicaid is financed by a federal contribution from the general treasury,
ranging from 50 to 77 percent and averaging 55 percent, and from state
treasuries, with an average contribution of 45 percent (Koch, 1988; Renn, 1987).
Like Medicare, the Medicaid program paid providers on a cost-based, fee-forservice bac;is.

Unlike Medicare, Medicaid is a means-tested program. To be

eligible, an individual's income and assets must be below state determined
eligibility levels, which are roughly 75 percent of the federal poverty level
(Rowland, 1987).

The Medicare and Medicaid programs are the closest this

country has come to a comprehensive, national health insurance program.
Summary. By 1953, the federal government's role in the national health
care system was firmly established with the creation of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (DHEW), now the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS).

Designed to support programs and services in the

private sector, biomedical research, health professionals training and hospital
construction, DHE W's role in direct medical care was limited to military
personnel, veterans, merchant seamen and Native Americans.

In the early

1960s, new health initiatives for the elderly and poor gained widespread
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political support and resulted in the legislation establishing the Medicare and
Medicaid programs (Lee and Benjamin, 1988). The introduction of all of these
federal initiatives in health care not only expanded health care services, they
increased the cost of care.

Federal funding accounted for 22 percent of all

personal health care spending in 1965; by 1980, that figure had increased to 40
percent. The next section examines the impact federal programs have had on
health care costs.

HEALTH CARE COSTS

The rise in health care costs had been acknowledged as early as the
Progressive Era (late 1880s-1920s) and attempts to control it discussed on the
national political arena since the early 1900s, cost was not a major federal
concern until the 1970s. On the contrary, as government and private employers
sought to encourage the development and use of health care services, concern
focu~ed

on the availability of medical care, quality of care, and to some extent,

on access to care. However, the last twenty years have seen below average
economic growth combined with increases in federal spending and tax cuts, slow
productivity gains and rapid inflation, and mounting federal budget deficits. All
of these factors contributed to rapid increases in health care expenditures. It
was not until the enactment of national health programs, specifically the
Medicare and Medicaid programs in the mid-1960s, that inflation really took off
in the health care sector and caused serious political concern.
Since 1940, national health expenditures have grown at a rate substantially
outpacing the GNP. Table I shows the progression of aggregate and per capita
national health expenditures for the United States since 1940. Prior to World
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War II, only 4.0 percent of the GNP was devoted to health care; by 1985, the
proportion of the GNP expended for health care almost tripled, increasing to
10.8 percent of the GNP (Koch, 1988).

TABLE I
AGGREGATE AND PER CAPITA NATIONAL HEALTH IEXPENDITURJES,
UNITED STATES, SELECTED YEARS*

Year

Total
Billion

Per
Capita

Percent
GNP
(Billion$) of GNP

1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1985

4.0
12.7
26.9
75.0
247.5
425.0

30
82
146
350
1049
1721

100
287
507
1015
2632
3989

4.0
4.4
5.3
7.4
9.4
10.8

*Source: Koch, 1988. Adapted from Waldo, D.R., Levit, K.R., Lazenby, H.:
National health expenditures, 1985. Health Care Financing Review, 1986, 8:121.
Another way to look at costs is that between the end of World War II and
1966, public outlays for health averaged approximately 25 percent of the total
dollar amount spent for health care. While expenditures in both the public and
private sectors increased during this period, the rate of increase was
approximately the same in both sectors. With Medicare and Medicaid programs,
public expenditures for health services rose, as expected, but at a rate far
greater than anticipated (Haglund & Dowling, 1988). In 1965, 22 percent of all
personal health care spending was publicly financed; yet the figure grew to 34
percent in just two years (Gibson, et al., 1984). Similarly, total national health
expenditures increased an average of 12.6 percent between 1965 and 1983,
fueled by a steady inflation in the hospital sector, which grew 14 percent per
year during that period versus 7 to 8 percent annual inflation for the rest of the
economy (Crozier, 1984).

In addition, between 1975 and 1983, the federal
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government paid for slightly more than two-thirds of all public: expenditures for
health and medical care (Sorkin, 1986).
Health care expenditures reached $3.5.5.4 billion by 1983, 10.8 percent of
the GNP and 10.3 percent more than in 1982 (Gibson, et al., 1984). If health
care spending were allowed to continue at this rate, expenditures could reach as
much as $690 billion (12 percent of GNP) by 1990 and $1.9 trillion (14 percent
of GNP) by the year 2000 (Freeland & Schendler, 1983). Of the total amount
spent in 1983, $313 billion was spent on personal health care services suc:h as
hospital care, physicians' services, nursing home care, drugs and medical
sundries, and other personal health care goods and services) (Gibson, et al.,
1984). Public sources paid for 42¢ of every dollar spent on health care in 1983;
federal payments amounted to $102.7 billion while $46.1 billion came from
state and local governments. Outlays for health care benefits paid by Medicare
and Medicaid totaled $91 billion or 29 percent of all personal health care
expenditures in 1983 (Gibson, et al., 1984).
Although health care spending increased dramatically overall, hospital care
led the way. Today, there are just under .5,800 community hospitals containing
nearly 1 million beds, or about 4.2 beds per 1,000 persons (Ebert, 1987).
Hospital care accounted for 47 percent of all personal health care spending in
1983 in contrast to 33 percent in 1960.

On a per capita basis, hospital

expenditures increased from $.50 per person in 1960 to over $1,4.59 by 1983 and
was double the per capita spending for physician's services, more than five
times what was spent for drugs or nursing home care, and more than six times
what was spent for dental services (Sapolsky, 1987). Federal programs paid for
41.1 percent of hospital care while private health insurance paid for 38.2
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percent and state and local governments paid for 12.1 percent, leaving just 7.5
percent to be paid by the patient directly (Gibson, et al., 1984).
Physician's services, which make up the second largest segment of personal
health care expenditures, accounted for 22 percent, or $69 billion of the
personal health care bill in 1983 (Gibson, et al., 1984). Together, physicians and
hospitals account for over 60 percent of health care expenditures and, as a
result, have been the target of most cost-containiment initiatives proposed over
the past few years (Renn, 1987).

Of other health care services, almost $29

billion (8.1 96) went to nursing home care.

Over $23 billion was spent for

prescription drugs, over-the-counter drugs and medical sundries.

Finally,

expenditures for all other types of health care goods and services amounted to
$44.5 billion in 1983 (Gibson, et al., 1984).
Overall, public programs financed almost 40 percent of all health care
services in 1983 (Gibson, et al., 1984). While it is difficult to determine just
how much is "too much", there is a growing consensus in the U.S. that health
care costs are too high. More recently, increased federal spending on a wide
variety of domestic and military programs, coupled with low economic growth
and tax cuts, have contributed to huge federal budget deficits. The deficit has
grown from $79 billion in 1981 to a projected $220 billion by 1986 (Haglund &
Dowling, 1984). The specter of ever-growing budget deficits, cost inflation, and
the election of conservative political leaders on the national level in 1980
resulted in a distinct modification in government's perception of its role in
health care.

The government moved from viewing health care as a social

problem to health care as a budget deficit problem (Thurow, 1985).
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lFACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH HEALm CARE COSTS

Relatively high rates of growth in health care expenditures are not unique
to the United States.

Economy-wide inflation, growth in real income,

demographic shifts, and rapid technological change, to name just a few, have
been associated with rising health care costs in all western industrialized
societies.

However, many health care economists agree that a number of

factors, unique to the U.S., explain the rapid increases in U.S. health care costs.
These factors fall into two major categories: economy-wide factors and health
care specific factors

(Abel-Smith, 1970; Enthoven,

1980; Freedland &:

Schendler, 1984; GAO, 1985; Meyer, 1983a).
Economy-wide Factors
Economy-wide factors include general price inflation and aggregate
population growth. Economy-wide general inflation, which is caused by many
factors, plays a major role in total health care expenditure increases. General
inflation accounted for almost 58 percent of the health care expenditure growth
with health care specific factors accounting for only about 35 percent of the
increase between 1972 and 1982 (GAO, 198.5). In 1983, a full 44 percent of the
increase in health expenditures was accounted for by general inflation alone
(Crozier, 1984).

In addition, while the health care system has influenced

aggregate population growth through decreases in infant mortality and
increased life expectancy, aggregate population growth accounted for less than
8 percent of the expenditure increases between 1972 and 1982 (Gibson, et al.,
1984). Economy-wide factors cannot be controlled and are, to some degree,
external to the health care sector. However, health care specific factors relate
to forces within the medical market itself and, thus, may be amenable to
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control.

The next section examines the contribution of health-care specific

factors to health care cost inflation.

Health Care Specific Factors
The major economic factors within the health care specific component
include: (1) medical care price increases in excess of general price inflation, (2)
the development and dissemination of new medical technology, (3) population
aging, (4) market imperfections that prevent the competitive market from
achieving efficient service delivery (including the wide-spread use of health
insurance) and (.5) public financing of health care services.
Medical Care Price Inflation.

During the 19.50s, medical care price

increases averaged only 4 percent annually but that was nearly twice the rate
of consumer price increases as a whole.

During the first half of the 1960s,

consumer prices increased at an average rate of 1.3 percent per year while
medical care prices increased 2•.5 percent per year. From 196.5 to 1970, prices
for goods and services in general rose at an average rate of 4.2 percent per year
while medical care prices increased 6.1 percent (Crozier, 1984). Part of the
reason for these large increases had to do with the implementation of various
federally funded health care programs, including Medicare and Medicaid, which
sharply increased the demand for health services.
From 1974, when the Nixon Administration's Economic Stabilization
Program price controls were lifted from the health care industry, through 1982,
the medical care component of the consumer price index rose at an average
annual rate of 10.2 percent versus 9.1 percent for the economy as a whole
(Morris, 1984). However, both sets of prices reflected periods of rapid inflation
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in the economy generally.

Despite the fact that the utilization of health

services has increased continuously, the major element associated with higher
expenditures has been rising prices, both on an economy-wide basis and on a
medical care specific basis (Evans, 1986). From 196.5 to 1983, three-fifths of
the rise in personal health care expenditures was accounted for by price
increases (Gibson, et al., 1984).
New Medical Technology. The development and adoption of new medical
technology have expanded the treatment of disease but also contributed to
greater consumption of health care and to increased costs.

While new

technology often benefits patients and can increase hospital productivity, new
technology usually becomes an additional service rather than a replacement for
existing services.
increased costs.

This can result in increased utilization and consequently
For example, a fairly recent innovation, coronary by-pass

operations, costs approximately $10,000 (Sorkin, 1986).

The spread of

technology has also resulted in changes in the mix of services delivered and
consumption of more health care per capita, and thereby has stimulated price
inflation as consumers and providers use the most modern facilities and
equipment available•
.Growth in the Elderly Population. Another important factor is the shift in
demographics.

Although the rate of population growth as a whole has been

fairly stable, the percentage of elderly in the population is increasing. The
Census Bureau estimates that there were 27 million elderly, or 11.7 percent of
the total population, in 1983 compared with 23 million (10.8%) in 1977 (Waldo &
Lazenby, 198.5). This older group is expected to more than double by the year
2030 when the baby boom cohort reaches 6.5.

This is a 160 percent increase
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versus a projected 41 percent increase for the population as a whole (Rice,
1986). The aged are also living longer. While there were large inc;reases in the
number of "recently aged"; that is, those people 65 to 69, the median age of the
elderly population as a whole rose from 71.6 years in 1977 to 71.9 years in 1983,
reflecting lower death rates for people over 85 years of age (Waldo & Lazenby,
198.5).

In fact, by 2030, those 85 and above are projected to increase to 14

percent of the elderly population (Rice & Feldman, 1983).
While each age group is healthier and living longer than its predecessors,
one consequence of more older people is the need for more health care since
older people require more hospital and nursing home care than do younger
people. The elderly represent only about 12 percent of the current population;
however, they account for over 30 percent .of all health care expenditures
including 31 percent of hospital admissions and 41 percent of total days of care
(Gornick, et al., 1985; Fiori et al., 1984). The elderly spend about two and onehalf times the amount on health care as do people under age 6.5 (Freedland &
Schendler, 1983). In 1980, per capita expenditures for the under 6.5 population
were $308 compared to $1,087 for those over 6.5 and the hospitalization rate for
those over 65 was two and one-half times that of the under 6.5 age group
(Sc:itovsky, 1984).
The health problems faced by the elderly are also very different from those
of younger persons. They often require more extensive and more expensive
services. When hospitalized, the elderly utilize as much as five times more
inpatient care services than do younger people (Ginzberg, 198.5). . Previous
studies of acute care hospitalizations have found that high cost users of medical
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care are more likely to be persons with chronic problems who are repeatedly
admitted to the hospital than those with single, cost-intensive hospital stays
(Scitovisky, 1984).

As a consequence of more people living into old age,

spending on the direct provision of health goods and services for the elderly has
nearly tripled since 1977; rising from $43 billion to $120 billion in 1984. This
growth in utilization is due not only to the increase in absolute numbers of the
elderly (the growth rate for this age group is 2.3 percent annually), but also to
an increase in the amount of per capita expenditures devoted to them.
Spending per capita for the elderly rose from $1,785 in 1977 to almost $4,202 by
1984, averaging a 13 percent annual growth rate (Waldo & Lazenby, 1985).
Market Imperfections.

Although a number of factors are identified as

contributing to high health care costs, many economic theorists believe that
one of the primary factors is the role of third-party payers in the health care
marketplace (Evans, 1986; Koch, 1988; Renn, 1987). Standard economic theory
suggests that in competitive markets, options for consumers increases and leads
producers to minimize production costs and to maximize economic efficiencyall in pursuit of profit. The result, at least in theory, is that individual selfinterest (utility maximization for consumers and profit maximization for
producers) coincides with the maximization of social welfare. Application of
this model to health care suggests that health services of a standard quality
would be provided at the lowest cost to society.

However, the necessary

conditions for competition to function have not been met in the health care
market and the ability of competition to optimize price, quantity, and quality
may not hold (Weisbrod, 1983).
First of all, unlike other goods or services for which the consumer pays the
provider directly, health care payments often are handled by a financial agent-
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a third party. Thus, the patient does not, in most cases, purchase care directly
but instead purchases access to the health care system by buying health
insurance.

It is this triangle of patient, physician, and insurance company

paying for care that insulates the consumer from knowing the true cost of care,
encourages over-consumption, and largely nullifies the traditional competitive
forces of the market (Morris, 1984).

For example, once hospitalization has

occurred, the consumer with insurance will directly pay less than the full costs
of the care. In such a situation, the consumer has the incentive for excess
consumption and little incentive for cost containment (Renn, 1987).
Moreover, the favorable tax treatment of health insurance premiums and
out-of-pocket payments for health care have also contributed to costs (Renn,
1987}. Under current law, employer contributions for health insurance policies
(more than three-quarters of the premiums earned by insurance companies in
1983) are excluded from employees' taxable income and from earnings subject
to payroll taxes (Sorkin, 1986}.

In addition, until 1983, up to $150 of an

employee's share of health insurance premiums could be deducted directly from
taxable income.

The tax treatment of premiums alone cost the federal

government $26 billion in foregone revenue in fiscal year 1983 (Congressional
Budget Office, 1983).
Certain changes in the current tax laws have confined the exemption,
which is tax deductible, to only that part of health insurance premiums and
other consumer medical expenses exceeding 5 percent of adjusted gross income.
Still, the tax-exempt status of health insurance premiums encourages
employees

and

does

not

discourage

employers,

to

substitute

more

comprehensive insurance coverage (e.g., expanded coverage to include mental
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health, eyeglasses, dental coverage) for higher money wages than they might
purchase themselves with after-tax dollars (Renn, 1987; Sorkin, 1986).
A second major distortion of the medical market is the consumer's lack of
information. Unlike most other markets, the consumers of health care lack full
information when making health care decisions, not only of their own medical
care needs but of the value, quality, and effectiveness of services provided
(Renn, 1987; Weisbrod, 1983; Greenberg, 1983). The standard economic model
assumes that consumers are well informed or that they can learn needed
information quickly and at a low cost. Further, the market model assumes that
the consumer is able to judge the effect of a particular purchase; "that is, able
to compare his/her utility level with and without the specific purchase"
(Weisbrod, 1983, p. 62).

It is this judgment that determines the consumer's

willingness to pay for the service/product.
While this may be true for many purchases, it is not true for medical care.
The uncertainity inherent in many medical decisions and the complex nature of
treatment often result in a limited ability on the part of consumers to make
informed decisions regarding the appropriate delivery of medical care. In the
medic;al market, physicians act as purchasing agents for consumers and are
delegated virtually full decision-making authority for medical decisions. The
use of an agent, however, carrries with it the risk that the agent may have a
conflict of interest - that is, self-interest over the interest of the patient.
The current system places physicians in a position of dual and conflicting
responsibility: acting as the agent for ill-informed patients and doing what they
would do if they possessed sufficient medical knowledge while at the same time
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acting as their own agent -

given the low private cost of medical care

sometimes acting in a privately rational {profit-making) but socially inefficient
(health care costs) manner (Weisbrod, 1983).

The doctor-patient relationship

can be described as a simple "social contract between a physician and
patient •••for the care of the patient (by the physician) in exchange for a fee"
(Ebert, 1987, p. 164). It can also be extremely complex as when the relationship
is placed within the medical world, where knowledge is specialized and the

patient must depend upon the medical expertise of the physician for life and
death matters.

Because of this unique relationship between provider and

patient, it is claimed that physicians have been able to create their own demand
since consumer leverage is extremely limited (Brown, 1986; Langwell, 1982;
Starr, 1982).
Cost-based insurance plans constitute a third factor distorting the medical
market. While insurance plans, especially the Blue Cross plans, reduced the
hospital's financial risk and allowed participating hospitals to gain dominance in
their communities, they also promoted over-utilization of expensive services by
providers and patients since they guaranteed reimbursement. Private insurers
sought to overcome the tendency toward over-utilization by levying copayments
and deductibles on beneficiaries, and made patients liable for the financial risk
that exceeded the indemnity benefit. However, rather than establishing a fixed
fee schedule in which the purchaser (the insurance company) would have had
control of costs, insurance companies reimbursed doctors and hospitals
according to their customary fees or, lacking a community standard, reasonable
costs. The guiding principle behind this form of payment in the physicianestablished fee-for-service medical market has been the acceptance of the
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usual and customary fees as the standard of payment. This acceptance extends
throughout the system to all payers, acceptance by patients, by industry, and
later, by the federal government (Ebert, 1987).
On the one hand, third-party, retrospective reimbursement provides little
incentive for consumers to be cost conscious and seek out efficient providers
since they do not pay directly for their care. On the other hand, reimbursement
has encouraged providers to deliver all possible care since the more services
delivered, the greater the payment.

Similar! y, the structure of insurance

benefits has tended to encourage the use of inpatient rather than outpatient
facilities as well as the overuse of tests and procedures, and encouraged more
doctors to enter high-return specialties like surgery (Starr, 1982). Thus, while
insurance provides easy access to hospitals and physicians and covers treatment
of major illnesses and disabilities, it distances the consumer from the costs of
care and reimburses on a basis that encourages consumption without regard to
cost or benefit.

The financial incentives embedded in the cost-based

reimbursement structure of traditional insurance appears to enhance access and
encourage effective medical care, but not necessarily efficiently or at the
lowest cost.

In this way, cost-based reimbursement by third-party payers has

increased service intensity, utilization, and may have even increased provider
charges (Starr, 1982).

Under such a system, neither the consumer nor the

provider need make any effort to keep costs down (Morris, 1984).
However,
retrospective

many

analysts

reimbursement

believe
and

it has been the combination of

third-party

payment~

specifically

the

government funded health insurance programs of Medicare and Medicaid, that
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are the root cause of health care cost inflation (e.g., Ebert, 1987; Brown, 1985;
Lave, 1984; Renn, 1987). As Weisbrod (1983) points out:
With 90 percent or more of the U.S. population having
some form of health insurance, the price to the patient
of additional medical care is often zero, even though the
social cost is far higher. Moreover, because employerfinanced health insurance is not subject to income
taxation, the purchase of health insurance is subsidized.
Finally, the health care coverage under governmental
Medicare and Medicaid programs acts further to drive a
wedge between the real cost of medical care and the
price to the consumer. Whenever consumers of any good
confront a price that is below social cost, excessive
consumption is likely (p. 65).
Any examination of the effect of federal health programs on health care
costs must include an understanding of the "character and evolution11 of the
program; that is, the trade-offs made in the development and passage of the
legislation (Brown, 1985, p. 580). To secure passage of Medicare and Medicaid,
supporters conceded control of the programs to providers through cost-based
reimbursement and to fiscal intermediaries by delegating major tasks of
oversight and review (Brown, 1985).

This created a payment structure that

encouraged beneficiaries and providers to over-utilize services and that offered
no reward for cost-effective patient management (Feigenbaum, 1987). Three
and a half years after Medicare and Medicaid began operating, a study by the
Senate Finance Committee found the programs already "in serious financial
trouble •••and adversely affecting health care costs and financing for the general
population" (Morris, 1984).

It became clear that the total cost of providing

Medicare and, to a lesser extent, Medicaid services had been underestimated.
For example, Medicare costs increased from approximately $1 billion in 1966 to
$62.9 billion in 1984, primarily reflecting greater utilization of hospitals by the
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aged (Gornick, et al., 198.5; Sorkin, 1986). What was originally seen as an easily
managed set of programs turned into a nightmare of escalating costs (Cohen,
198.5).

How this came about and the impact on health care costs of the

structure of the reimbursement process of the programs, particularly Medicare,
is delineated in the next section.

MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND HEALTH CARE COST INFLATION

Although national health insurance, a major agenda item for Progressives
since the early 1900s, had been contemplated in the development of the Social
Security Act of 193.5, vociferous opposition by the AMA, which opposed any
form of publicly-funded health insurance as "socialized medicine," and
conservatives in Congress, who feared the monumental administrative and
management problems involved in such a plan, forced the removal of the health
provision before it reached Congress (Cohen, 198.5; Koch, 1988; Morris, 1984;
Starr, 1982).

Called the 11 orphan of the New Deal," Truman made national

health insurance a major component of his "Fair Deal" by actively supporting
the Wagner, Murray, Dingell National Health Insurance Bill in 194.5 {Beyer &:
Callahan, 198.5).

However, government-sponsored health insurance remained

blocked in Congress as a result of bitter opposition on the par·t of organized
medicine and conservative politicians.

By 1949, the movement for national

health insurance was "moribund11 {Bayer&: Callahan, 198.5; Koch, 1988).

Frustrated by the failure to achieve their goal of universal medical
insurance coverage, advocates for the elderly sought a strategy to capture
broad public support and overcome Congressional resistance.

"On June 2.5,
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1951, Oscar Ewing, Federal Security Administrator, announced a hospitalization
coverage plan for Social Security pensioners and the widows and c;:hildren of
pensioners. Thus began a fourteen year struggle to pass the Medic;:are hospital
insurance legislation (Bayer & Callahan, 1985). For the most part, the debate
over Medicare centered less on its programmatic;: details than on whether the
c;:irc;:umstanc;:es of the aged warranted a governmental or private sector response
(Marmor, 1986). These efforts were seen at the outset as the first step toward
a comprehensive and universal national health insurance program (Cohen, 1985).
The use of the elderly as a class to provide federal health insurance was a
"unique" approach to universal health coverage (Bayer & Callahan, 1985).
Unlike the governments of Europe, which had adopted universal coverage before
the turn of the century and who had focused on low-income workers initially but
later expanded coverage to all groups, the proposed amendments focused on the
elderly as a group in order to "grease the skids" for a more comprehensive form
of national health insurance in the future (Cohen, 1985). The elderly were seen
as a desirable vehicle for presenting a national health insurance program since
they were more likely to be poor but their poverty was "undeserved" (Bayer &
Callahan, 1985, p.

537).

Moreover, the private insurance system, just

expanding from the employed to the entire middle class, did not protect the
elderly and their families were often burdened by their medical expenses.
Furthermore, the attachment of a health insurance component to the popular
Social Security program, allowed advocates to tap into a program with almost
universal appeal. And, finally, the elderly themselves were lobbying for an agebased social insurance program rather than a means-tested welfare approach
(Bayer & Callahan, 1985; Brown, 1985; Cohen, 1985; Koch, 1988).
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Opposition from the AMA stalled the Medicare legislation until the
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations (Cohen, 1985).

A national study

conducted in the early 1960s showed that about three-fourths of all adults under
age 65 had hospital insurance but only 56 percent of those over 65 did. Yet the
aged were shown to be the most at risk for hospitalization, to have the highest
rates of illness and to have the lowest average income (Gornick, et al., 1985).
Opinion polls from 1960 to 1965 showed dramatic support for Medicare-type
proposals. At the same time, there were a number of ideological and political
issues surrounding the Medicare and Medicaid legislation that threatened its
passage.
There was heated debate over the inclusion of the beneficiary deductibles
and co-insurance provisions. Most Congressional members wanted a deductible
on the hospital insurance portion of Medicare as a means of controlling overutilization, considered a major probability in the debates over the legislation
(Cohen, 1985; Gornick et al., 1985). Another big issue concerned who should
administer the hospital insurance program.

Administration officials felt the

Social Security Administration could do a more effective, efficient, and
responsible job than the many diverse private insurance plans but political
leaders worried whether the program could be satisfactorily administered.
These ideological and politial issues were so hotly contested that they
"precluded consideration of issues such as reimbursement alternatives and
efficiency options" (Cohen, 1985, p. 8).
The decisive victory of Lyndon Johnson in 1964 pushed the Johnson agenda,
induding Medicare and Medicaid, to the forefront in Congress.

Sensing a
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change in the political climate, the AMA and conservative legislators made
counter proposals to the Medicare program. The proposals had one element in
common, they were broader than hospital care and provided for physician's
services (Cohen, 1985).

By 1965, public hearings were being held on the

programs and compromises had been worked out concerning the hospital
insurance deductible and who would administer the program.

In addition,

Medicare and Medicaid included statutes covering physician and other services.
Cognizant of the opposition to the original proposals by the AMA and
conservative legislators, Congressional leaders inserted language into the
Medicare law that expanded coverage to include physicians but ensured that the
program in no way altered "the traditional practice of medicine" (Ebert, 1987,
p.170).
Consequently, Medicare and Medicaid utilizes an "indirect pattern of
finance and delivery", in whic;h the federal government contracts with
independent providers to act as the fiscal intermediaries who administer the
program (Kocll, 1988). The tasks of paying and auditing hospitals and physicians
were delegated to

Blue Cross and commercial insurers as the fiscal

intermediaries. To get providers to enroll in the program, the reimbursement
system adopted to pay for Medicare and Medicaid services was borrowed from
the system established by Blue Cross.

It offered retrospective, cost-based

payment and virtual 'first-dollar' coverage beyond the first day of care for a
fixed number of hospital days and paid physicians their "reasonable,"
"customary," and "prevailing" fees (Brown, 1988b; Cohen, 1985; Koch, 1988;
Renn, 1987). The legislation established a reimbursement rate of 80 percent of
the "reasonable" and "customary" charges for covered services with the
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beneficiary making up the difference between what Medicare paid and what a
physician might charge, unless the physician agreed to accept "assignment"
(Sorkin, 1986).
Furthermore, Section 1801 of the Medicare law provided that "Nothing in
this title shall authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any
supervision or control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which
medical services are provided •••" (Cohen, 1985, p. 8). This section was included
in the legislation to offset the criticism, made by the medical profession and
conservative opponents of the bill, that Medicare/Medicaid would give the
government the right to interfere in the medical diagnosis and treatment of the
individual.

The bill was supported by the medical profession since it left

control of service delivery decisions in the hands of physicians and kept the
government at arms length from any cost-control potential.
Cost-based Reimbursement.

The principle of "reasonable cost" for in-

patient hospital services was "never seriously debated •••opposed •••or criticized"
during the debates over the program.
"principles

generally

applied

by

The legislation prescribed that the

national

organizations

or

established

prepayment organizations" would be accepted by the Congress and the providers
(Cohen, 1985, p. 8). An author of the Medicare/Medicaid legislation stated that
retrospective, cost-based reimbursement was accepted not only because no
other alternative was proposed but also because conventional practice at the
time accepted reasonable cost as a "reasonable principle" (Cohen, 1985, p. 8).
Supporters argued that payment of comparable reasonable costs in the
Medicare/Medicaid programs would assist in reducing barriers to the health
care system for economically disadvantaged people throughout the nation and
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promote equality in their medical treatment. Congress accepted "reasonable
costs" and amended the Social Security Act (PL 89-97) on July 30, 1965 to
establish the national health insurance programs for the aged, known as
Medicare (Title XVlli) and a federal-state insurance plan for the poor known as
Medicaid (Title XIX). The legislation went into effect on July 1, 1966 (Cohen,
1985).
Merlic:are's f'immcial Problemso By almost every measure, the introduction
of Medicare and Medicaid has had a dramatic impact on the availability and
accessibility of health care to the poor and elderly.

At their peak, the

programs resulted in over 97 percent of all elderly and 22.9 million poor people
in the U.S.

being covered by health insurance (Gornick, et al., 1985).

The

number of aged enrollees increased from 19.1 million in 1966 to 26.8 million by
1983 (Congressional Quarterly, 1984).

In addition, the volume of health care

services nearly doubled with the addition Medicare and Medicaid (Renn, 1987).
Although there had been a general upward trend in hospital use by the elderly,
beginning in 1950, the number of hospital stays and the average length of stay
for the aged increased 48 percent during Medicare's first year alone (Gornick et
al., 1985). Between 1966 and 1982, hospital reimbursements, which represent
about 95 percent of Part A expenditures and 71 percent of total Medicare
expenditures, increased at an annual rate of about 20 percent (Gornick, et al.,
1985).
Table

n

and Table III present data on total reimbursements and

reimbursements for the Hospital Insurance (Part A) program and for the
Supplementary Medical Insurance Program (Part B) for the period 1966 to 1984.
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Total Medicare payments grew from $4-.6 billion in 1967 to $62.9 billion in 1984-.
Medical costs rose overall 192 percent between 1970 and 1983 compared to a
157 percent rise in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) (Wehr, 1984-).

From the

program's inception, Part A expenditures have been substantially greater than
Part B, although Part B outlays have been a growing proportion of total medical
expenditures. In 1967, Part A represented 74 percent of benefit payments and
Part B 26 percent; by 1984, Part A had declined to 69 percent and Part B
expenditures had grown to 31 percent (Gornick, et al., 1985).

TABLED
MEDICARE BENEFIT PAYMENTS AND ANNUAL PERCENT CHANGE:
1966-1981g.

Total

Hospital
insurance

1966
1967
1966
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1961
1982
1963
1984

$1.0
4.6
5.7
6.6
7.1
7.9
8.6
9.6
12.4
15.6
18.4
21.8
24.9
29.3
35.7
43.5
51.1
57.4
62.9

S0.9
3.4
4.2
4.7
5.1
5.6
6.3
"7.1
9.1
11.3
13.3
15.7
17.7
20.6
25.1
30.3
35.6
39.3
43.3

ACRG•

16.6
9.1

16.1
8.6

Year

Supplementary
medical
insurance

~nnual

percent
change
for total

Amount in billions

S0.1
1.2
1.5
1.9
2.0
2.1
2.3
2.5
3.3
4.3
5.1
6.0
7.3
8.7
10.6
13.1
15.5
18.1
19.7

346.5
252
15.9
7.5
10.8
9:9
10.9
29.6
25.5
18.2
18.2
14.5
17.6
21.7
21.7
17.6
12.4
9.5

Percent
ACRRG•

17.9
10.3

SOURCE: Health Care Rnancing Adm!nlstraUon, OffiCe of the Al:tullly. 1985 Annual Report oflho Boarcl of Trustees of the Federal H05pitallnsurance
. and Supplementary Medicallrnsurance Trust Funds.
1Annulll c:cmpound rate of grewlh 1967-114.
· 2Annual c:cmpoulid real ;ate of growth 1967-84, adjusted for char.ges In Consumer Prlce Index 19S7-84.
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TABLEm
DISTRmUTION OF MEDICARE JHOSPITAL INSURANCE AND SUPPLEMENTARY
MEDICAL INSURANCE REIMBURSEMENT FOR AGED AND DISABLED
BENEFICIARIES BY TYPE OF SERVICE, 1967 and 1983

Amount
in millions

Percent

Amount
In millions

Percent

Annual
compOund
rate of
growth
in percent

$4,239

100.0

$53,438

100.0

17.2

Type
of
service
Total

1983

1967

34,519
64.6
62.7
17.4
Inpatient hospital
2,659
Physicians and
13,661
25.6
16.3
1,224
28.9
related services
Skilled nursing
facility
428
0.8
274
6.5
2.8
1,388
2.6
43
1.0
24.1
.Home .health agency
3,442
6.4
Outpatoent
38
0.9
32.5
NOTE: F".gures do not Include flllal :;ettlamonra.
SOURCES: (Social Security Admlnistoation, 1971); Health Care Financing Administration, Bureau of Oal4 Mcnagemant and Strategy: Data from tha
MO<I'ICI!rl!l Stali;tical System.

The dramatic increase in utilization and costs is attributed to several
factors: a growth in the eligible categories of beneficiaries (e.g., the expansion
of entitlement to previously uncovered populations), an expansion of the
numbers of previously entitled over-6.5 population, and to some increase in
utilization. Nevertheless, most of the increase has been attributed to increases
in the unit-cost of care; namely, the cost of a hospital day {Gornick, et al.,
198.5; Congressional Quarterly, 1984).
Although

policy-makers

believed

that

retrospective,

cost-based

reimbursement was necessary to encourage providers to participate in the
program, critics of the program contend that Medicare has contributed to
healthcare cost inflation in three ways. One, Medicare's indulgent "entitlement
ethic," they claim, has triggered a financial <:risis and encouraged the elderly
to consume larger and larger proportions of the welfare pie; two, Medicare's
reimbursement system incentives encouraged over-consumption and overuse;
and three, the program over-emphasized the most expensive form of care,
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acute inpatient hospital care while neglecting prevention and long-term care
(Brown, 1985).

As the 20th anniversary of the programs approached,

policymakers began to question how well the programs provide access to care
for the most needy, the equitable distribution of services, the appropriateness
of the covered services, and the effectiveness and efficiency of the system in
which the services are delivered and financed (Gornick, et al., 1985).
Indeed, Medicare is in financial trouble. According to the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO), the hospital in-surance trust fund (Part A of Medicare),
which is financed by payroll taxes, will be bankrupt before the end of the
decade. Given the hist(':>dral trends, the year-end balances of Part A are
projected to decline af

987 and will total from $200 to $300 billion by 1995

(Demkovich, 19&3b; Ginsberg &: Moon, 1984).

In addition, outlays under the

Supplementary Medical Insurance Fund (SMI), which are paid out of general
revenues and premiums levied on beneficiaries, are projected to inc-rease by one
percent per year through 1988. General revenue contributions to the SMI Fund
would have to rise to $31.9 billion by 1988, compared to $14.2 billion in 19&3,
just to pay for this increased use (Ginsberg &: Moon, 1984; Demkovich, 1983b).
With the number of beneficiaries rising, the volume of services per beneficiary
increasing, and the units of costs for services going up, it is clear that the
conflict between the medical needs of the aged population and a growing
federal deficit is destined to be one of the nation's most pressing policy
dilemmas (Etheridge, 1984 ).

CONCLUSION
Health care was a shared function of private providers, local government
and charitable institutions before the turn of the century.

By the 1930s,
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advances in medical science and technology and the monopoly on medical
practice attained by the medical profession made health care a valuable
commodity. The American medical establishment had made enormous strides in
discovering and applying effective diagnostic and treatment procedures and, as
a result 9 physicians attained unprecedented autonomy and power.

Federal

intervention in health care; such as federal aid for hospital construction, liberal
tax laws regarding insurance coverage, and support of educating health
professionals, did not change the status quo constructed by the medical
profession. Health insurance, with its potential to alter the power relationships
of physicians and hospitals to society, left the health care market and its
payment mechanisms ir

, The result has been spiraling health care costs. A

number of factors con.

•Jte to the rise in costs, such as general inflation,

medical care cost increases, increases in utilization, aging of the population).
However, analysts believe that it has been the combination of federal health
care

programs (Medicare

and

Medicaid)

and

retrospective,

cost-based

reimbursement by third-parties that has contributed most to health care cost
inflation. The next chapter examines the response of the federal government to
health care costs and poses the research question addressed in this dissertation.

CHAPTERB
THE ERA OF COST-CONTAINMENT IN FEDERAL HEALTH POUCY

The principal problem in health care today is the need
for a workable mechanism to achieve a proper balance
between acceptable cost and an ensured level of quality.
At the core of the trade-off between cost and quality
faced by consumers, employers, and state and federal
governments is the question of how to pay the providers
of health care enough to get them to supply services, but
to do so in a way that is affordable for those paying the
bill (Meyer, 1983, p. 3).
The American hea

:are system is the nation's second largest industry,

employing 7.2 million ar,_ .vith a payroll of $360 billion in 1984 (Gibson, et al.,
1984). Consuming 10.7% of GNP ($42.5 billion in 198.5), it ranks third behind
defense and education, in terms of general public expenditures (Koch, 19&8).
Prior to the Depression, the U.S. health care system was a shared function of
the voluntary sector, responsible for establishing and operating hospitals, and
state and local governments, responsible for educating and training health care
personnel, public health, and medical care for the poor.

Significant social

legislation enacted during the Depression, such as unemployment insurance and
federal aid for health care for mothers and children, altered this historical
situation.

Federal initiatives after World War II expanded the number of

hospital beds and health care personnel, encouraged the spread of health
insurance to the middle class, and funded programs that provided greater access
to health care by disenfranchised groups; specifically the poor and elderly.
However, while these activities broadened access to health care, they also
fueled inflation in health care costs.

This chapter examines the federal
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government's retreat from the previous expansionary phase of national health
care policy (1945-1970) and the subsequent emphasis on regulation and marketbased competition for health care cost control.

Specifically, this chapter

examines the most revolutionary change in health care policy since the
enactment of the Medicare and Medicaid programs; that is, on Medicare's
Prospective Payment System (PPS).

REGULATION AND COMPETITION IN HEALTH CARE COST CONTROL

The high and persistently climbing cost of health care, especially hospital
care during the 1970s, made the search for ways to slow this trend a key
national policy issue. Iz

iition, the growing emphasis on cost containment by

the government, as well as by third-party payers, has sparked a national debate
regarding the direction of health care and forced providers and insurers to
reconfigure their operations in an attempt to protect their patient bases and
marketshares (Iglehart, 19&5). Two national policy approaches to the cost issue
can be identified:

regulating providers and introducing competition into the

medical marketplace.

These national policy actions have reshaped the

American health care system in ways that greatly diverge from the pattern
developed over the last 100 years.
Regulation Strategies
It was clear by the 1970s that the massive post-war infusion of federal
funds into the health care system not only failed to produce an adequate supply
or distribution of health resources, but also contriruted to cost increases. As
Judith Lave (1984) pointed out:
Retrospective cost-based third-party reimbursement, in
a world with little cost-sharing for patients and an openended entitlement, is now considered to have been the
major factor contributing to the cost explosion (p. 67).
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Pressure for national regulatory reform of retrospective reimbursement
increased during the 1970s as public policy sought ways of changing the
incentives within the health care system (Brown, 1986). Chief among the policy
initiatives during the seventies included a wage and price freeze; controls on
Medicare reimbursement; peer review organizations, consumer involvement in
health planning and an attempt by the Carter Administration to control hospital
costs nation-wide.
Economic Stabilization Act. Most cost-containment proposals have focused
on controlling increases in costs for physician and hospital care. The Economic
Stabilization Act of 1971 authorized President Nixon to freeze wages and
prices. Although appli·

. the whole economy for only 90 days, controls were

applied to the health care sector for over three years, from 1971 through 1974
(Morris, 1984). The program limited doctors' fees to an annual increase of 2.5
percent and hospital charges to 6 percent, or about half the inflation rate in
medical care preceding the freeze (Starr, 1982). Health care prices began to
rise, however, when controls were lifted.
The 1972 Social Security Amendments. A second attempt to control costs
was made with the Social Security Amendments of 1972 (PL 92-603).

The

Amendments enacted important changes in the Social Security Act and
represented the first attempt to reduce program costs.

Most of the Act's

amendments dealt with controlling costs, including limitations on payments for
capital expenditures, increased cost-sharing

for

Medicare

beneficiaries,

encouragement of Health Maintanence Organization (HMO) demonstration
projects and Part B (Medicare physician services program) deductible increases.
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While the amendments expanded coverage to the disabled and those with renal
failure, the bill also included two significant cost-containment provisions.
Section 222 directed the Secretary of the then Department of Health,
Education and

Welfare (DHEW) to establish demonstration projects to

determine the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing a prospective payment
system in which fixed payment rates determined in advance of the provision of
care for Medicare hospital reimbursement would be used and to grant waivers
from the Medicare program to states wanting to experiment with prospective
reimbursement prior to a national system implementation.

Several states,

including Maryland and Washington, requested such waivers. Section 223 set
limits, for the first timf

:1

the 'reasonable' cost to be paid under the Medicare

program (Gornick, et aL, . 98.5; Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986). The rate was capped
at 112 percent of the average for similar institutions (Demkovich, 1981).
PSROs. With the 1972 Amendments, Congress established 190 Professional
Standard Review Organizations {PSROs), made up of groups of physicians who
were

to

independently

review

Medicare

utilization,

to

guard against

unnecessary hospitalizations and procedures that would add to the cost of the
Medicare program. AMA opposition modified much of the original legislation
{for example, community norms rather than national norms became the basis of
the assessments) and weakened the authority of the PSROs.

In the final

legislation, PSROs were to review: 1) whether Medicare services were
medically necessary; 2) whether admissions and lengths of stay were
appropriate; 3) whether care met professionally rec~gnized standards; and 4)
whether services should be delivered in an inpatient or less expensive outpatient
setting {Senate Finance Committee, 1986). Over the years, the program fell
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into disfavor as costs continued to rise faster than the cost of living. Congress
particularly grew impatient with the program after the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) reported that the program was costing about as much as it was
saving and was causing hospitals to make up lost Medicare dollars by charging
privately insured patient's more (i.e., cost shifting) (Demkovich, 1983b; Spiegel
& Kavaler, 1986).

From 1972 through 1981, a gradual tightening of rules

reduced Medicare's growth somewhat but cost containment hopes in Medicare
were waiting for the development of legislation that would reform the payment
system (Demkovich, 1981; 1982).
Health Planning. Another regulatory approach to the cost problem involved
consumer participation

health services development.

Congress passed the

Health Planning and Resources Development Act (PL 93-641) in 1974. The bill
authorized spending $1 billion over three years to establish a national network
of some 200 local Health Systems Agencies (HSAs), run by boards with
consumer majorities representative of their areas and fifty State Health
Planning and Development Agencies (SHPDAs). The goal was to give states,
local communities and consumers a say in planning for health resources as a
way to limit duplication of facilities and services and containing costs. The
centerpiece of the legislation was the Certificate of Need (CON) provision
requiring health care institutions (hospitals, nursing homes) to get prior state
approval for capital expenditures and acquisition of major medical equipment
(Havighurst, 1986).
The original proposals for health planning placed responsibility in local,
independent, consumer controlled boards accountable only to the federal
government. The boards were to review proposals for new projects, focus on
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the development of three year health plans, and close down hospitals and
nursing home beds they decided were unnecessary.

HSAs were not given

authority to implement their decisions in the final legislation however. Instead,
they had to send their recommendations to the State Health Planning and
Development Agencies for final decisions. The state agencies were then free to
follow the suggestions or reverse them.

State agencies rarely refused

certificate of need applications and, when they did, the hospitals mounted legal
challenges of their authority that eventually led to out of court settlements in
favor of the hospitals. Thus, HSAs had review responsibility but no authority.
The whole effort wa<> doomed to failure due to the fact that certificate of
need laws, like PSRO l;;

were based on the assumption that the cost problem

was one of spending on facilities and services with marginal returns versus
perverse incentives within the payment systems.

Additionally, Congress's

refusal to give the agencies any control over physicians' office practices, the
allocation of health care capital or the reimbursement system that determined
the flow of revenues hampered the HSA's efforts to control duplication of
services and costs (Havighurst, 1986).
The Carter Hospital Bill.

Regulatory strategies for cost containment

culminated in 1977. The Carter Administration, recognizing the limits of the
Nixon Administration's decentralized HMO approach, proposed new and farreaching legislation that would impose a fixed limit on the annual growth of
hospital costs (the over9-ll rate of hospital cost inflation plus one percent)
(Morris, 1984). The Carter proposal contained an important tenet: controls on
costs should not adversely affect quality and quantity of care making equity for
beneficiaries a dominant goal in Carter's plan (Morris, 1984).

The formula-
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based Carter proposal differed significantly from previous cost-containment
efforts that had relied on public determination of the appropriateness of capital
spending, as in the health planning certificate of need legislation, or of
treatment costs, as in cost-based reimbursement founded in "reasonable
charges" (Morris, 1984). The uniqueness of the Carter bill lay in the arbitrary
nature of the proposed constraint; i.e., across the board controls on hospital
costs and thus, the hospital's bottom line.

Effective political and special

interest group opposition defeated the bill in 1979.
With the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the health care cost debate
shifted to new ground. The defeat of the Carter hospital cost containment bill
in 1979 put an end to f(

al efforts to solve cost problems system-wide. The

federal government now concentrated on controlling costs in its own health
programs, specifically Medicare and Medicaid.

The major reforms of this

period were the introduction of competition in the medical market through the
encouragement of Health Maintenance Organizations, stricter enforcement of
the anti-trust laws, tax-based incentives for health insurance coverage, and the
Prospective Payment System (PPS) of Medicare.
Competition Strategies
The emergence of competition strategies in health care can be traced back
to the early 1970s with the passage of the HMO legislation and antitrust
decisions that gradually changed the American health care system (Brown,
1986; Ha vighur st, 1986). A1 though there had always been competition in health
care, such as competition among physicians for patients, it never conformed to
the economic market ideal nor was it based on price (Sapolsky, 1986;
Havighurst, 1986; Starr, 1982).
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While competition-based health care proposals differ in detail, they also
share several common elements including: (1) the requirement that employers
offer, and equally contribute to, multiple 'choice of plan' insurance options as a
means of providing cost-conscious choices for consumers and prudent buyer
concepts for bill payers, including HMO options; (2) placement of a cap on the
dollar value of employer contributions to employee health insurance plans that
are excluded from the taxable income of the employee; (3) the design of health
insurance plans that provide for cost sharing, in the form of co-payments and
deductibles, by the insured; and (4) the development of Medicare voucher
systems under which elderly and disabled persons would receive a fixed value
voucher to purchase a q:

'fied health insurance plan (Brown, 1986; Demkovich,

1982; Greenberg, 1983; :<och, 1988; Lee & Benjamin, 1987; Meyer, 1983b;
Shapiro, 1983; Starr, 1982).
Competition-based cost containment strategies have always intended to
create a more efficient health care market to reduce costs (Greenberg, 1983).
In the view of competition advocates, regulatory strategies overlook the
fundamental forces driving spending in health care: that is, open-ended federal
tax subsidies supporting the purchase of increasingly comprehensive insurance;
retrospective cost-based reimbursement systems that reward inefficiency; and
regulation iself, which protects profligate providers and impedes innovation. In
contrast, greater reliance on market-oriented incentives would encourage
health care providers to deliver services of acceptable quality at a lower cost
and encourage consumers to select more efficient providers (Meyer, 1983b).
The common denominator of these competition strategies is that insurerbased competition; that is, competition among third-party payers, alternative
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delivery systems, preferred provider groups (PPOs) and health maintenance
organizations (HMOs), is the most viable form of comP.etition in healt:h care
(Greenberg, 1983). Consequently, competition proposals focus on strengthing
consumer cost-consciousness, eliminating regulation, and enforcing antitrust
laws (Havighurst, 1983a).

Federally-sponsored competition initiatives of the

early 1970s focused on the development of HMOs.
HMOs- The New Health Strategy. Partly in response to a national health
insurance bill to be introduced by Senator Edward Kennedy and partly in
response to increased federal expenditures in health care, President Nixon
announced "a new national health strategy" in February, 1971, in which health
maintenance organizat
medical care.

(HMOs) were the major innovations proposed for

The key feature of an HMO, or prepaid health plan, is the

combination of insurance and health care delivery in one organization. HMOs
would give a fairly comprehensive range of health care services in return for a
fixed annual or monthly payment that was to be independent of the enrollee's
use of services.

Due to this assumption of financial risk, HMOs are

theoretically motivated to discourage the inappropriate use of services and
encourage alternatives to costly hospitalization, such as primary and home
health care and wellness or prevention services.

HMOs provided the Nixon

Administration with a policy option that "reduced no one's benefits, took no
steps toward national health insurance and was non-regulatory" (Brown, 1986, p.
575).

In 1970 there were some 100 HMOs, enrolling about 2 percent of the
population. The Administration's goal was to help create 1,700 HMOs by 1976,
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enrolling 40 million people.

By 1980, it was hoped that 90 percent of the

population would have HMOs available to them (Brown, 1986). By 1973, Nixon's
Health Maintenance Organization Act was passed.

It established financial

assistance to promote federally qualified HMO development. Although HMOs
had been around for 50 years, public acceptance of them had been slow due to
physician reluctance to participate and the public perception of substandard
quality of care. The HMO Act attempted to enhance HMO acceptability by
establishing mechanisms for certifying federally qualified HMOs. Between 1973
and 1983, the federal government pumped $14.5 million into grants and $219
million in loans for HMO development. The private sector invested $348 million.
Even with this infusion

:unds, public acceptance has remained slow. By 1980,

some 23.5 HMOs served c.iiy 5 to 6 percent of the total population.
HMOs have grown slowly in the face of immense structural and political
barriers within the health industry, and until recently, have been a small,
geographically localized phenomenon (Evans, 1986). While federal subsidies to
HMOs represented government sponsored expansion of consumer choice,
pressure from the medical profession kept many of the existing barriers to HMO
competition, such as professional norms as the "standard of practice", in the
1973 legislation. HMOs were heavily regulated as a condition of government
support and were therefore handicapped when competing with traditional
insurers and providers. Nevertheless, HMOs have been able to demonstrate an
ability to contain costs (Havighurst, 1986). Since 1980, however, HMO growth
has been occurring at more than 20 percent per year. By 1986 some .500 HMOs
served 1.5 million people, or about 8 percent of the population, with
approximately 87.5,000 elderly in Medicare-sponsored HMOs (Brown, 1986;
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Cohodes, 1987; Renn, 1987; Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986).

A New York Times

business and health column painted a rosy future for HMOs, noting that HMO
growth "displays vigor" (Friedman, 198.5).
Enforcement of the Sherman Anti-trust Ad:.

The

success

of

the

competition strategies advocated by competition advocates depended upon the
application of antitrust laws in order to inhibit the medical professions' long
established restraints of trade.

Thus, along with the rise in interest in

competition in health care was an interest in broadening the definition of
antitrust laws, since "only when the antitrust laws began to be applied to
provider conduct" did competition become a realistic policy option in health
care (Havighurst, 1983b

29.5).

For the first eighty-five years after the enactment of the Sherman AntiTrust Act of 1890 there was little application of antitrust principles to the
medical profession (Havighurst, 1983b; Kopit, 1983). In only one case (the U.S.
versus the American Medical Association and the District of Columbia Medical
Society) had the law been applied. The St•preme Court held that the defendants
had violated the Sherman Act by conspiring against a prepaid health plan
(Kopit, 1983). The inactivity by the Federal Trade Commission has often been
explained away as a result of a implied exemption, based on a 19.52 decision
(U.S. versus Oregon State Medical Society), that existed for the learned
professions (Havighurst, 1983b; Kopit, 1983). In this case, the Supreme Court
stated:
Since no concerted refusal to deal with .private health
associations has been proved, we need not decide
whether it would violate the antitrust laws. We might
observe in passing, however, that there are ethical
considerations where the historic direct relationship
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between patient and physician is involved which are
quite different from the usual considerations prevailing
in ordinary commercial matters. This court has
recognized that forms of competition usual in the
business world may be demoralizing to the ethical
standards of a profession (Kopit, 1983, p. 323).
The perception that physicians were not engaged in trade or commerce
thus became the norm. Furthermore, the Court went out of its way to indicate
a tolerant disposition toward the professional sponsorship of boycott if
undertaken by professional bodies. Havighurst (1983b) points out, however, that
the medical profession's de facto antitrust immunity probably owed less to
judicial belief in professional standards than to the inability of federal law to
reach localized conduct not affecting interstate commerce.
profession enjoyed a vi

The medical

i.l exemption from the antitrust laws until the mid-

1970s.
A crucial event in the establishment of market-oriented policy in health
care was the Supreme Court's 197 5 Goldfarb decision (Havighurst, 1983b; Kopit,
1983). In Goldfarb versus Virginia State Bar, the Court decisively rejected the
idea that the "learned professions" were exempt from antitrust scrutiny,
rejected any claim by the medical profession to a "professional" exemption, and
interpreted federal antitrust laws to mandate competition in the provision of
professional services (Havighurst, 1986; 1983b; Kopit, 1983).

With Goldfarb,

and with subsequent cases involving both hospital and professional services, the
Court made jurisdictional requirements substantially easier to satisfy in cases
involving health care and, as a result, changed de facto federal policy toward
the health care sector. These decisions by the Court and subsequent Federal
Trade Commission actions in the enforcement of the Sherman Act undermined
numerous industry-sponsored barriers to competition (Havighurst, 1986).
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The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act. Under Reagan, federal Medicare
and Medicaid polic;:ies changed significantly. Foremost among the changes were
cuts in the Medicaid program and changes in the method of payment to
hospitals for Medicare inpatient services. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of
1981 (OBRA) incorporated extensive budget reductions in Medicaid with new
flexibility in hospital reimbursement policies, both designed to reduce the
number of persons eligible for Medicaid.

The bill also consolidated 19

categorical health programs into four block grants, including preventive health
and health services, alcohol and drug abuse, mental health programs, primary
care and maternal health (Davis, 1985). Changes in Medicare involved trimming
$1.4 billion from expen(::,ures, primarily by increasing the Medicare deductible
to $75 which was more ;.han 12 percent higher than that scheduled under the
automatic adjustment procedures set by previous legislation (Brown, 1986;
Demkovich, 1983b).

Tax-Based Competition Proposals. In addition to cutting the budget, the
Reagan

Administration

set

about

deregulating

industries

(i.e.,

the

communications industry, interstate commerce, aviation). Health care was no
exception.

Having stated in his inaugural address that he would propose

sweeping pro-competitive legislation in the health care sector as a way of
containing soaring medical care costs, Reagan's appointee of Health and Human
Services (HHS), Richard Schweiker, set up a task force in 1981 to examine the
problem of rising costs and to draw up specific proposals to combat it
(Demkovich, 1982a,b).

The task force drew heavily upon proposals already

before Congress (e.g., the Gebhardt-Steckman pro-competition bill of 1980) and
presented the President with a list of options that has served as the basis for
the Administration's "pro-competition" health care legislative proposals.
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To stimulate competition in the private sector, the Administration
considered a number of tax-based proposals while, in the public sector, the
Administration recommended converting Medicare to a "voucher" system
(Demkovich, 1982a,b).

The private sector proposals used tax mechanisms to

achieve cost controls. One part of the tax-cap proposal would limit the ability
of employees to exclude the full amount of employer contributions to their
health insurance premiums from their taxable income. The second part would
put a ceiling on the amount of such contributions that employers can deduct as
business expenses. Both parts were designed to have employees paying for some
of the insurance they received free and, in that way, become more aware of
how much health care thf'.y were using and how much it cost. While a part of
most competition bills hmoduced thus far had a cap on employee deductions,
HHS added a new twist. Instead of just proposing a cap on employees, HHS
added a cap to the deductible made by employers on their contrabutions to
health care coverage (Demkovich, 1982a).

In addition, the Administration

proposed having employers offer multiple health plans, including at least one
HMO option, for employees to choose from.
The tax-cap proposals were based on the assumptions that (1) most firms
would continue paying health premiums instead of shifting to other fringe or
cash benefits; (2) that premium costs would escalate more rapidly than
inflation; and (3) that other cash paid to employees would be taxable, adding to
federal revenues. In the long run, HHS believed that pressure on employers and
employees to reduce costs would lead to pressure o_n insurance companies to
offer more cost-efficient insurance policies. However, the insurance industry
viewed the proposal as the result of political considerations; i.e., not wanting to
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raise taxes in an election year. The insurance industry feared the real outcome
would lead to reduced insurance sales and thus opposed the plans (Demkovich,
1982a).
Another major criticism of the tax-cap proposals was that they leave out a
sizeable segment of the population; that is, those that work for governments
and non-profit institutions. The proposal would thus have less of an impact on
consumers behavior than anticipated. Further, the proposals had the potential
of alienating big corporations, including private insurers, by raising the question
of what constitutes a legitimate business expense and thus threatened the whole
range of corporate benefits (e.g., pensions, vacations, etc;:.). Moreover, there
was a question of the pr;
(Demkovic;:h, 1982a).

iety of using the tax code to determine health policy

Yet most health policy analysts agreed that the tax

subsidy to employers significantly contributed to the over-purchasing of
insurance.
The proposals to have employers offer multiple insurance options have been
criticised by industry as adding significantly to their administrative costs and
that requiring such options through legislation c;:onstitued "regulation in
disguise" (Demkovich, 1982a, p. 19.5). Further, critics argued, multiple choice
options merely shifts controls from doctors and hospitals to employers and
insurers and would, in reality, do little to slow the rate of health care cost
increases which were seen as being physician driven. Effective opposition to
the tax-cap plans has kept the proposals in Congressional committees since they
were introduced.
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Of more immediate concern to the Reagan Administration, however, was
getting control of government spending for health care, specifically slowing the
growth of the Medicare and Medicaid programs.

Specifically, the Reagan

Administration "competition" proposals have focused on two approaches to the
cost issue:

one, a voucher program and two, the adoption of a prospective

payment system for health care providers.
Voudters for Medicare.

Under

the

proposed

voucher

system, the

government would pay a percentage (e.g., 9.5% under the 1982 Reagan
Administration plan) of the average annual Medicare payment to those eligible
beneficiaries who voluntarily enroll in a private plan; either a traditional feefor-service plan or an

'iO. If the private plans cost less than the voucher

payment, the beneficiaries could keep the difference; if they cost more, the
beneficiary would have to make up the difference.

Additionally, vouchers

would result in the development of efficient health insurance plans by
encouraging private insurers to compete for their "share" of the $32 billion
Medicare market (Demkovich, 1981; 1982a,b).
The major concern with the voucher proposals, as well as with the tax-cap
proposals, was with adverse selection; that is, sicker people choosing higher
cost but more comprehensive plans and healthier people choosing less costly but
also less comprehensive ones. Some critics of the system contend that adverse
selection could be a major problem if physicians and hospitals encourage
chronic Medicare patients to enroll in the higher reimbursement private plans.
"Government could suffer financial losses ••• if private insurers attract betterthan-average risks to voluntarily leave the Medicare program" (Demkovich,
1982a, p. 196}.
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Although a potentially lucrative market, commercial insurers have been
the most outspoken opponents of vouchers. In addition to the issue of adverse
selection, commercial insurers argue that they can't compete with the federal
government which benefits from an average 17 percent "discount" negotiated
with Medicare participating hospitals and which would have little or no
marketing costs (Demkovich, 1981, 1982a,b).
Senior citizen advocates have been extremely skeptical of the voucher plan
and see it as a "backdoor way to limit benefits and, more fundamentally, to
undermine the link between benefits and services" on which the Medicare
program was built (Demkovich, 1981, p. 1616}. Furthermore, advocates for the
elderly are concerned : , ott if the voucher amount isn't tied to increases in
health care costs, the elderly will end up paying a greater share of their
medical bills out-of-pocket.

This could result in more elderly ending up as

Medicaid patients or as medically indigent "bad debt" for the hospitals
(Demkovich, 1981). Critics also argue that it is unlikely that a voucher system,
by itself, would check the inflation driving Medicare and believe it merely
shifts the burden of health care costs to private payers (Demkovich, 1981).
Opposition to the voucher plan from labor, senior citizen groups, insurance
companies and a Congress reluctant to adopt vouchers after making substantial
cuts in the program under OBRA have effectively kept the plan in check and
the Reagan Administration was only able to implement demonstration projects
of the plan (Demkovich, 1982a}.

Finally, the HHS task force also urged the

President to limit the growth of Medicare by implementing a prospective
payment system.

The next section describes the two pieces of legislation,

enacted by the Reagan Administration that have radically altered the face of
the American health care system.
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The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act. The Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, P.L. 97-248

(TEFRA) substantially changed

Medicare's hospital reimbursement system.

TEFRA was the first legislation

since the 1972 Amendments to Social Security designed to actually reduce
Medicare costs and not just the rate of growth (Long et al., 1982). Previously,
Medicare paid hospitals for inpatient services on the principle of "reasonable
and necessary costs" (OTA, 1985, p. 23).

Hospitals submitted annual cost

reports detailing expenses incurred by Medicare patients.

Medicare's fiscal

intermediaries (e.g., Blue Cross) audited them to arrive at the allowable costs
for final reimbursement (which included operating and capital cost factors).
Prior to TEFRA, the only limit to reimbursement was a cap on inpatient
operating costs known a:. Section 223 limits, established in 1972. Nonroutine
costs, such as ancillary services and capital costs, were exempted from the
Section 223 limits.
TEFRA set a three year ceiling (or target rate) on the annual rate of
increase in operating costs per discharge for inpatient hospital services. The
target represented the hospital's own cost per Medicare discharge, adjusted for
inflation. TEFRA also provided for a small incentive payment to hospitals that
operated below the specific cost target. Under this provision, hospitals could
keep up to half the difference between their target amount and their actual
costs.

The incentive payment, however, was capped at five percent of the

target cost per discharge. TEFRA set no limits on capital costs, direct costs of
medical education, or outpatient services which

rem~ined

"pass-through" items

(Arthur Young, 1983; Demkovich, 1981; Ernst & Whinney, 1983; OTA, 1985).
TEFRA was expected to reduce Medicare reimbursement by 4.5 percent over a
three year period by imposing a progressively tighter ceiling on reimbursement
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for routine room and board costs as well as the costs of ancillary services (i.e.,
laboratory texts, x-rays, etc.), it fixed 'target rates' based on a hospital's actual
operating costs, and it provided the first incentive system for hospitals to lower
costs (Demkovich, 1982b; Koch, 1988).
TEFRA also included a provision requiring the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) to develop legislative proposals for a prospective
payment system for Medicare's hospital insurance trust (HI) to replace the
retrospective cost reimbursement system.

The proposals were to be to

Congress no later than December 31, 1982 (Demkovich, 1982b; Ernst &
Whinney, 1983; OTA, 198.5; Arthur Young, 1983). This new payment system was
intended to establish th· federal government as a prudent purchaser of health
care services, reduce Medicare's outlays for inpatient hospital care and
maintain an acceptable level of quality and access to care for beneficiaries
(Arthur Young, 1983; Guterman & Dobson, 1986).
TEFRA was a significant change in the reimbursement mechanism for
Medicare and introduced the use of Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs) (a system
of 467 mutually exclusive categories of illnesses or combinations of medical
problems) as the basis for computing a hospital's case mix index to determine
operating cost limitations.

With TEFRA, the basis of reimbursement was

shifted from an implicit per-diem system to an explicit per case system; that
is, case mix was incorporated into the payment system and the rate of
allowable increase in costs per case was capped.

While reimbursement

continued to be retrospective and based on reasonable costs, the application of
explicit per-case reimbursement radically altered the concept of Medicare
reimbursement.
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TEFRA cut a total of $2.4 billion from Medicare expenditures although these
savings were primarily the result of reductions in payments to hospitals and
large increases in beneficiary

cost sharing

(Demkovich,

1983b; Major

Legislation of the Congress, 1983).
While TEFRA profoundly changed Medicare's hospital reimbursement
methods, it provided few financial incentives for hospitals to reduce their cost
per discharge below the limit set by the rules. Other weaknesses in the TEFRA
legislation included the fact that the system was still retrospective, which
meant that the costs to the government for Medicare still couldn't be predicted
"in advance;" providers (e.g., hospitals) lacked sufficient incentive to spend
below the target costs:;

by the government, and finally, hospital's were faced

with cost reporting systems that were confusing, complicated and hard to
monitor (Arthur Young, 1983; Guterman & Dobson, 1986).

Despite TEFRA,

hospital costs continued to grow and Congress, faced with the forecast that
Medicare could be bankrupt within as little as four years, moved with "unusual
speed"

to

change

the

cost-based

reimbursement

system

of

Medicare

(Demkovich, 1983a; Wehr, 1983a,b).
The 19&3 Social Sec:urity Amendments. By 1983, almost all policy makers
and providers had agreed that a prospective reimbursement system would be
superior to the retrospective system then in place. The "hitch" was that no one
appeared ready to agree on which version of a fixed price system to implement
(Demkovich, 1982b).

For example, the American Hospital Association (AHA)

had outlined its version of a fixed-price system with payments based on each
hospital's 1982 cost per case. Inflation and the increased cost of technology
were built into the formula as were expansion and renovation costs. However,
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<::ritics argued that this formula would just <;:ontinue to reward ineffi<;:ient
behavior.

Alternatively, the Health Se<::urity Action Coun<;:il proposed a plan

that would <;over hospital <;:osts in the private se<;:tor as well as Medi<;:are and
Medi<;:aid <;:osts, and would extend <;:ost <;:ontrols to nursing home <;:harges,
do<::tors fees and "other health <;are <;:osts" (Demkovich, 1982b, p. 1981).
However, as with the Carter Administration's national hospital <;:ost-control bill,
it did not appear likely that such a broad plan would be politi<::ally feasible.
The Health Care Finan<::ing Administration (HCF A), the agen<;:y in charge of
the Medi<::are program, was also developing its own prospe<::tive payment plan.
HCFA's goal was to establish a payment system that addressed two major
issues: one, <;:on<;:erning

t·

e unit of <;are on whi<::h to base the payment while the

second <;:on<;:erned the mechanism for setting rates.

In its deliberations on

fixed-price systems, HCFA rejected proposals that advo<;:ated paying per day
(such as the existing reimbursement system) since per day payment had the
incentive to keep patients longer.

HCFA also rejected schemes based on

payment for each service, which encouraged overuse and payment based on
paying per case due to the fact that this could lead hospitals to skim off the
most profitable patients and reject sicker ones who might require longer
hospitalizations.
Other payment proposals considered by HCFA included negotiating hospital
budgets in advance, which had been experimented with in Rhode Island under
the waiver program. However, with almost 7,000 hopsitals in the nation, it was
considered too complex and cumbersome a plan. The Budget Review System,
utilized in another Medicare waiver state, New Jersey, was rejected for the
same reasons. HCFA also seriously <;:onsidered a "<::ompetitive bidding scheme"
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but rejected the plan based on the concern that under competitive bidding, if
the proposals came in too high, "they would throw the Administration's budget
figures out of whack". A capitation scheme was also considered but rejected
because there had been "too little experience" with the HMO option to
implement it on a national level (Demkovicll, 1982b, p. 1982).
The Health Care Financing Administration finally decided to go with a
predetermined reimbursement rate plan that would pay hospitals per diagnosis
since this method allowed the government to more accurately predict costs and
the system took into account the fact that some hospitals treat patients who
need more care than others, an element missing in most other PPS proposals
(Demkovich, 1982b).

MEDICARE'S PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM
The prospective payment plan proposed by the Reagan Administration,
based on HCFA proposals, was outlined in the fall of 1982. The plan advocated
replacing the existing Medicare hospitalization (Part A) cost reimbursement
system with one that paid a standardized price for the treatment of each of 467
medical conditions or combination of conditions referred to as DiagnostisRelated Groups (DRGs).

Each price reflected the national average costs for

treating that condition based on the 1981 average inpatient operating costs per
case for each DRG, based on a 20 percent sampling of all Medicare c;;laims. The
Administration's proposal recommended conversion to the plan within one year
of implementation and that DRG prices would be updated periodically at the
discretion of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Wehr, 1983b). In
contrast

to

most

Administration's

bill

fixed-rate
would

proposals
apply

only

advocated
to

the

at

the

Medicare

time,

the

program
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and would vary payment rates according to the type of diagnosis based on a
single rate for all hospitals in the country (although adjustments would be made
for teaching expenses, capital costs and wage variations). Both the AHA and
Administration's versions of PPS would exempt hospitals with fewer than 100
beds (Demkovich, 1982b; Wehr, 1983b).
The proposal submitted by HHS resembled a hospital payment plan already
implemented in New Jersey. The plan, begun in 1980 and phased in over two
years, represented the culmination of many years of cost-containment efforts
by New Jersey policy makers. Since the 1960s, New Jersey had a number of
legislative actions implemented in order to control health care costs including a
cap on Blue Cross payme•itf> to certain types of hospitals; a prospective budget
review system, and the Standard Hospital Accounting and Rate Evaluation
(SHARE) project. In an extensive review of the SHARE Project, Rosko (1984)
suggests that the SHARE program did help to contain hospital costs but at the
same time threatened the financial viability of some inner city hospitals.
Rosko concluded that surburban hospitals were able to shift costs while inner
city hospitals were not.

By the mid-1970s, however, SHARE was abandoned

because it failed to encourage cost containment by hospitals enough (Spiegel &
Kavaler, 1986). After the SHARE program, New Jersey received a $3 million
grant from HCF A to develop a prospective reimbursement system using DRGs.
In 1978, New Jersey passed a law mandating the gradual implementation of a

per case payment system covering all payers.

A hospital rate setting

commission was given power to tie payment rates directly to the patient's DRG
and in 1980, the plan began being phased in. By 1982, all New Jersey hospitals
were covered under the system.
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Unlike the Reagan plan, the New Jersey DRG average costs per case were
developed from data on each hospital's own costs as well as those of all other
similar major teaching, minor teaching, and non-teaching hospitals in the state
and included direct patient care costs, indirect costs (overhead), allowances for
capital facilities replacement, bad debt and charity care, and working capital
costs. The Reagan plan was based on a single, fixed cost versus a rate based
partly on a state-wide average and partly on each individual hospital's costs and
would not allow for exemptions from the standard price except for patients
with longer than average hospital stays (outliers), regional variations in labor
costs, and for hospitals which were the sole source of hospital care in a
community. Uncompensated care, bad debt and charity care, and indirect costs
were not figured into the Administration's proposal.
Nor did the Reagan plan cover all payers of hospital bills (e.g., Blue
Cross/Blue Shield, private insurers, businesses, Medicaid) as did the New Jersey
plan. Psychiatric, children's, and long-term care hospitals were exempted from
the proposal.

Further, those covered under the plan would no longer be able to

appeal the new fixed prices judicially as they could under the existing law.
Their only recourse was to either convince HCF A that the rates were
insufficient or to stop treating Medicare patients (Wehr, 1983b).

However,

since hospital incomes from Medicare ranged from 30 to 60 percent of
revenues, HHS had an upper hand in the battle over PPS provisions.
The Administration's proposal was based on two assumptions: one, that
some care delivered in hospitals is unnecessary or produced inefficiently (OT A,
198.5) and, two, that hospital cases can be categorized into "clinically coherent
groups that are reasonably similar in resource consumption", either in terms of
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cost or length of stay {Iglehart, 1982, p. 1289).

If the assumption about

inefficient hospital care was correct, then cost savings would be achieved under
PPS without sacrificing the patient's health or welfare, provided the incentive
inherent in the payment system led to appropriate changes in hospital and
physician behavior (Fessler & Wehr, 1983a,b; OTA, 198.5; Wehr, 1983b).
Thus, instead of paying for the cost of all services that are delivered to a
patient, Medicare would now pay hospitals a fixed payment, set in advance, and
based on the patient's diagnosis.

The amount of reimbursement would be

determined by the diagnosis (DRG) under which the patient is classified instead
of paying the costs of all services delivered to a patient who is hospitalized. To
encourage hospital efficiency, PPS allowed the hospital to keep the difference
between the Medicare payment rate and the actual patient costs as a profit.
However, the hospital must absorb the loss if its costs are higher than the
payment rate (Arthur Young, 1983; Demkovich, 1982, 1983a; Ernst & Whinney,
1983; Fessler & Wehr, 1983a,b; GAO, 1986; Grimaldi & Micheletti, 1983; OT A,
198.5; Wehr, 1983a).
Provisions of the Prospective Payment System.

The prospective payment

idea was not new. Congress had debated the idea of changing Medicare to a
prospective reimbursement system; that is, negotiating a flat amount for
services and rewarding lower-cost institutions by letting them keep whatever
surplus their efficiencies yielded, as early as 1970. But Congress was reluctant
to tamper with the system's basic structure and balked at what amounted to a
bonus for efficiency.

These factors, combined with fierce opposition to

prospective payment by the health care industry, blocked any serious
consideration of the plan at the time (Demkovich, 1981).
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When HHS originally outlined its PPS plan, it was expected that it would
provoke a long, thorough debate since it was believed that Congress would want
to examine the proposals carefully and consider alternatives before coming to
any conclusions and taking specific courses of action.

In addition, it was

believed that the Administration faced a monumental task in selling the plan,
not only to Congress but to hospitals, doctors and insurers (Oemkovich, 1982b).
Furthermore, the manadatory nature of the plan was seen to be similar to the
one the Carter Administration had advocated in its 1977 hospital costcontainment bill and was considered to be a potential sticking point in the
deliberations over the proposal. For example, health policy experts argued that
the Reagan Administration had abandoned its so-called competitive approach in
favor of a regulatory one.

Joseph Califano, President Carter's Secretary of

Health, Education, and Welfare until 1979, stated in a New York Times editorial
(October 20, 1982) that HHS's "proposed cap •••is in some respects tougher than
the Carter plan" and that the Reagan Administration had "rightly abandoned
free-market competition as the way to hold down inflation in health care."
The Administration countered that the reimbursement strategy was very
pro-competitive, especially in its potential to eliminate duplication of services
as hospitals begin to specialize in different treatments thus eliminating the
need for duplication of expensive staff and equipment. Proponents also argued
that the proposal would encourage other payers to utilize fixed price systems
using Medicare as an example of prudent purchasing of health care services
(Demkovich, 1982a). Still, it was expected that the. magnitude of the change
proposed for Medicare would provoke a great deal of controversy and require
much time and political finesse to get through Congress. However, this turned
out not to be the case as speed became of the essence (Demkovich, 1983a).
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The Administration's bill was introduced into the Senate in January, 1983
and into the House in February (Major Legislation of the Congress, 1984). The
bill was hurridly sent to the House Ways and Means Committee.

The

Committee basically endorsed the proposal but amended it to ease the impact
on hospitals, to give state hospital cost control programs more independence
and to restrict the Administration's authority to expand the new payment
system until a number of mandated studies of the effects of the system could
be evaluated.
The amendments to the Administration's proposal included: (1) to ease the
transition to the new system, Ways and Means decided that DRGs should be
phased in over a three year period as opposed to the Administration's plan to
impose the new rates immediately. During the transition period from TEFRA
to PPS, a declining portion of the total prospective rate was to be based on a
hospital's historical costs in a given base year and a gradually increasing portion
was to be based on a blend of federally determined regional and national DRG
rates.

Starting October 1, 1986, the PPS rates were to be based solely on

national averages; (2) while the Administration's plan allowed for only a few
adjustments to the national payment rates, Ways and Means added adjustments
for urban and rural hospitals and adjusted the payment formula to account for
teaching

costs

and

capital

expenses;

(3)

while

initial

rates

in

the

Administration's plan were based on 1981 data and provided for updates in the
DRGs to reflect changing technology and physician practice patterns at the
discretion of the Secretary of HHS, the panel set rates on 1983 data and
required annual updates for fiscal 1984 and 1985, to be based on changes in the
hospital goods and services index plus 1 percent. Ways and Means also set up a
panel of experts, called the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission
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(ProPAC), to recommend updates after 1986 and every four years thereafter;
(4) Ways and Means also exempted psychiatric, children's, rehabilitation and
long-term care hospitals from the plan unless Congress, and not the Secretary,
decided to include them; (.5) the revised plan also flatly excluded capital costs
from the system whereas the Administration's proposal had recommended
including them in the payment formula (thus capping them); and (6) while the
Administration's plan attempted to encourage state-wide hospital cost-control
demonstration projects to adopt DRGs as the payment formula, Ways and Means
reinforced state flexibility in deciding which payment formula to choose but
added new criteria to meet "Medicare Waiver" status.
Other subcommittee amendments included retaining most of the existing
authority for administrative and judicial review of Medicare payment decisions,
which the Administration had wanted to eliminate, but excluded DRG payment
rates from the review process. The Committee also required HHS to monitor
hospital admission patterns through a revised Peer Review program (PROs) and,
as a condition of eligibility for Medicare participation, required hospitals to
contract for such review. Further, the revised PPS plan required HHS/HCFA to
deny Medicare payments or to take other corrective action against hospitals
that manipulated the system with inappropriate changes in admission practices.
Finally, the Committee required HHS to conduct a number of studies on the
impact of PPS, including the appropriateness of different DRG rates for urban
and rural hospitals, the treatment of exceptionally expensive medical cases, the
inclusion of hospital capital costs in DRGs and the impact of the new system on
individual hospitals, classes of hospitals and "third-party" insurers and Medicaid
(Demkovich, 1983a; Fessler & Wehr, 1983a,b; Guterman & Dobson, 1986; OT A,
198.5; Wehr, 1983a,b).
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PPS Receives Speed)' Approvalo Very little was known about the way the
DRG-based Prospective Payment System actually worked; that is, (1) it was
being used by only one state (New Jersey), (2) the differences in the national
and state systems were pronounced (e.g., it was applied to all payers in New
Jersey versus just Medicare in the national program), and (3) there were very
little data available on the impact of the New Jersey system at the time the
Medicare system was being debated (analyses of how individual hospitals would
fare under the program were not available due to a two to three year lag in cost
reporting to HHS concerning the demonstration project).

Yet, given these

uncertainties and the magnitude of the change the system implied, the DRGbased Prospective Payment plan moved through Congress with remarkable
speed and little opposition (Demkovich, 1983a; Fessler & Wehr, 1983a,b; Wehr,
1983a,b).
Action on the legislation by the Ways and Means Committee came just two
months after it was outlined by the Administration and amendments to the plan
were approved by the Committee just two days after the Administration
produced its detailed legislative proposal. By contrast, the Carter cost control
plan was acrimoniously debated for three years before being "amended into
oblivion" (Wehr, 1983b, p. 456). Most conspicuous was the absence of strong
opposition by hospitals, doctors, Congressional Republicans, and the insurance
industry. In fact, the Federation of American Hospitals and the American
Hospital Association supported the legislation. Opposition to the plan was also
diluted because some groups were preoccupied with

o~her

health proposals (e.g.,

Blue Cross/Blue Shield were concerned about the tax-cap plans on employmentrelated health insurance) (Wehr, 1983b). By February, 1983, the

U.s. Senate

Subcommittee on Health was holding public hearings on the PPS system.
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While there wasn't nearly as much controversey over the proposal as had been
feared, the plan was far from universally accepted.

The private health

insurance industry argued that using prospective payment only for Medicare
would allow hospitals to make up lost dollars by shifting the costs to their
privately insured patients.

They suggested that HHS encourage states to

develop individual all-payers cost-control systems (Demkovich, 1982a, p. 705).
The American Medical Association and the American Nurses Association
urged Congress to move slowly; to take time to test the impact of PPS on costs
and on the quality of care before implementing on a national scale. Physicians
feared that PPS would institute policies in the hospital that would interfere
with their independent patient care decisions; specifically in the areas of
admissions, process of care, and length of stay. As a result, quality of care
would be threatened.

They also feared they would be liable for more

malpractice suits under these practice constraints. Health professionals were
also concerned about the limitations of the DRG-coding system itself.

For

example, they argued that there were only 467 codes, the DRG reimbursement
schedule favored surgical versus medical treatment, and that nursing factors
were not included in the payment formulas.

Finally, health professionals,

especially physicians, were concerned that if PPS came to pass, the next logical
step would be to extend the system to cover physician's services (GAO, 1986;
Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986).
Although acknowledging the need for reimbursement reform, senior
advocates were concerned about the impact of the program on Medicare
beneficiaries.

The American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), which

represents millions of retired individuals, had been a long-time supporter of
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prospective payment for Medicare.

In testimony before the U.S. Senate

Subcommittee on Health, AARP representatives stated that to avoid problems
of cost-shifting and quality, DRGs should: (1) cover all payers, all services, and
all hospitals; (2) include a severity of illness index; (3) establish strong
utilization review guidelines, including consumer representation; (4) promote
state plans for cost containment programs; and (.5) physician assignment should
be mandated in the plan (that is, physicians accepting what Medicare pays as
payment in full). Finally, to stagger implementation of the system to allow for
adequate evaluation of the impacts of the program (Wehr, 1983a).
Jacob Clayman, president of the National Council of Senior Citizens
(NCSC), which represented over 4 1/2 million senior citizens, stated in
testimony before the same committee that the Administration's plan should
"not be rushed through •••We cannot afford to harshly impose a national, largely
untested, plan that will affect •••the health of vulnerable citizens. If the system
goes through, however, the Council would expect it to apply to all payers"
(Demkovich, 1983a, p. 70.5). NCSC believed that applying prospective payment
toward the entire health care system would benefit all purchasers of health
care, including the federal government and Medicare beneficiaries (Senate
Subcommittee on Health, 1983).
Organized labor, which supported prospective pricing, agreed with the
senior advocates that any such system "ought to apply to all payers and include
all providers, including physicians" (Senate Subcommittee on Health, 1983).
However, the AFL-CIO had serious reservations about the suitability of DRGs
as the basis for prospective payment.

Although labor viewed DRGs as an

improvement over retrospective reimbursement, they were also concerned that
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there was little hard evidem;:e regarding the system's use in New Jersey to
warrant its adoption for the Medicare program.

As Robert McGlotten, a

representative from the AFL-CIO, stated in testimoney before the Senate
Subcommittee on Health, "We believe the jury is still out on the New Jersey
system, which has been the model for this proposal. We do not know enough
about the effectiveness of this approach to adopt it immediately for Medicare"
(Senate Subcommittee on Health, 1983, p. 263). Labor was concerned over the
cost of implementing the plan, the possibility of cost-shifting, the financial
difficulties of public and inner city hospitals, the control of teaching and
capital costs and the exemption of HMOs from the plan. In addition, the AFLCIO and the United Auto Workers joined with AARP to recommend the
extension of PPS to physician's services.
Business leaders, as represented by the Washington Business Group on
Health, while indifferent to DRGs per se, supported prospective payment in the
abstract but were concerned about the exemption of capital costs from the plan
and joined with labor to recommend that health planning be continued as a
means of controlling capital cost increases (Senate Subcommittee on Health,
1983).
Hospitals were also concerned, especially the larger, urban institutions that
cared for a large proportion of elderly and poor. Already in financial straits
under the cost-cutting effects of TEFRA, they criticized HHS for failing to
provide adequate information about the proposal for them to evaluate the
provisions prior to the bill's introduction to Congress. However, there were two
larger issues that concerned the hospitals. One, the House's amendments
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concerning capital costs, i.e., the money hospitals need to build and buy
equipment. Under the old system, Medicare reimbursed hospitals for a share of
their capital costs.

The Ways and Means bill would reimburse hospitals

differently, and presumably less generously. A second issue concerned 'return
on equity' payments under PPS. This issue, complex and esoteric to all except
the hospitals, pitted the for-profits against the not-for-profits.
Since 1966, Medicare had paid the for-profit hospitals an amount tied to
their net equity (capital minus debt) as a way of compensating investors for
their risk and to theoretically offset the not-for-profit sector hospital's tax
exempt status· that enabled them greater access to the tax exempt bond
market.

With inflation, interest rates soared and voluntary hospitals

complained that it put them at a disadvantage in the capital markets. They had
been attempting to get HCFA to give them equity payments as well.

The

Administration's bill proposed no change in return on equity until HHS could
figure out how to include capital in the reimbursement formula. The not-forprofit hospitals argued that it would be "disastrous" if Congress "perpetuated
the inequity" of the old system. The House amended the bill to phase out return
on equity payments over three years. The Senate Finance Committee, in its
version, voted to continue Medicare's capital and return-on-equity payments
through October, 1986.
The stakes for hospitals concerning this issue were high.

Medicare's

return-on-equity payments totaled $300 million in 1983 and about $3.2 billion
for capital costs. Under the existing law, payments -for capital costs averaged
$3,360 per bed to the not-for-profits and $3,760. to the for-profits.

return-on-equity was added, the per bed payments totaled $7,170.

When
Despite
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efforts to get the Senate's version adopted, a compromise was struck between
the Committees in which return-on-equity payments would continue to be made
through fiscal 1986 but their size was to be reduced and the provision on capital
costs was dropped altogether. In the end, all sides seemed satisfied with the
results (Demkovich, 1983a).
Thus, the final PPS provisions did not call for a precipitous leap into
prospective payment; there would be a phase-in of the system over three years
and payments would combine the hospital's costs with national rates. The DRG
rates were to be adjusted for numerous contingencies and were to be updated
annually. Although far different from the one evisioned by the Administration,
PPS appeared well on the way to passage almost as soon as it got to the
Congress. Even so, members of the House and Senate were nervous about the
bill's passage since the plan still needed the support of hospitals and physicians.
To speed approval of the plan, Ways and Means attached it to its legislation
to overhaul the Social Security System.

Members believed that an unusually

favorable opportunity for passage had been created by the popularity of the
Social Security rescue bill (HR 1900), by the open support of the bill by the two
major hospital groups (the American Hospital Association and the Federation of
American Hospitals), and by the absence of strenuous opposition by the AMA
and other critics of the program (Wehr, 1983a). Once it had become part of the
Social Security package and had won approval in the House, its supporters
reasoned that the Senate would have no choice but to do the same. And, since
the Social Security bill seemed veto-proof, the PPS plan would become law
before the hospital industry had time to change its mind (Demkovich, 1983a).
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A number of factors combined to provide uncharacteristic momentum for
the bill, including:

(1) the fear that, given time,

the AMA, the hospital

associations, and some members of Congress would mount the same vehement
opposition

to

the

PPS

plan

that

was

mounted

against

the

Carter

Administration's cost control proposal, which had resulted in months of debate,
dissention, and futile attempts at compromise; (2) the almost universal
recognition, even by senior citizen advocates, that Medicare urgently needed
reimbursement reform; and (3) the fact that even the hospital industry
supported the idea of prospective payment, since they saw the new plan as
"better" for them than the progressively harsher 1982 Medicare payment limits
set under TEFRA (Demkovich, 1982, 1983a; Speigel & Kavaler, 1986; Wehr,
1983}.

The Congressional committees with oversight of Medicare spread the

word that nothing was to be done to "derail the speeding train". They believed
if any of the interest groups had time to consider the plan more fully "the rosy
glow of optimism would fade" and the window of opportunity would close. It
might take "months before Congress would get another chance to consider
Medicare reform again" (Demkovich, 1983a, p. 704).
The House passed HR 1900 by a vote of 243 to 102 on March 24, 1983. The
Senate Finance Committee approved a similar measure (SB 1} on March 10,
1983 by a vote of 18 to 1 and sent the bill to the floor. Debate began on March
16 but Congressional leaders were optimistic that a package would be· sent to
President Reagan before the March 26th Easter break. The Senate approved
the bill on March 25, 1983 by a vote of 58 to 14 and it was signed into law (P.L.
98-21) on April 20, 1983 (Major Legislation of the Congress, 1984). One of the
biggest overhauls of the Social Security System, the bill also included a
fundamental change in hospital reimbursement; that is, the DRG-based PPS.
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The Problem With The Solution

Medicare's DRG-based Prospective Payment System (PPS) has the potential
to fundamentally change the character of the American health care system;
especially federally-financed health care programs. The reform of Medicare's
payment mechanism placed control in the hands of the price setter and
radically altered the relationship between hospital management, physicians and
the Medicare beneficiary. Although a DRG-based prospective payment system
was implemented in New Jersey and experience from this program provided the
basis for the national model, the new payment system, and the assumptions
behind it, were largely untested prior to the passage of the Social Security
Amendments of 1983.

Research conducted on state-initiated rate-setting

programs, such as New Jersey's, provided some information relevant to the
national system, but the data were fragmented, contradictory, and much of the
available information did not directly apply to a national system (e.g., many
applied to all-payers of hospital costs; some were mandatory, others voluntary)
(Bankhead, 1985; Eby & Cohodes, 1985; Hsaio & Dunn, 1987; OTA, 1983; Rosko
& Broyles, 1986).

Four states received waivers from the Medicare program

during the 1970s to institute variations on state-wide rate-regulation of hospital
care costs; the New Jersey program, Massachusetts, New York, and Maryland.
However, it has been the New Jersey program that HHS and legislators relied
on in creating the Medicare PPS system.
New Jersey's All-Payers System. New Jersey has had a history of activities
related to controlling the high cost of hospital <;are.

Under the state's

Commissioner of Insurance, a cap was placed on Blue Cross payments to some
hospitals.

This was followed by a prospective budget review system
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operated by the state health department. The next attempt at cost control
came under the Standard Hospital Accounting and Rate Evaluation (SHARE)
program, a more stringent mandatory budget review program applied to Blue
Cross and Medicaid patients and based on a reasonable cost per day. Rosko
(1984) analyzed the SHARE program between 1972 and 1982 and concluded that
SHARE did contain hospital costs but at the same time, the program threatened
the viability of many of the state's inner-city hospitals.

Rosko found that

surburba.n hospitals were able to shift costs under the program while inner-city
hospitals could not.
Shaffer (1983) also analyzed the SHARE program and

suggested that

although the program saved money, it was "abandonded because it failed to
introduce sufficiently powerful cost containment encouragement" (p. 390). In
the mid-1970s, New Jersey received a $3 million grant from the Health Care
Financing Administration to develop a prospective reimbursement system using
DRGs. In 1978, New Jersey passed a law mandating the gradual implementation
of a per case payment system covering all payers. A Hospital Rate Setting
Commission was established to monitor rates and the implementation of the
system, and in May, 1980, 26 New Jersey hospitals began billing under the new
system. By October, 1982, all New Jersey hospitals were under the program.
The first national conference focusing on DRGs occurred in November of
1983. The conference, titled ''Diagnosis-Related Groups: The Effect in New
Jersey: The Potential for the Nation," had participants reporting on the impact
of DRGs on a variety of topics, including financial departments, medical
records, quality assurance, data processing, nursing, payers, utilization review,
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teaching hospitals, inner-city hospitals, etc. Overall, the results were "mixed"
(Spiegler &: Kavaler, 1986).

Some analysts suggested that New Jersey's plan

caused the state's hospitals to inflate costs instead of reducing them.
According to a New York Times editorial (April 2, 1984), hospitals covered by
the program received $2.3 million more, on average, than they would have
under the old system. New Jersey's health commissioner, J. Richard Goldstein,
argued that the conclusion that the DRG system had failed were "premature" in
that the program had been in full operation for only one year, that the plan
covered the uninsured, helped inner-city hospitals maintain solvency, shortened
the time a person stayed in the hospital, eliminated cost-shifting and that startup costs of the program amounted to only one-half of one percent of a hospital's
total budget. Goldstein (1984) cited AHA data from 1980 to 1982 that showed
New Jersey had dropped from the eighteenth most expensive health care state
to the thirty-second and suggested that critics give the program more time to
prove itself.
The

first

comprehensive

evaluation of

the

program, produced by

researchers for the Health Research and Educational Trust of New Jersey
(HRET), produced a five volume report with topics ranging from the economic
impact (May & Wasserman, 1984) to the political development of the DRG
system (Dunham & Morone, 1983). In terms of the economic impact, May and
Wasserman (1984) found no definitive answer concerning cost-savings under the
program. They state that:
Even though some of the hospitals in New Jersey have
been reimbursed by DRGs for almost 4 years, it is still
not possible to state unequivocally that the system has
been a complete success or failure (p. 559).
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J. Joel May, HRET President, stated 11It is still not possible at this point
(February, 1984) to pass final judgment" on the DRG program (HRET, 1984, p.
xi). And Jeffrey Wasserman, HRET Vice President for Research, stated that:

While there is no proof that the DRG system has saved
money •••it is possible that the system has caused more
money to be spent than would otherwise have been spent
(Smith, 1983, p. 3).
In contrast, New Jersey's health commissioner claimed that the state saved

$299 million in 1983. The figure was later revised to $149 million to account
for a 13•.5 percent increase ($80 million) in payments to hospitals (Spiegel &:
Kavaler, 1986). And a Medical Economics editorial (Medical Economics, 198.5)
analyzing the program declared that the entire $3 billion hospital industry in
New Jersey showed a $3 million profit in 1983 and, while that was hardly more
than break-even, it was the first taste of profit for the state's hospitals since
DRGs began. Finally, an analysis of the state's hospitals by the New Jersey
Hospital Association (Spiegel &: Kavaler, 1986) presented data that showed New
Jersey hospitals charged $3861ess for a hospital stay than other hospitals across
the nation and $623less than other northeastern hospitals. Association officials
attributed the savings to the DRG-plan.
Analysis of other state rate-setting programs also provides some relevant
information regarding the impact of PPS-systems.

Eby &: Cohodes (198.5)

evaluated a number of studies and concluded that the one common finding
among the studies was that, while most data were contradictory and specific to
each program or setting, it was clear that

programs with mandatory

participation and compliance have, in fact, controlled the rate of increase in
hospital costs. This finding should be interpreted cautiously, however. Those
states with strict payment systems actually had higher overall costs than the
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national average and it was only the rates of cost increases that were lower in
PPS states than in states without PPS. Moreover, the effects on costs became
apparent only after the programs were in place for a few years. And, finally,
the comparability between rate setting programs and Medicare's PPS is highly
questionable (Anderson & Lave, 1984; Bankhead, 1985; Coelen & Sullivan, 1981;
Cromwell & Kanak, 1982; Dunham & Morone, 1983; Goldstein, 1984; HRET,
1984; Jaskow, 1981; May & Wasserman, 1984; Melnick et al., 1981; OT A, 1985;
Rosko, 1984; Shaffer, 1983; Sloan, 1983, 1981; Worthington&: Piro, 1982).
There was no clear cut impact of the DRG program in New Jersey when
the national program was being considered. In addition, there were a number of
differences between the New Jersey program and the DRG-based PPS proposal
before Congress.

For instance, (1) the New Jersey plan covered all-payers

versus the Medicare-only PPS plan; (2) each hospital in New Jersey had a
separate and individualized set of rates for all 467 DRGs based on hospital plus
state-wide average costs not just the average national rates proposed by the
Reagan Administration; (3) uncompensated care, bad debts, and charity care
were all fully reimbursed under the New Jersey system and are not under
Medicare PPS; (4) outpatient services in New Jersey are paid at a flat rate,
with no association to DRGs; (5) the Reagan Administration's proposal
attempted to extend DRGs to outpatient care in the near future while New
Jersey's covered outpatient care; and, (6) while in New Jersey, payer discounts

(i.e., percentage discounts) were awarded to insurers for economically providing
care, there are no similar benefits under PPS other than the savings that could
be made by early discharge (Demkovich, 1983a,b; Fessler &: Wehr, 1983a,b;
Spiegel &: Kavaler, 1986).
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Other differenc;es include the fac;t that New Jersey reimburses capital
c;osts on a pass-through basis and c;onsiders educ;ational and teac;hing costs. The
Medic;are plan proposed by Reagan attempted to include capital costs under the
DRG system.

Furthermore, New Jersey's hospital population is relatively

homogeneous versus the diversity of patients nation-wide. May and Wasserman
(1984) state, however, that the most important difference between the New
Jersey plan and the Medicare DRG-based PPS plan is that the New Jersey plan
covers all payers and that fac;t alone will prohibit c;ost-shifting among payers.
The Prospec;tive Payment System (PPS) of Medicare is intended to provide
strong financial inc;entives for hospitals to conserve, rather than expend,
resourc;es in c;aring for Medic;are patients and to shift care to less costly
settings. However, the unc;ertainties surrounding the direction and pac;e of the
impac;t of PPS have sparked widespread concern that the system poses a
substantial threat to the health c;are system. A number of concerns have been
raised by this c;hange in hospital financ;ing; concerns whic;h focus not only on the
basis for the payment structure (i.e., the DRG system itself) but also on the
new payment system's effect on providers in the health care system (e.g.,
hospitals, physicians), the Medicare benefic;iary and on quality of care.

Diagnosis Related Groups {DRGs)
DRGs were first designed and c;;ompiled at Yale University's Center for
Health Studies in the late 1960s. This effort c;onsolidated previous work by
attempting to c;reate a usable, effective framework to monitor utilization
review and quality of c;are in hospitals (HCF A, 1983). In order to accomplish
this, it was necessary to develop a uniform definition of what c;onstitutes a
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"case" in an inpatient setting. Prior to DRGs, case costs were not precisely
defined due to the fact of inadequate technologies for cost accounting as well
as the fact that, with retrospective reimbursement, costs had not been a source
of major concern to the majority of hospitals or payers. But, as Jack Owen,
Executive Vice President of the American Hospital Association (AHA), has
stated, "Of all the new management challenges hospitals

fa~e

due to PPS •••case

mix management looms as one of the most important'' (Owen, 1984).
Case- Mix Classification. As the country began facing rapid! y increasing

complexity in medical care (i.e., increasingly sophisticated medical technology)
and sharply rising costs, improved methods for analyzing and monitoring
institution performance became necessary. Interest in hospital "case-mix'' and
the resulting hospital output became a major topic of research (e.g., Bayes,
1977; Feldstein, 1965; Fetter, et al., 1980; Lave, et al., 1971; Lee, et al., 1972;
Lee, et. al., 1973; Shin, 1977a; Shin, 1977b; Thompson, et al., 1975). Initial
attempts to explain cost variation among hospitals were developed in the early
1960s focusing on institutional characteristics (such as bed size, average length
of stay, existence of residency program, proportion of board certified medical
staff, presence of medical school affiliation).

Later attempts at case-mix

classification were directed at describing more precisely the attributes of
patients

(OTA,

1983).

The critical

issue

was

to determine patient

characteristics that accurately describe case-mix (such as the diagnoses of
patients and the procedures performed) as a proxy for costs (Spiegel & I<avaler,
1986). However, it was generally agreed that hospital costs and case mix were
positi ve1y correlated as numerous studies confirmed the direct relation between
case-mix measures and cost (Ament, 1976; Bentley, 1981; Klastorin & Watts,
1980; Lave et al., 1972; Young, et al., 1980).
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Two principal methodologies were used to approach the problem of casemix definition; one, the Single Diagnosis Method, is a definition of case-mix
based on the patient's primary diagnosis. The primary diagnoses are based on
some variant of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-CM codes).
These schemes were intended to provide a classification of conditions of
morbidity and mortality for statistical reporting and information retrieval.
Because this scheme is based on diagnosis alone, it was determined to be
insufficient for defining cases by resource consumption (HCF A, 1983).
The second widely used patient classification scheme was developed by the
Professional Activity Study (PAS) of the Commission of Professional and
Hospital Activities. It published tables of length-of-stay (LOS) gathered from
participating hospitals using primary diagnosis, presence of any additional
diagnoses, presence of any surgeries, and age to classify patients into 349
distinct groups. While many of the diagnoses were homogeneous, the system
resulted in nearly 7,000 patient classes. The fundamental problem with the PAS
method was that in cases where age is not important, the method overspecified
the case type. In those cases where type of surgery was important, the method
underspecified the resource requirements (HCF A, 1983).
In order to describe case mix, it was necessary to develop a patient
classification scheme that was manageable in terms of the number of case
types defined and was reasonable in describing the variation in resources needed
for treatment. DRGs were develped as an alternative patient classification
scheme to the problems of the ICD-CM codes and-the PAS scheme (HCFA,
1983). Given the fact that diagnostic procedures are a key function of the
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patient's condition, treatment modalities and services are generally prescribed
on the basis of diagnosis. Likewise, the length of time a patient is hospitalized
is linked to the diagnosis assigned by the physician. Given these factors, DRG.s
were designed to account for the type and amount of hospital resources
required to provide care; presupposing that groups can be defined based on
similar patterns of resource consumption for cases within each group.
DRGs are a patient classification system designed to reflect differences in
predicted resource use among different kinds of patients.

Although each

patient admitted to a hospital is unique, the DRG system classifies cases
(patients) according to certain demographic, diagnostic and therapeutic
attributes.

The similarities and differences emerging from such groupings

profoundly affect which treatment protocols are utilized and the level of
resources consumed in treating a patient. Thus, resource consumption became
the pivotal point on which the DRG system was built (HCF A, 1983).
The DRG, and other related utilization schemes, assume that certain
patient characteristics can be considered common in terms of the use of
diagnosis and treatment procedures, enabling the administrator to analyze
institutional effectiveness in terms of the patient products under care as well
as the resources a patient consumes and their related costs. The DRG system is
built upon clinically coherent patterns of care in which diagnoses are collapsed
into 23 Major Diagnostic Categories (MDCs) which represent major body organs.
Once assigned to an MDC, the case is further assigned to one of 467 DRGs
based on the presence or absence of certain procedures (e.g., surgery or not),
age of the patient, specific principal diagnosis, presence or absence of a
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significant co-morbidity or complication, treatment procedures, and discharge
status. These attributes then provided a way of explaining variations in length
of stay and cost of care. For reimbursement purposes, a monetary value was
assigned to each diagnostic category. Once the diagnosis was determined, the
payment was also determined regardless of the length of time the patient
stayed in the hospital (Bromberg, 1986; Ernst & Whinney, 1983; Grimaldi &
Micheletti, 1983; Health Care Financing Administration, 1983, 1982; Speigel &
Kavaler, 1986; Arthur Young, 1983).
Goran (1981) pointed out that linking case mix to DRGs defined a hospital's
product based upon a case-mix reimbursement system and warned of the
possibility of clinicians' inflating the complexity of cases resulting in "case mix
creep". Simborg (1981), echoing Goran's point about DRGs and case mix, called
"DRG-Creep" the new hospital-acquired disease.

As Simbourg (1981) stated,

"Today, the use of DRGs is virtually synonymous with case mix measurement
and it has become the standard method to describe hospital outputs for any use"
(p. 1603). For example, case mix can also be used for regulation (i.e., in terms
of budget review to determine the appropriate rate level; change setting to
determine the appropriate rate structure; public disclosure; capital expenditure
review; utilization review; and epidemiological studies (Cohen & Atkinson,
1982).
DRGs became the center of discussion among regulators, hospital
associations, third-party payers, and academicians as soon as they were
developed. Concern over the limitations of the system increased when they
were used as the basis for the New Jersey rate-payers system and, even more
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intensly, when the system was adopted by HHS as the basis for their new
prospec;tive payment system for Medic;are hospital reimbursement.

Critic;s

argued that the DRG system was not well tested, needed more study before
they were used on a national level, and that the DRGs themselves are flawed
(Grimaldi & Mic;helleti, 1980, 1982). In the first plac;e, DRGs were originally
designed by Yale University researc;hers as a means of improving utilization
review by providing a medic;ally meaningful explanation of differenc;es in
patient length of stay and not as a resourc;e c;onsumption sc;heme (Arthur Young,
1983).
Moreover, the DRG system is not stric;tly c;linic;ally c;oherent.

For

example, it was pointed out that DRGs c;ontain c;ases whic;h, from a medic;al
perspec;tive, are quite different. That is, the DRG classific;ation system does
not distinguish among patients with different severity or intensity levels within
the same DRG.

Alternatively, some broad diagnostic; areas, suc;h as ac;ute

myoc;ardial infarc;tion (AMI), are not subdivided into disc;rete DRGs (OTA, 1985,
1983; Smits et al., 1984; Arthur Young, 1983). Furthermore, analysis of the
DRG system suggests that some DRGs c;ould be statistic;ally homogeneous but
not ec;onomically homogeneous; that is, medic;ally meaningful but ec;onomically
heterogeneous (Grimaldi & MiGheletti, 1982).

Experienc;e under DRGs have

shown that there are wide-ranging variations within spec;ific; DRGs related to
the patient's severity of illness. This c;ould mean that the fac;ility c;ould lose
financially since the DRG payment remained the same regardless of the
severity not compensated for by outliers, direc;t or indirect adjustments. Smits
et al. (1984) identified eight sources of DRG instability in terms of severity: (1)
error in disc;harge or cost data; (2) true outlier

cases; (3) physician
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practice patterns; (4) a small number of rare DRGs; (5) Uniform Hospital
Discharge Set (UHDDS) data limitations; (6) ICD-9-CM limitations; (7) nursing
severity data is lacking; and (&)medical severity descriptions are vague. Smits
et al. (19&4) concluded that severity discussions were often confounded by the
inctusion of cases that

were erroneously identified as an inaccurate

c;lassification, by the assumption that eliminating outliers is a desirable goal or
by the belief that high levels of sickness and high levels of cost are synonymous.
An effective severity index should also identify less costly subgroups of patients
as well as more costly ones. DRGs, in their present configuation, do neither.
In addition, there are limitations in the data base and in the variables used

to describe and measure hospital case mix; that is, the reporting systems used
as the basis for DRGs are troublesome (Smits et al., 19&4). For example, DRGs
are criticized because they rely on patient abstract information which is often
not reliable (Arthur Young, 19&4; HCF A, 19&3; Demkovich, 19&2). The creators
of the DRGs respond that, due to increased cost-consciousness on the part of
payers and hospitals, hospital abstract information is becoming inc;reaingly
more precise and accurate and that the level of aggregation in the DRG system
reduces the effect of reporting errors (Spiegel & Kavaler, 19&6).
Other criticisms inctude: one, DRGs are not nationally representative.
Critics point out that a study by the Institute of Medicine in 1977, before the
New Jersey plan was implemented, found an error rate of 30 percent in the
state's Medic;are records (Demkovich, 19&2). Supporters of the system concede
that while the initial DRG system was developed froin a 20 percent sample of
19&1 Medicare hospital records as the basis for setting rates, the system is
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reliable. In addition, with the focus on more accurate coding of information
and Congressionally-mandated updates of the reimbursement formulas, the
system will prove itself over time. The response to this criticism has been that
there is going to be some trade-off between the number of groups and clinical
homogeneity in all patient classification systems and that this trade-off is most
reasonable in the DRG system.

Furthermore, because the system is to be

refined, inconsistencies and discrepancies will be eliminated (HCFA, 1983).
Critics of the system also argue that the DRGs do not reflect the current
state of medical practice (Arthur Young, 1983; HCFA, 1983). The response to
this criticism is that the DRGs are mandated by law to be up-dated periodically
and that this continual refinement will reflect the changes occurring in
medicine. It has also been argued that other variables, such as socio-economic
status or type of admission, should have been included in the DRG system
(Arthur Young, 1984). The response has been that this type of information was
not available nationally at the time of the DRG development but that as more
comprehensive and reliable patient information is generated by the hospitals, it
will be incorporated into the DRG calculations (HFCA, 1983).
Finally~ critics have stated that just having a prospective rate is not

enough. It is important to control the right unit of costs and, for a hospital,
that means controlling admissions.

HCF A promised to keep close watch on

admissions through peer reivew but also through cost increases to the
beneficiary for hospitalization.

As of January 1, 1983, beneficiaries were

paying over $300 for the first day of hospital care~ which increased to over
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$.500 by 1986.

It was believed that higher c;:osts to the benefic;:iary would

c;:ontribute to lowering unnec;:essary admissions.

POTENTIAL IMPACT OF PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT

The way in whicll hospitals will respond to the PPS cllallenge is by no
means understood and

will

vary

by

institution, depending

upon

suc;:h

c;:harac;:teristic;:s as bed size, loc;:ation, teac;:hing status, ownership/c;:ontrol, payer
mix (i.e., dependenc;:y on Medic;:are}, financ;:ial status, and c;:ase mix c;:omplexity of
patient populations served (OTA, 198.5).

Consequently, the magnitude and

direc;:tion of the effec;:ts c;:annot be predic;:ted with confidenc;:e. In addition, PPS
alters hospital inc;:entives in ways that c;:onflict with one another, leading to
unintended and possibly undesirable c;:onsequenc;:es (OT A, 198.5).
Table IV presents the expec;:ted impac;:t of PPS as identified by Guterman
and Dobson (1986). PPS introduc;:es a variety of inc;:entives and affec;:ts not only
hospitals but other payers for inpatient hospital services, other providers of
<;:are, Medic;:are benefioaries, and c;:osts. The effec;:ts of PPS most relevant to
the performance of the health care system are its effec;:ts on the c;:ost of
providing medic;:al <;:are and the effec;:ts on the health benefits rec;:eived from
that care such as quality of c;are; ac;c;ess to c;are; tec;hnologic;:al cllange, and
c;linic;al research (OT A, 198.5}. On the one hand, PPS introduces incentives for
hospitals to be more c;ost-c;onsc;ious and to increase quality of c;are.

For

instanc;:e, PPS encourages hospitals to reduce length of stay and unnecessary
services, thus reducing patient exposure to the risk of c;omplic;:ations, hospital
ac;c;:idents, nosocomial infections and other iatrogenic; events. In addition, DRGbased PPS offers incentives for hospitals to specialize, thus reducing the
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TABLE IV
EXPECTED IMPACT OF THE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM

Provldens end payers

lmpoct meeaurea
Economic
Anllcipatod

boneflls

Other payer&
for inpaUent
hospital services

Hospllals

ShOIItr lloapllal alayu.
Fewtr unnocoll84ry Ieaia and
IIO!Vicaa.
Spocllllization-cconomlea of ecale.
Adoption Ol COSI•reclucfng

Unintended consequences

technology.
lmp<ovements In haspilal
manaooment.
lmprovamenta In hospital
adminislrativo dara syutoms.
Reduction of excess hospital
capacity.
Vertical integration of heellh care
services.
Increases In unnecessary •
admissions. roadmisalons, ancl
rranalors.
lncrecses in llospilal case·mir, due
to changes In coding prOCIXluras"DRG crtep."
Separala provision ol services which
previously ware considered part of

Rapid dlfluolon of ~
payment and other innoltatlvo

puymonl ayalema.
Cost mvlngs lor all payara, with
roaulllng roductloM ln
hoallh in;uranco premiums.

Olhor providers
of lleafth care

lncrouod p<OWialon of health care
HMcosln~
lncreillled numbtt of di~argH
from Inpatient 10 c:IMiDPGr

poal-llospil&l cora.
tioGpltal ecquiGillon of Ot
.
contriiCIIng with olhor p<ovldorl,
loading

of

Polenllll shilling of coat burden 10
other payera for lloopllal IOMcoa,
wilh rosulling inert- in hoallh
lncuranccJ promluma et raductiona in
bono His.
lncraaaa In uncompensated care.

routine inpaliant care""uniKulcllfng."·
lncrtalle in "outlier"' caaea.
Higher axpondituraa on
"pus~nrough" coer categoriucapital, diroct medical education.
kidMy acqufalllon.

to GRIQolhcr provisiOn

a continuum of palionl cora.

Presauro on pltyllclans lo chango
lholt prectice pallema.
Fewer inohoepilal phyalcian
coneutratlona.
lncrell$0d froquency or minor

surgical proc:ecluros.
Mote IIOYOraly ill patienlo cflllchQrgad
from lnpaU11111 to poat-lloap~lal care.
Ollelaclea to pniVIding a continuum
of pallont care. dua to
cartificalo-of·nHCI realrlcllono.
conlractlng prohibllionl. ore.

Excaaalva rero or lloopltal cloainga.
Quality of care
Anticipated benefits

Unintended consequences

Moro elflclent ~nl ol
Spoc:lalizalion-lncreaso In elftCioncy B<lllar coordination of health care
and p<oficiency.
patient care.
traalment, payment, and coveraoo.
lncreaMd llldlf lowlo for
Fower unnocetll&ry Ieaia and
poGI.floapftal ~ pareonnel.
IMMc9s.
Moto Nioctfve uso of new
tecllnology.
Increase in unnecessary adminions. Compallng incenUvea to heallh core Fowor in-llospilal physician
Tendency reward premature
providera, dapanding on tho· typo of conaullations.
Moro
il pa.Uon~a cliOciWirtod
dlachargu. ·
coverage.
from lllpallcftt 110. poali>OGPI&I care.
O&creases in necessary tooling and

_ar,.

olhor enclllary servicea.
Roluctenca to adopt
qualily-onhancing (but expansive in
the ah-"'11 run) lechnology.

Acceoa to care
Anticipated benefils

Altailobility of more :services
regional laval.
Sh•fting of services to more

on a

appropriala (and inexpensive)
solhngs.

Unintended consequences

""Dumping"" ol high-cost casas.
Roluctanc:e ol llospilals to sccopl
casas in DRG"s which aro nol
prolilablo.

Reduced hoallh cora charooa and

insurance premiums ..
Boller coordinalion of heallh cart
troatz:oenl. paymonl, and covorago.
lncroaaed sponaorship of heallh
mamlenance organlza110ns and
prelerrecl provider organizations.
Oocreaso in c01t0rage lor poot
po.tieniS. dllll to uncomponsaled

cere iasuo.

lncraaaecl avaUabiiily ol aarvicea in
nonlloap~llll

:seninga.

lontle<. backlogs ol pa!lon!a
wailing lor poat·hcl&pllal care.
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TABLE IV
EXPECTED IMPACT OF THE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM

(continued)
Cost control
Medicare
beneficiaries

Impact meas1.1res
Economic
Anticipated benefits

Part A liability limited to legal
deductibfes and coinsurance.

Unintended consequences

Quality of care
Anticipated benefits

Unintended consequences

Access to care
Anticipated benefits

Unintended consequences

Higher out<lf-pocket costs, if Part B
utilization increases.

Budget neutrality in the short run.
Slower rate of growth in
expenditures for the longer run.
More predictable ouUays.
Increased growth In "pass-through"
costs.

Shorter hospital stays.
More efficient provision of hospital
Lower ·ratos of nosocomial infection. care.
Fewer ln-1\ospltal complications and
deaths.
·
Fewer unnecessary tests and
services.
Reductions in Iatrogenic care.
Specialization-increase in efficiency
and proficiency.
Replacement of quality with
Tendency toward premature
financial COMideraUons as the
discharges.
objective of hospilals.
Decrease in necessary tests. and
services.
Decrease In necessary physician
consultations.

Slower rate of growth in .program
expenditures.

Increased growth In expenditures for
substitutes for Inpatient care, to the
extent that thi!Y are not offset by a
dacllne In inpatient hospital
expenditures.
Increased growth In expenditures for
post-hospilal care, to tbo extent that
they are not offset by a decline in
acute C!!fe expenditures.

More efficient provision of ovorall.
health care.

Replacement of quality with
financial considerations as the
C?bJective of health care providers.

Reduction in the total cost of health

Decrease In overall cost of services
provided.
Shift In treatment to mora
appropriate settings.
Regional availability of broad range
of services.

Reduction In the cost of hospital
care.
Promotion of the success of
efficient hospitals.

Selective exclusion of hlgiH:ost

Widespread hospilal closings,
Reduction in acceptance of
particularly in undersarved or poorer Medicare patients.

case types.

·

"Dumping" ol''unprofilable" types
of paUants.

Source:

Medicare program
expenditures

Hospital
expenditures

care.

Encouregement of efficiency in the
management of health care
providers.

areas.

Sturart Guterman and Allen Dobson. "Special Report: Impact of the
Medicare prospective payment system for hospitals." Health Care
Financ:ing Review, Vol.7(1):97-114 (Spring, 1986).
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risk of adverse outcomes and potentially improving the quality of care. Finally,
it provides hospitals with the incentive to reduce unnecessary tests and
procedures, thus encouraging the provision of appropriate care (Senate Finance
Committee, 1986).
On the other hand, PPS also introduces negative incentives. That is, while
the intended consequences of PPS are the elimination of care that "offers little
or nothing in the way of patient benefits" and "the organization of hospital
operations to provide the necessary care in the least expensive manner," PPS
introduces incentives for "hospitals to conserve resources during the hospital
stay" and to "shift care to less costly settings, both with potential negative
consequences for quality, access, and cost" (OT A, 1985, pp. 24-25).
Prospective payment using DRGs emphasizes the business of hospital care.
Administrators must be capable of running an institution without falling into a
negative cash balance.

Hospital managers are thus faced with three basic

incentives under PPS (OTA, 1985):
1.

to reduce the cost per admission;

2.

to selectively increase DRG revenues; and

3.

to develop new sources of profit or surplus by
offering services not subject to payment
restrictions.

Hospitals will attempt to reduce costs in a number of ways, including:
adopting business management techniques, e.g., long-range strategic planning,
joint ventures, enhanced productivity, etc. (Morris,. 1984; Spiegel &: Kavaler,
1986); reducing lengths of stay (Berki, 1985; Demkovich, 1983a; Fedorowicz,
1983); reducing rates of use of ancillary services (Berki, 1985; Kuntz, 1984;
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Nathanson, 1984; OTA, 1985); reducing the total ratios of personnel to patients
(Berki, 1985; Bromberg, 1984; Kuntz, 1984; Richards, 1984; Washington Report,
1984); providing services formerly provided during hospitalization before or
after the inpatient hospital stay (i.e., unbundling) (Bromgerg, 1984; Lave, 1984);
increasing preadmission screening (Lave, 1984; Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986);
reducing rates of increase in employee wages and fringe benefits (OTA, 1985);
purchasing hospital supplies more prudently (Allen, 1984; Bromgerg, 1984);
reducing discretionary activities (e.g., continuing education; clinical research)
(Coelen & Sullivan, 1981); and, finally, the new financial arrangements are
likely to further stimulate restructuring of the health care system (i.e.,
horizontal & vertical integration) (Berki, 1985; Gray & McNerney, 1986; Starr,
1982).
For example, hospitals are likely to approach decisions regarding the
introduction of new medical technology under PPS differently than under costbased reimbursement.

Before PPS, the additional costs of new technologies

were fully covered; thus, hospitals had no reason to refrain from adopting them.
Between 1977 and 1982, medical costs increased 107 percent and, according to
the Office of Technology Assessment, approximately 28 percent of this increase
was related to overuse of medical technology (American Medical News, 1984).
Under PPS, new technologies that raise the cost of treating a case will have to
compete with alternative (e.g., established) treatments and with alternative
uses of funds (e.g., employee wage increases). It has been hypothesized that
new medical technology may be at a disadvantage under PPS in that it offers
uncertain benefits in the early stages of diffusion (Romeo et al., 1984). Others
have argued that DRG-based PPS offers the opportunity to slow the flow of new
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technology into the health care sector and thus moderate costs as well as more
effectively evaluate new technology in terms of its impact on both the
extension and quality of life (Lave, 1984). Although it has not been suggested
that PPS will halt the adoption of new technology, it is suggested that hospitals,
with their limited resources, will now need to assess new technology more
closely and to ration resources more carefully (Berki, 198.5; OTA, 198.5).
Strategies to selectively increase DRG revenues include:

increasing

admissions by treating patients as inpatients who might otherwise be treated on
an ambulatory basis (Enthoven & Noll, 1984); breaking up of hospital stays into
multiple admissions or readmitting patients for the same DRGs (Anderson &
Steinberg, 1984); identifying and attracting relatively healthy patients within
any given DRG by encouraging services associated with those patients (Berki,
198.5; Frye, 1984; Stern & Epstein, 198.5); expanding medical staffs in profitable
DRG specialties and reducing them in others (Bromberg, 1984; Omenn &:
Conrad, 1984); adopting marketing practices aimed at relatively healthy
patients (Seymour, 1984); and encouraging physicians to refer patients posing an
expected financial burden to other hospitals, particularly to the VA and other
public hospitals (Berki, 198.5; OT A, 198.5).
In an attempt to increase revenues, for example,

hospitals may assign

patients to DRGs that will provide the greatest possible return. This is called
"DRG Creep" (Lave, 1984; Simbourg, 1981; Stern &: Epstein, 1985). Hospitals
may encourage physicians to consciously consider the payment implications of
their medical record keeping and the assignment of- principal diagnosis upon
discharge. In the past, accurate diagnosis and procedural coding were not as
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critical to the payment process and many errors in coding, particularly omission
of surgeries, appear to have occurred. Now hospitals are motivated to improve
the accuracy of coding and to report codes that will maximize payment levels.
While "upcoding" or "gaming the system" may be limited due to review
processes in the system, it is still in the best interest of the hospital to obtain
the most favorable DRG possible (Demkovich, 1983a; OTA, 198.5; Wehr, 1983a).
A third option for hospitals is to expand services to less financially
constrained

or

more

profitable areas

(e.g., satellite clinics, chemical

dependency treatment, laboratory or other ancillary services, home health,
outpatient surgery} or to phase out unprofitable cross-subsidized services (e.g.,
health promotion, social services} (Koch, 1988; Lave, 1984).

Under such

circumstances, the hospital is at a particular advantage in marketing pre-andpost hospital services to its still hospitalized patients.

This largely captive

market for post-hospital home services, for instance, has led many hospitals to
set up their own skilled nursing, rehabilitation and home health services
(Caldwell, 1982; Koch, 1988; Lundberg, 1982; OTA, 198.5}. Likewise, because
Medicare still pays hospitals for outpatient surgery on a cost basis, many expect
this area to substantially expand as a result of PPS (Koch, 1988}. Moreover,
PPS could increase expenditures for privately insured patients (Aaron, 1984;
OTA, 198.5; Sheingold, 1986}.

Because the PPS policy only affects Medicare

patients, hospitals will have greater incentive to cost-shift their losses to
private-charge payers, such as commercial insurers, some Blue Cross plans, and
self-paying patients (Demkovich, 1983a). Thus, to the degree that a hospital is
pressed by reduced reimbursements per Medicare case, it will have the
incentive to shift these costs to non-Medicare patients to increase revenues
from private sources.

114

Other Consequences
Other anticipated consequences of PPS for the Medicare program include
shifts in financing, from Part A to Part B, as PPS encourages changes in health
care delivery from the inpatient hospital setting to the outpatient setting.
Medicare expenditures for home health services and skilled nursing care are
also likely to increase. While it is unclear how PPS will affect expenditures for
other federal health programs, it is hypothesized that reductions in Part A
payments may increase demand for VA medical care and Medicaid nursing home
beds. In addition, the incentive for stays and reduced services under PPS may
reduce physician visits to hospitalized patients and increase outpatient visits or
visits to the physician's office (OT A, 1985).
Urban/Rural Differences. In terms of the overall hospital system, PPS's
nationally-based payment rates will redistribute surpluses among hospitals,
with some losing and some gaining (Vladeck, 1985). The federal government
designated lower DRG reimbursement rates on the assumption that labor and
supplies cost less in rural versus urban areas.

In the development of the

reimbursement rates, HHS established 9 geographic regions within the United
States and designated labor-related and non-labor-related DRG rates based on
them. In each case, the rural reimbursement was lower. With the inception of
the urban/rural classification, the American Hospital Association warned that
geographic anomalies would result in unfair treatment of many hospitals
(Mickel, 1984).

The chairman of the American Small and Rural Hospital

Association stated, "Something is wrong with the idea t.hat just because we're in
a rural setting we should get less money" (Wallace, 1984, p. 48).
Concern was expressed by many critics of the system that the arbitrary
discrimination against rural hospitals would force many of them to close
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(Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986). Although part of this redistribution was intended to
reduce inefficiencies in management and patient care, at least part of the
redistribution may be caused by the pricing mechanism itself (i.e., the DRG
reimbursement rate) and thus, is beyond the hospital's control (Ashby & Palmer,
1985). Furthermore, because DRGs are used as a proxy for the kind of care
provided, hospitals are concerned that some DRGs, including the numerous
catchall categories in which a variety of low-volume, high-intensity cases have
been dumped, do not adequately account for the patient's severity of illness
(Stanley, 1984).

Both factors could mean major financial losses for some

hospitals.
Inefficient hospitals may not be able to adjust to PPS and therefore close,
potentially leaving some communities without hospital services. Hospitals with
high ratios of poor and/or indigent patients may be extremely vulnerable under
the system. Moreover, because of the enormous variation in patient mix and
cost patterns, some hospitals may be severely or unfairly penalized by the
payment system whereas some hospitals will receive an unmerited windfall
(Ashby & Palmer, 1985). The resulting redistribution generated by PPS may

~

produce any net savings to the Trust Fund (Vladeck, 1985).
Physician/Hospital Relations. The physician-hospital relationship will also
be affected by PPS. Hospital managers under PPS have powerful incentives to
alter the practice patterns of physicians, specifically in ways that minimize
costs (Berki, 1985; Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986). While physicians make the major
decisions regarding placement of patients and ordering of services once the
patient is hospitalized, management will attempt to limit length of stay and
service intensity.

Although physicians may be disposed to cooperate with
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management's cost control efforts out of loyalty to the hospital, there may be
limits to this cooperation (Berki, 1985). For example, physicians fear subtle and
overt presures from management to alter practice styles, to selectively admit
people who could be taken care of on an out-patient basis or not admit complex
or high cost cases, and to shorten length of stay and reduce services to
Medicare beneficiaries.
Medical decision-making processes that show different patterns from peer
practices will now be critical elements under PPS utilization review incentives.
Areas for which physicians will be evaluated include: alternatives for care;
efficiency in the process of care delivery; increased morbidity and mortality;
readmissions; post-hospital experiences; readmissions; post-hospital mortality
and inter-institutional transfers. HHS believes that medical ethical standards
and fear of malpractice suits will inhibit poor care. Physicians, however, see
the potiential for increased malpractice suits if patients begin to believe they
are receiving less than optimal care, if they believe they have had incomplete
workups or treatments, or if they have unfavorable outcomes {Spiegel &
Kavaler, 1986).
For example, defensive medicine operates to an unknown extent in this
decision-making process. The incentive to protect oneself from possible
litigation may counter-balance the incentive to reduce the intensity of services
delivered. Hospitalization is an important source of income for physicians. In
1981, 64 percent of physicians' Medicare services were provided in the inpatient
setting, although only 24 percent of Medicare beneficiaries were hospitalized in
that year (OTA, 1985). With so much income derived from hospitalization,"
physicians may be reluctant to cooperate with strategies designed to reduce it.
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However, the most important concern about PPS in relation to health
benefits is its impact on the quality of care. Although there is potential for the
system to result in more "judicious" clinical decision-making, PPS could also
diminish quality of care. As John Thompson, professor of Public Health at Yale
University and one of the developers of the DRG classification system, has
stated: "Quality assurance under prospective pricing is the most serious ethical
question raised by DRGs" (Friedman, 1985, p. 30).

PPS AND THE QUALITY OF CARE

Deterioration in the quality of care is anticipated under systems of
financing that emphasize productivity and efficiency rather than patient needs
or satisfaction. As Spiegel and Kavaler (1986) point out:
Under PPS, management is rewarded for decisions by
physicians and clinicians who react to pressures from
utilization review committees, discharge planners, and
complex computer analysis of peer profiles, rather than
for diagnostic accuracy, therapeutic triumphs, and
saiubrious outcomes of the patient's episode of illness (p.
427).
Hospitals are expected to limit their financial liabilities by altering their
service capabilities, such as specialization in high yield DRGs; elimination of
high cost, low yield services; cuts in staff or curtailed acquisition of new
medical technology, as a means of cost savings. The shift from "more is better"
to "less is more" emphasizes cost containment rather than attention to health
care access and quality of care (Pointer & Ross, 1984).

Quality of In-patient Care
Hospitals may curtail certain expensive services in favor of more
profitable areas of care. This could limit the range of services available in a
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community or region (Mahoney, 1982). Yet others argue that concentrating
certain diagnostic and therapeutic abilities in select institutions can actually
heighten quality of care since staff expertise and experience have been shown
to affect morbidity and mortality outcomes (Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986).
However, Ed Mihalski (1984, staff member of the Senate Finance Committee, is
concerned that:
Reducing
costs
and
potentially
maxtm1zmg
profits •••creates a real worry that hospitals would also
reduce the amount of care and therefore, the quality of
care provided to their patients •••Hospitals could do that
through early discharges, inappropriate admissions, or by
simply providing less care than a patient would need (p.
45).

The ability to order tests or to do procedures may be impeded as physician's
practice patterns come under peer review. This may also hinder full diagnostic
workups or limit treatment options for patients as physicians who do not
"conform" may be denied access for their patients and may be barred from
hospital privileges. The final consequence of PPS on quality of care may be to
end the era of a physician's freedom to offer a patient anything that might help
and the beginning of an era of rationing care (Boyle, 1984).
Restructuring staffing patterns under PPS in order to reduce costs and
increase efficiency, i.e., through layoffs, hiring freezes, flexible staffing (e.g.,
using per diems, on-calls), changing staff mix or consolidating jobs, is a byproduct of reduced length of stay, shifts to outpatient services and general
pressures to reduce costs.

These actions will have definite implications for

quality of care. Inadequate staffing ratios and changing the mix of professional
and ancillary personnel does save money, but also affects all direct patient
contact services, may delay or hamper recuperation, and may even increase
changes in hospital-based morbidity or mortality (Spiegler &: Kavaler, 1986).
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Physicians are now having to confront the cost impact of their decisionmaking as the once passive institutional managers become more aggressive in
their actions to maintain hospital solvency and prosperity.

For example,

utilization review committees were predicted to be given broad responsibility
and stringent authority to monitor physician/hospital behavior for compliance
to DRG programmatic goals.

These committees are charged with keeping

readmissions under scrutiny and to reduce unnecessary admissions.
Data are now being collected and systematically analyzed in order to
develop local practice patterns for each DRG, which can be used to measure
physician behavior.

From the data, physician "winners" and "losers" are

identified and administrative pressure is being applied to losers to alter their
practice patterns (Hardwick, 1983). Such analyses can reduce repetitive orders
for

expensive lab

tests,

eliminate

standing orders, encourage

prompt

consultation with specialists, evaluate the efficacy of therapeutic procedures,
eliminate ineffective treatments, and avoid weekend admissions for elective
procedures (Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986).

However, while the effects of these

pressures on physician's treatment patterns and on quality of care are not easily
measured, it has been predicted that these pressures could result in tension
between physicians and management over treatment (i.e., cookbook medicine)
and the replacement of careful clinical judgment by tests and procedures that
are easy to administer but may cost more in the long run (Rucker, 1984;
Vladeck, 1984).
Access to care may also be inhibited.

While the responsibility for

admitting a patient lies primarily with the physician; under DRGs, the
admitting diagnosis will be scrutinized.

If it does not meet certain criteria
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(e.g., can the patient be treated elsewhere, winner or loser DRG, can patient
pay, does admission conform to rules, etc.), access to care may be denied.
Specifically affected in these cases would be the poor, elderly, and uninsured;
that is, those with existing access limitations and who most often have
extensive, expensive multiple diseases and need acute medical care (Kinzer,
1984; Reiman, 1985; Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986).
Perverse admitting practices might also evolve since "there will be no
incentive whatever in such a system to care for healthier patients in less costly
outpatient settings" (Anderson, 1983).

There will be strong incentives to

increase readmissions due to reduced length of stay and concern over premature
discharge. Early discharge patients may get sick again or deteriorate in posthospital care settings.

Prompt readmission, called "churning", is a possible

result. In these cases, hospitals will be paid twice for the "same" illness/injury
resulting in a "gaming" of the DRG system (Spiegel &: I<avaler, 1986).

Quality of Post-Hospital Care

Some policy analysts, senior advocates, physicians and critics of PPS fear
that the new reimbursement system will alter the locus of care for Medicare
beneficiaries since the incentives focus on shortening hospital stay and reducing
services.

It is hypothesized that shorter stays will shift care previously

delivered in the hospital to nursing homes and home care settings.

Sicker

patients could be discharged, possibly before their medical problem is resolved,
increasing their risk of readmission, extended recuperation, or death. This is
especially true for those elderly patients with certain diagnoses or multiple
and/or chronic health problems. There is concern that attempts to save money
by early discharge of patients will have an adverse impact on the outcomes of
care.
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Cure rates will be much lower and patients are likely to
have multiple admissions if they are discharged
prematurely. Although this may be better economically
for the hospital, it is certainly not in keeping with good
medical practice (Farber, 1985, p. 18)
Although the shift in care to settings outside the hospital may be appropriate
for some DRGs, it may not be for others. Moreover, the savings in hospital
costs may be more than offset by equal or greater costs in other delivery
systems (OTA, 1985).
There are other potential problems with PPS.

There is a limit to the

extent that hospitals can reduce utilization. Other than shortening stays, it is
unclear how physicians and hospitals will actually alter their basic care
methods.

Further, the impact of shortened stays on the post-hospital care

system is not known.

It is not clear whether post-hospital care providers,

including nursing homes, home health agencies and community service
organizations are equipped to handle "sicker" patients or if beds/services are
even available.
Moreover, because of the high intensity care needed by these patients
and/or the limited coverage for a skilled nursing facility under Medicare,
nursing homes may avoid accepting too many Medicare patients. In addition,
since Medicaid reimbursement rates for skilled care often are insufficient to
cover costs, nursing homes may limit the number of Medicaid patients as well.
These issues are particularly important to certain groups within the Medicare
population, such as the aged disabled, the very old, and the aged poor, all of
whom have special health and socio-economic characteristics that make them
particularly vulnerable to the PPS incentives. These groups are likely to be
most affected because they require more intensive (and, thus, more expensive)
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care for a given type of illness episode. Hospitals might tend to view these
patients as potential money losers under PPS and choose not to serve them.
Furthermore, as a result of a growing older population (i.e., 75+), the
number of chronic care patients, in both hospitals and the community, has
increased.

Shortages of nursing home beds and available community-based

services have pointed out the need for a coordinated, comprehensive long-term
care service system. Some have argued that hospitals should begin to provide
long term care (e.g., Champion et al., 1983) to address this growing problem.
However, the implementation of DRGs is expected to compound the problem by
discharging patients with high intensity, sub-acute care needs to community
care, traditionally the place where chronic care patients are cared for.
The potential is there for the sub-acute care patients to push chronic care
patients out of community care settings and back onto their families. Burdens
are being placed on families, home health agencies and nursing homes as a
result of early discharge of patients in need of high levels of care. A great deal
of anecdotal evidence suggests that the elderly are being forced out of the
hospital 11early11 , often by being told that their Medicare benefits have 11run out11
(Davis, 1985). Many elderly with serious health problems, especially the frail
elderly, appear to be having trouble caring for themselves at home following
discharge, particularly if there is no one at home to help them (Senate Finance
Committee, 1986).

Quality Assurance Under PPS
Federal mechanisms were mandated in the PPS legislation to monitor and
assure quality of care under the DRG system. Utilization and quality control
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Peer Revei w Organizations (PROs) were established as the designated medical
review entities responsible for determining a variety of quality issues for
Medicare beneficiaries; e.g., medical necessity, appropriateness, etc.

PROs

also have the responsibility to validate DRG classifications. Furthermore, the
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) was required by the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982 to establish an
monitoring system indepentent of the PROs.

admissions

In addition to the utilization

review activities of HCFA and the PROs, P.L. 98-21 of the Social Security
Amendments of 1983 established an independent organization, called the
SuperPro, to review the work of the state PROs. Thus, if HFCA or a PRO
determines that a hospital is engaged in unacceptable admissions, medical or
other practices, HCF A may deny Medicare payments to the hospital or may
require the hospital to take corrective action.
independent

commission,

Commission

(ProPAC),

called
to

the

monitor

Finally, Congress. set up an

Prospective
DRG

Payment

payment

rates

Assessment
and

make

recommendations to the Secretary of HHS regarding changes in the DRG
system.
PROs. Congress was also concerned about the impact of PPS on the quality
of care. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) had
replaced some 190 Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs},
established in 1972 to guard against unnecessary hospital admissions and
procedures that added to the cost of Medicare and to monitor quality of care,
with a utilization and quality control peer review pr:ogram called Professional
Review Organizations (PROs}. Although PSROs had survived for more than a
decade, they were continually surrounded in controversy until, in 1981, the
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Reagan Administration proposed terminating them.

Congress, however,

believed the concept of peer review was important enough to salvage the
program, especially in light of the potential for abuse with the new
reimbursement system being implemented under Medicare.
PROs were mandated to review (1) admissions, for medical necessity and
appropriateness; (2) procedure review, to screen operating room procedures for
necessity; (3) admission pattern monitoring, to determine the appropriateness of
admissions and discharges; (4) outlier review, to determine if the stay contained
non-covered, medically unnecessary or inappropriate days or services; (5) DRG
validation, to assure that the DRG assigned is proper; and {6) coverage review,
to assure application of all technical and medical coverage rules to the claims
made for covered services (Demkovich, 1982a,b; Fessler & Wehr, 1983a,b;
Spiegler & Kavaler, 1986; Wehr, 1983a,b).

Although the aims of the two

organizations were essentially the same, the new programs had more specific
objectives to meet and fewer federal rules telling them how to meet them.
However, critics of the program charged that the cost-cutting component of
the mandate could jeopardize the quality of care the organizations were trying
to monitor if the rules were overly restrictive (Demkovich, 1985, 1983c).
To avoid some of the problems that plagued the old PSRO program,
Congress simplified the rules. · For example, there would only be one PRO per
state. In addition, Congress directed the new peer review groups to specify
objectives or goals so that there would be some basis for judging their
performance, a serious problem with PSROs. But the PRO system got off to a
shaky start with the Health Care Financing Administration (HCF A) balking at
publishing final rules for the program. This delayed the contracting process for
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well over a year. Thus, "quality" under PPS, in effect, went unmonitored as
PROs and the Health Care Financing Administration (HCF A) battled over
technicalities in the final rules.

Adding to the controversy were the cost

objectives established by HCFA, which some critics characterized as "quotas"
on care, which HCFA negotiated with the PROs for reducing unnecessary
admissions and procedures (Demkovich, 1985).
The American Hospital Association (AHA) stated that HCFA could have
expressed the cost objectives in ranges, (i.e., reducing admissions from 1 to 5
percent), instead of setting specific numerical goals, but did not (Vladeck,
1984). If the PROs meet the contractual requirements over the first two years
of the program, more than one million hospital admissions will be eliminated;
including some 595,000 inpatient surgeries (which will be shifted to outpatient
settings), the elimination of more than 425,000 admissions, and the elimination
of more than 290,000 unnecessary or inappropriate admissions or procedures. In
addition, the goals call for 32,000 complications and 6,000 deaths to be averted
under the program (Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986).
Physicians argued that the arbitrary nature of the numerical goals for
reduction of hospital mortality and morbidity, as set between PROs, HCFA, and
hospitals created an atmosphere where physicians believed they must send
patients home to die rather than allowing them to die in the hospital and
relegates physicians to the status of assembly line workers who are expected to
meet production figures (Speer, 1984). Dr. Thomas Devlin, vice president of the
American Peer Review Association, said that PRO ojectives, though laudable,
have several medical liability implications and "are politically volatile with its
presumption of widespread negligence" (American Medical News, 1984, p. 4).
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Another problem with the PRO is that when an administrative error has
been made, the government can deny payment even if it is later determined
that the care the hospital provided was necessary and appropriate. Hospitals
fear that they will have no avenue of appeal. A related problem concerns the
"waiver of liability" in which hospitals that provide services in good faith were,
under the old Medicare rules, able to obtain a waiver protecting them for 2•.5
percent of erroneous claims, even if questions arose later about the necessity of
the procedure or whether Medicare would cover it. Under PPS, PROs have been
given authority to revoke the waiver and deny payment retroactively.

That

threat could have dire consequences for some hospitals (Spiegler & Kavaler,
1986).

Moreover, the PROs themselves were concerned about the final rules of
the program. Specifically, they were concerned that the government did not
put enough money into the program to make it successful. The $300 million
over a two year contract period is only 1/3 of one percent of the amount
Medicare will pay hospitals over the same period. PROs contend that there will
not be enough money to ensure fulfillment of the goals set by HCF A.
PROs were also concerned that the review component outlined by HCF A is
not comprehensive enough to ensure quality and cost control.

For example,

PROs do not have authority to review outpatient services, which are expected
to increase under PPS. Furthermore, PROs feel that some of the categories
they must review are unnecessary; such as reducing unavoidable deaths which
hospitals have enough incentive to do under PPS anyway.

American Medical

Association (AMA) officials have voiced reservations about the review
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component of the program also. In some cases, says the AMA, the government
does not have reliable data to back up the numerical objectives it has
negotiated with the PROs. Having been burned under PSROs, it appeared to the
AMA that HCF A was trying to tighten all loopholes (Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986).
Senior advocates have taken a cautious view of PROs. The major concerns
for the elderly were that patients might be billed by the hospital for their care
if a PRO review resulted in a denial of payment.

This contingency was

outlawed under the PPS legislation. Another concern was that hospitals would
begin shifting some elderly patients to outpatient settings, not because such
treatment is more appropriate, but because outpatient clinics would be under
less intense scrutiny by the PROs.
Despite the reservations about PROs, most observers seemed to agree that
the PROs had a better chance of succeeding than the old PSROs but cautioned
that while the PROs are the "great hope" for beneficiaries' quality assurance,
the government's fixation on numerical standards, and thereby costs, has
overshadowed what should be the primary goal of peer review; that is, assuring
that the elderly receive quality care.
SuperPRO. A second quality assurance capability in the PPS legislation
involved the establishment of a program to monitor the 54 designated

PRO

programs; one for each state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and Guam
and Samoa. The objectives of the SuperPRO, as the monitoring organization
came to be labeled,

provisions were to ensure- that the PROs were in

compliance with the negotiated performance-based goals contracted with
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the Health Care Financing Administration (HCF A). The program was designed
to oversee all PRO activities and would evaluate and monitor the progress of
the Prospective Payment System as a whole (American Medical News, 19&5a).
The SuperPro is to provide quarterly evaluation and monthly reports on the
appropriateness of the medical review decision-processes of the PROs and to
verify PRO physician's determinations of denials.

Problems with the PRO

system surfaced early in the SuperPro reviews as PRO agencies which were not
formerly PSROs were having difficulties in start-up, development of data bases,
staffing, and review delays.

By July, 1986, three of the original 54 PRO

contracts had been cancelled (Spiegel &: Kavaler, 19&6).
Critics of the PPS legislation contend that the SuperPRO is merely a
watchdog for HCF A and that the focus of the Super PRO is to keep the PROs in
line with the cost-cutting focus of the Health Care Financing Administration.
Quality assurance for the elderly beneficiary, in or out of the hospital, is not a
primary concern of this organization.
The Prospective Payment Assessment Commission. A third quality review

element in the PPS legislation was the establishment of an indepenent
commission to review DRG rate increases proposed by the Secretary of HHS
and monitor the implementation of the PPS system.

P.L. 98-21 required the

Director of the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OT A) to
appoint, by April I,

1984~

a commission of 15 independent health care experts

to a Prospective Payment Assessment Commission (_E:)roPAC). The Commission
is required to (1) review the percentage increase used to update the DRG
payment rates for FY 1984 and 1985 and to make recommendations to the
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Secretary on the appropriate percentage change for fiscal years beginning with
FY 1986; (2) consult with and make recommendations to the Secretary
concerning the need for adjustments to the DRG classifications and the
methodology for classifying specific hospital discharges with the DRGs; and (3)
report to Congress its evaluation of any adjustments which the Secretary makes
(Grimaldi & Micheletti, 1983; Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986).
Members of the Commission have included representatives from hospital
administration, nursing, state rate setting agencies, insurance companies,
private practice physicians, proprietary hospitals, organized labor, medical
schools, and hospital supply firms.

In an interview in Hospitals (1984), Dr.

Stuart Altman, Chairman of ProPAC, stated that ProPAC had no final authority
and could only make recommendations to the Secretary although, since ProPAC
was essentially an extension of Congress and under the jurisdiction of the
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), the Secretary would "weigh ProPAC's
advice carefully."

The most important thing ProPAC has to do, according to

Altman, is "be a truly honest broker" to all constituencies and "to operate as a
surrogate for the competitive marketplace" by reacting appropriately to the ups
and downs of the health care system (Hospitals, 1984, p. 11). Thus, the focus
of the Commission was on DRG price revisions and not quality of care.
The Commission established three working subcommittees covering the
following areas: (1) Data Development and Research; (2) Hospital Productivity
and Cost Effectiveness; and (3) Diagnostic and Therapeutic Practices.
However, with an extremely limited budget and a mandated staff level of only
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2.5, it is clear that ProPAC had a difficult task facing them if they were to
evaluate the "safety, efficiency and cost effectiveness of new and existing
medical and surgical procedures" in order to make recommendations to
Congress (Hospitals, 1984, p. 11).
ProPAC met for the first time on December 19, 1983, and met seven times
in 1984. The focus of the Commission that year was the "workings of the DRG
system in the real world'' and to suggest adjustments that needed to be made
(Iglehart, 1984, p. 20). However, Dr. David Banta, a physician and staff person
at the Office of Technology Assessment, characterized the Commission as only
"a tool for considering social goals and use of technology" (Lesparre, 1984, p.
29).

The first ProPAC report, sent to Congress on April 1, 198.5, had 21

recommendations; 16 of them concerned the updating factor for hospital rates
while the remainder addressed adjustments of DRG classifications and weights
(Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986). Action was also recommended on improving labor
market area definitions and on hospitals serving a disproportionate share of
low-income patients.

ProPAC did not recommend the development of a

severity of illness index to the DRGs, a provision the hospitals wanted.
However, the hospitals saw the recommendations as better than the no increase
payment freeze advocated by the Reagan Administration (Medical World News,
1985:i).
The second report by ProPAC, presented to Congress on April 1, 1986, had
33 recommendations, most of them concerned with update factors; revising the
formula for inpatient deductible contributions; phasing capital payments into
PPS by FY 1987; incorporating technological change into the DRG rates; and
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recommendation:. concerning adjustments for labor markets in urban and rural
areas. In addition, the Commission recommendations included two related to
quality of care issues, one, a recommendation on the kind of information to be
given to a Medicare beneficiary about PPS and length of stay and two, a
recommendation that PROs review the entire episode of care as well as
selected outpatient surgery procedures to assess quality in other than inpatient
settings.
Even with the provisions for quality of care a:.sessment contained in the
PPS legislation, there are critics who believe that the Medicare hospital
reimbursement changes were enacted without sufficient examination of the
potential impact.

Nor was there any evaluation whether the New Jersey

program, which served as the basis for the Medicare program, had been
sufficiently tested to determine if it were suitable as a model for the
nationwide program. Even supporters of the PPS system have raised questions
about its impact.

Will the system achieve sufficient savings?

Others are

concerned about the impact on the hospital system (e.g., whether the DRG
payment rates are large enough to adequately pay hospitals for their services).
Finally, the impact of the program on elderly beneficiaries has been of
concern. For example, will quality of care change under PPS? What does the
implementation of a DRG-based prospective payment system mean for the
patient/consumer?

Will medical care differ?

Will the patient be able to

recognize any differences? In testimony before a U.

s.

Senate Subcommittee

on Health hearing on PPS, Plunkett (Senate Subcommittee on Health, 1983),
cautioned:

132

A prospective payment system, especially one based on
DRGs, would do nothing to alleviate the problem for the
consumer of health services. It would not make services
more available, it would not encourage alternative
services, and in all likelihood, would make services for
many types of illnesses, injuries and diseases more
difficult to access (p. 344).
While a number of studies on the impact of PPS on the health care system
were mandated by Congress in the legislation, most of the emphasis of this
research has been on hospitals or the DRGs themselves. In addition, the review
processes established by Congress for quality of care oversight (e.g., PROs,
ProPAC) have serious flaws regarding their focus and their ability to carry out
beneficiary related quality of care evaluations.

This emphasis on providers

obscures the potential consequences of PPS for consumers of health care
(Rosenblum, 1985).
Much remains unknown about the PPS's effects on the Medicare patient. It
is presumed that the primary method hospitals will use to remain profitable
within the PPS system will be shortening length of stay and reducing ancillary
services. It is possible that, for certain DRGs, shorter lengths of stay will have
little or no effect on the discharge status and/or follow-up care needs. For
other, more complex diagnoses, shorter stays may mean a different and/or more
intensive mix of follow-up services.

Thus, the question as to whether the

patient "looks" different or has different "treatment needs" at discharge than
similar patients discharged prior to the PPS system's implementation is an
important one. Has the DRG-based Prospective Payment System changed the
pattern of post-hospital placements (e.g., more needing home health services or
going into nursing homes than before PPS)? As Meiners and Coffey (1983) point
out:
It is important to know about the characteristics of
patients most subject to increased pressure for earlier
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discharge for two reasons. First, successful discharge
planning will depend on early identification of the
patients most likely to have unreimbursed days. Second,
a successful discharge program requires planning and
development of the necessary extended care services (p.
10).
RESEARCH ISSUES

The uncertainties surrounding the direction, strength and pace of the
impacts of Medicare's prospective payment system have sparked widespread
concern that PPS poses a substantial threat to the health care system and
argues for the provision of valid and timely data on its actual impacts (OT A,
1985). Two Congressional committees concerned about the impacts of PPS
(Senate Aging Committee, Senate Finance Committee) commissioned the
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in 1984, after the implementation of
the DRG-based system, to identify the types of economic, technological and
health-related effects that might result from the implementation of PPS and to
develop a series of strategies that would provide a framework for the
evaluation of the most important effects of PPS.

The first in a series of

reports was published in October, 1985. It identified five important dimensions
of health system performance that should be considered when evaluating PPS
impacts including:

expenditures and costs, quality of care, access to care,

technological change and clinical research (OTA, 1985). A key issue is that PPS
has intensified the concern with the complex relationship between cost and
quality of medical care.

Assessing PPS impacts on quality of care is critical for several reasons.
First, if PPS succeeds in containing expenditure growth for the Medicare
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program, its effect on the quality of care will be a deciding factor on the
program's continued survival. Second, PPS incentives for the amount and mix
of inpatient services provided to the elderly differ markedly from the
incentives of cost-based payment, yet the limited research on such prospective
payment systems has provided equivocal results.
among

professional

groups,

including

Third, widespread concern

physicians,

nurses,

and

hospital

associations as well as advocates for the elderly, that PPS might pose a
substantial threat to quality of care has made quality a central issue in any
discussion of PPS (Select Committee on Aging,

198.5; Senate Finance

Committee, 1986; Stern & Epstein, 198.5; Washington Report, 198.5).
A factor complicating the evaluation of PPS's impact on quality of care,
however, is that there is no accepted universal standard of quality. Further,
changes due to PPS will vary in terms of their seriousness, their timing, their
measurability and their distribution among patients, payers, and providers
(OT A, 198.5). For example, highly visible or easily measured effects are likely
to be the most serious (death, inappropriate readmission) and are likely to be
concentrated among a few groups of patients, such as the very old, mentally ill,
disabled, patients in specific DRGs, or those seeking care at particular kinds of
hospitals. More subtle effects, such as the impact of PPS on recuperation or
quality of life, are likely to be more difficult to measure and will emerge over
time rather than immediately. Furthermore, the timing of all PPS effects will
be extremely difficult to predict and will be mitigated as slack in the system

masks their impactc 'IJn short, although some effects. of PPS on quality of care
may surface relatively early, other effects that are equally or more important
may take some years to be detected or documented'' (OTA, 198.5, p. 77).
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In addition, three elements make up the PPS system: one, it is a system of
expenditure control; two, it restructures financial incentives to hospitals; and
three, it uses Diagnosis' Related Groups (DRG5) a5 the ba5i5 for cla55ifying
patient5 for payment. These three elements will be difficult to distinguish from
one another in terms of their impact. Many of the changes occurring as a result
of PPS might well have come about through any system of financial controls on
Medicare expenditures for ho5pital care. Other changes, such as reductions in
length of hospital stay, can be expected under any per case payment method. In
fact, decreases in lengths of stay were already occurring within the health care
system prior to the implementation of PPS.
Moreover, other effects on the availability and use of medical technologie5
can be related to the peculiar characteristics of the DRG patient cla55ification
system itself rather than the control of expenditures (OT A, 1985).

For

example, the DRG system classifies hospitalized Medicare patients into a
specific number of mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. It necessarily
groups patients with heterogeneous medical and surgical needs. The result is
that the DRG to which a patient is assigned determines how profitable (or
unprofitable) t.he patient may be for the hospital.
Without detailed analyses of how observed changes in the utilization and
organization of services affect quality and cost of health care, little can be said
about the ultimate success or failure of PPS. Certain methodological obstacles
constrain the development of an accurate view of PPS including: the difficulty
in operationalizing concepts such as quality, access and technological change;
the lack of refined impact measure& and current data bases by which to set
baselines and measure changes; the limited feasibility of attributing observed
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changes to PPS due to other changes in the system; and the cost and time
required to measure changes and impacts (OTA, 1985). A number of changes
resulting from PPS can be evaluated despite these constraints. The importance
of such evaluation is that it could provide early detection of unintended
consequences of PPS as well as for short-term positive results.

Research Question
The question to be addressed by this dissertation is whether a sample of
Medicare patients differed from a sample of

beneficiaries after

the

implementation of the DRG-based Prospective Payment System. SpeCifically,
this dissertation will examine beneficiary health status and post-hospital
placement as the first step in more comprehensive evaluations of the DRGbased Prospective Payment System of Medicare.

CONCLUSION

For a considerable period after the Second World War, the federal
government's health care policy focused on stimulating supply to meet an
increasing public demand.

The United States has supported an expanding

federal role in social and medical insurance over the past forty years as its
major public policy tool for improving the standard of living, health and income
security for the poor, elderly, and disadvantaged. In addition, tax subsidies in
support of private health insurance assured adequate coverage and access to the
most advanced health care system for most of the population.
As a major contributor to these costs, the federal government, facing
massive budget deficits and expecting high increases in the Medicare program
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(the Medicare budget was expected to double to $110 billion by 1987), approved
sweeping policy changes designed to curtail program growth and begin a process
of reordering the incentives that had driven the system since the program began
(Iglehart, 1985).
The legislation, the 1983 amendments to the Social Security Act, was the
centerpiece of the Reagan Administration's efforts to control costs and
established a national set of per-case prices in 467 diagnosis-related groups
(DRGs) for care delivered to Medicare beneficiaries. The Prospective Payment
System (PPS) shifts hospital reimbursement from retrospective payment to
prospective rate setting.

The government intended this change to create

financial incentives for hospitals to deliver services in the most efficient
manner by making cost a consideration in health care treatment decisions.
While these changes could improve quality of care, quality could also be
compromised.

Premature discharge may necessitate readmissions, illness

treatable at an early stage could progress undetected to a more serious degree,
or patients could be forced to acquire follow-up care in inappropriate settings.
The potential is there for expenditures to be so constrained that adequate care
is impossible and patient outcomes seriously compromised (OTA, 1985).
Saving money in the Medicare program is important, but so is maintaining
access to medical care and the quality of care. It must be recognized that a
national preoccupation with costs may adversely effect quality of care,
especially for the elderly. It is vital to evaluate PPS. Specifically, what are
the costs of cost containment? Are cost reductions coming at the expense of
needed care for vulnerable groups through premature discharge of elderly
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patients? Learning whether patients are being discharged from the hospitals
"quicker" and "sicker" and whether there are changes in their placement in the
community are important first steps in evaluating the broader impact of DRGbased PPS and will, when added to hospital-based information, show a more
accurate picture of the changes taking place in the health care system. This
dissertation addresses this very important first step in the evaluation of PPS on
quality of care.

The next chapter delineates the methodology used in the

conduct of the dissertation.

CHAPTEJR.m

METHODOLOGY
Given the importance of quality of care issues under PPS, this dissertation
focuses on the impact PPS may be having on the Medicare beneficiary. The
specific question is whether PPS may be inappropriately shifting the locus of
care for Medicare beneficiaries from the hospital to the community by
shortening length of stay, discharging Medicare patients "quicker and sicker",
and increasing the number of Medicare beneficiaries needing subacute care
from community-based care providers. There has been little systematic data
published on this critical issue to date.
The research upon which this disc;ertation is based is derived from an
original research project conducted by the staff of Northwest Oregon Health
Systems (NOHS) during 1985 and 1986.

The study measured the changes in

Medicare beneficiary health status at hospital discharge before and after the
implementation of PPS.

This dissertation is unique and separate from the

NOHS Dependency at Discharge (1986) study in that, while utilizing the
Dependency measurement tool developed for the NOHS study, it extends this
work by examining Dependency in relation to changes in the discharge
di~position

of Medicare patients to community-based care providers before and

after the implementation of PPS.
This dissertation can also be distinguished from the NOHS study in that it
identifies and describes the broader changes occurring in the health care system
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besides PPS and discusses the impacts all of these changes are having on the
traditional health care system. Finaily, this disseration addresses a variety of
health policy implications raised by the potential shift in the locus of care of
Medicare beneficiaries created by the implementation of PPS.

QUALITY OF CARE

While Medicare's PPS system is expected to impact cpality of care in a
variety of ways, quality remains "poorly defined" (OT A, 19&.5, p. 7&).

Two

terms are frecpently used in the literature of health care quality -- "quality
assessment"

and

"quality

assurance."

Quality

assessment

refers

to

measurement and evaluation of the quality of care for individuals, groups, or
populations. Quality assurance, in contrast, refers to integrated programs that
attempt to protect or raise quality of care by monitoring medical care delivery,
taking corrective action when problems are found, and following up on
corrective actions.

Historically, quality assurance programs have focused on

changing the behavior of individual providers, such as physicians within a
hospital setting.

The Professional Review Organizations (PROs) within the

Medicare program are the major example of quality assurance efforts.
Although

quality

assessment

and

quality

assurance

are

often

used

interchangeably, it is the distinctive attribute of quality assessment, in the
context of evaluating the care of individuals as a result of PPS, which is the
focus of this dissertation.
Measures of q..Jality of care fall into three categories: structure, process,
and outcome (Donabedian, 1966). Structure and process fall within the quality
domain while outcome tends to be classified as a quality assessment function.
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Structure refers to the relatively fixed and stable parts of the medical care
delivery system, such as numbers, types, and qualifcations of professional
personnel, physical facilities, and medical technologies. Criteria for structural
factors are set by professional associations, regulatory bodies, or legislation and
are used for accreditation, licensing, and Medicare certification purposes (OT A,
1985). Process measures involve the care of the patient, such as the application
of medical procedures, drugs, nursing care, and so forth. For the most part, the
process of care is evaluated against implicit or explicit criteria that reflect
professional norms of practice. Process measures are more tentative indicators
of quality, although some do correlate with outcomes, such as "handwashing
reduces infection," "pap smears improve the likelihood of detecting cervical
cancer," "nursing care can reduce or prevent bedsores and skin ulcers" (OT A,
1985, p. 79). In most instances, developing the criteria for linking the process
of care to outcome can be developed through either the consensus of experts
(usually physicians), the accumulation of evidence from clinical practice, or
clinical trials and research.

However, for every example of a "probable

process-outcome link, there is one for which the evidence is equivocal" (OT A,
1985, p. 79).
The best example of this is length of stay.

A study by the Office of

Technology Assessment (OTA) in 1983 concluded that variations in length of
hospital stay for five diseases were not shown to be related to differences in
health outcomes {Chassen, 1983).

Acute myocardial infarction or elective

surgery patients who were discharged "early" fared no worse than those with
traditionally longer lengths of stay. In psychiatric disorders, shorter lengths of
stay were shown to be beneficial.

There is little consensus in the medical
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profession regarding what is an "appropriate" length of stay for any given
diagnosis.

Thus, links between much of the process of medical care and

eventual patient outcomes have not been well demonstrated.

Consequently,

judging quality by process measures (i.e., length of stay) is questionable, tends
to give an incomplete picture and gives no clues as to likely outcomes for
patients (Brook & Lohr, 198.5).
Outcomes are seen as the. result of patient care and are more direct
reflections of patient benefits since they are measures of changes in the
patient's health status. Although health statu'i itself has many dimensions, such
as the level of functioning in activitie'i of daily living, emotional health,
physiologic functioning,

satisfaction

with care, health status has most

frequently been defined to include the physical, mental, and social well-being of
individuals (OT A, 198.5).

Examples of such evaluation are, at a macro level,

made in terms of death or presence of illness or disability and, at a more
specific level, in terms of pre'ience or absence of fever or infection, the level
of functioning of a specific organ, and so forth. These measures are relatively
unambiguous but they tend to be insensitive to small or incremental changes in
medical practice. Furthermore, outcomes need to be evaluated over time: the
patient's health status at the time of discharge from a hospital may or may not
indicate his or her health status in a week, month, or a year. Another drawback
is that the collection of data on outcomes may be very expensive and intrusive
if, for instance, patients must be interviewed or examined directly (OTA, 198.5).
Theoretically, then, measures of quality of health care should use specific
measures in all three categories (structure, process, outcome).

However, this
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rarely has occurred. For example, the Health Care Financing Administration
has used an outcome measure, in-hospital mortality rates by specific diagnosis,
to evaluate the quality of hospital care. But this method does not capture all
three parameters of quality and has been roundly criticized as simplifying the
relationship between a complex set of variables that may result in mortality;
for example, severity of illness at hospital admission or differences in physician
practice patterns may influence outcomes as well as diagnosis (Vladeck, 1985).
Other studies have examined frequency of procedures in relation to patient
outcome (Flood, Scott, & Eury, 1984a,b; Hadley, 1982; and Wennberg, 1982,
1984a,b; ) and readmission rates (e.g., Guterman &: Dobson, 1986). However,
these analyses have primarily been used for purposes other than comprehensive
quality of care evaluations (OTA, 1985).
Current research on PPS/beneficiary impact has been limited to anecdotal
reports, surveys of service providers or beneficiaries, and policy-related
speculations on the impact of the PPS system on the Medicare population (GAO,
1985; Tatge, 1985; Murray, 1984).

While PPS may cut costs, demographic

trends along with advances in medical technology may push costs up again.
With rising costs for hospitalization and falling reimbursement rates, many
hospitals are likely to turn to community-based service delivery organizations
to fill the gap between shortened hospital stay and the adequate recovery of the
Medicare patient. However, meeting the diverse needs of the elderly patient in
the most effective and efficient manner will require more information and
planning to ensure the availability of appropriate levels and quality of care.
Experts in community care nursing and social work research are examining
the impact of PPS on the continuing care needs of the elderly and the resources
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available at the community level. Initial findings from a social work study at
Mt. Sinai Medical Center indicated that patients being referred to long-term
care facilities are exhibiting a much higher degree of co-morbidities (more than
one illness) upon admission (Rehr, 1984). After an eight month study, Kornblatt
et al. (1985) report that Medicare patients, newly referred to home health
agencies, required more services, more education and a greater number of visits
than those referred two years earlier. Although both authors acknowledge the
possibility

of

cohort

effects,

they

attribute

these

changes

to

the

implementation of PPS. While these studies contribute to our understanding of
the clinical impacts of the DRG system changes, more work is needed to
develop a multi-disciplinary method of systematically assessing the health
status of patients at each point in the health care delivery system.

For

example, status at hospital admission, hospital discharge, admission to
community-based care, and so forth.
Specifically, data are needed that would aid in identifying how and in what
ways appropriate adjustments to Medicare coverage rules and reimbursement
amounts should be made. The current DRG discharge system has a number of
unique characteristics; including {l) it is diagnosis specific, (2) it is time-based,
and, (3) although derived from national averages, it is somewhat insensitive to
the needs of special populations (e.g., the severely ill).

In contrast, most

clinical assessment regarding health status is situation specific, has little
standardization, and focuses on special needs.
Although there is no universal quality of care measure, researchers agree
that identifying changes in health status at hospital discharge in relation to
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discharge disposition is an essential step in evaluating the impact of PPS on the
health care system for the elderly (OTA, 198.5). In addition, due to the gap
between generic DRGs and specific clinical summaries, a uniform scale that
comprehensively

measures

patient dependency at discharge

relative to

discharge disposition would be of benefit to policy-makers, providers, and
beneficiaries themselves. Therefore, research that could empirically assess any
changes in quality of care- for example, changes in length of stay; changes in
beneficiary health status; changes in post-hospital placement; changes in
amount and mix of services rendered the Medicare patient while in the hospital
setting since the implementation of PPS - would be of significant benefit.

HYPOTHESIS OF THE DISSERTATION
The focus of this study, then, is on whether a POST-PPS sample differed
from a PRE-PPS sample in terms of health status and post-hospital placement
upon discharge from a hospital. The essential question to be addressed in this
dissertation is whether the post-hospital placement (e.g., nursing home, home
alone, hospital transfer, group home) of Medicare beneficiaries differed before
and after the implementation of the PPS system.

The hypothesis to be

examined in this dissertation is:
H0 1: Both discharge health status, as measured on the
Dependency at Discharge Classification Tool, and posthospital placement as measured by type of placement
upon discharge from the hospital, have not been
significantly modified by the implementation of the
DRG-based Prospective Payment System of Medicare.
It should be noted that this research is exploratory and can only begin to
address some of the methodological issues identified in measuring the impact of
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PPS on quality of care for the Medicare beneficiary. Data for this research are
from the Dependency at Discharge research project, conducted by Northwest
Oregon Health Systems (NOHS) in 1986. The NOHS study measured changes in
beneficiary

health

status at

hospital

discharge

before

and

after

implementation of Medicare's Prospective Payment System (PPS).

the
This

dissertation focuses on Medicare beneficiary discharge status in relation to
post-hospital placement.

The following sections describe

the

purpose,

objectives and methods of data collection used by NOHS in the conduct of the
Dependency at Discharge study (1986). National data will be used to illustrate
the impacts of PPS on hospitals, physicians, and consumers of health care.

OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

Two methodological issues were addressed in the NOHS study. The first
was the development of a measurement instrument for "discharge status". This
new data collection instrument had to be applicable in both the PRE and POST
time periods, relevant to the hospitalized population, and common across
hospitals.

The second was a valid sampling methodology that adequately

represented the change and severity of "common" DRG classification.

Objective One: Patient Classification
The term patient classification is familiar to many hospital and nursing
administrators and some health care researchers.

Patient classification

systems were initially developed in the late 1950s as a means of more
accurately estimating nursing care resources required to care for patients in
order to predict costs (Shaffer, 1986).

There have been a number of
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classification systems developed since then, although the ability of these
systems to accomplish their goal has been somewhat mixed (e.g., Bergner, 1985;
Brook, Ware, & Rogers, 1983; Ware, Brook, & Davies, 1985). These measures
typically focus on the physical and mental aspects of health and are generally
measured by direct examination, interview, or self-administered questionnaires.
Although many of these instruments have been shown to be highly reliable
and valid, no one set of classification instruments comprehensively measures
health outcomes for the Medicare population (OTA, 1985). Furthermore, the
variables forming these patient classification schemes depend on their ultimate
use by the specific health care organization. Yet, a measurement tool was
needed that could assess changes in patient health status at the point of
hospital discharge as well as identify the ultimate placement of the patient
after hospitalization.
Since the NOHS study was concerned with inpatient discharge status, it
was determined that the literature regarding patient classification for purposes
of planning and designating resources in the inpatient as well as commt.mitybased care settings should be examined. Two systems were identified in the
inpatient classification literature that had potential use for the NOHS study.
One system focused on status at admission to an acute care facility (a hospital).
Examples of this type of classification system include the International
Classification of Diseases-ninth revision (ICD-9) codes, which are the standard
patient classification codes for most American hospitals, and the DiagnosisRelated Groups (DRGs) developed by Yale University.
classification systems are based on the patient's diagnosis.

Both of these
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However, while diagnosis is often identified as a major explanatory
variable in assessing patient status in the inpatient setting, many authorities
have pointed out the limitations of a diagnosis-centered approach when
describing the elderly (Kane and Kane, 1981).

Most recently, this caveat has

been reinforced by Susan Horn (1986) in her work on severity of illness
indicators; itself a diagnosis-based patient classification system. She points out
that information based soley on diagnosis, expenses or hospital charges makes
clinical comparisons difficult (Horn, 1986).
Another patient classification system utilized in resource identification is
that of nursing care reqired by patients. Most classification schemes in the
nursing literature have attempted to quantify the level of nursing care
requirements of patients in an acute care hospital setting. These classification
systems have been generally designed for a particular setting and most typically
include the patient's need for assistance with Activities of Daily Living (ADLs),
special procedures and treatment needs, observation needs, instructional needs,
and emotional needs.
There are three basic approaches to patient classification in nursing: the
prototype; the task document, and the critical indicator (Martinetto, 1986).
Prototype approaches are characterized by paragraph descriptions of "typical
patients" in each category level of care. However, it is generally agreed that
there are no "typical" category descriptions that effectively allow reliable
patient classification because too much subjectivity in classification is likely.
The "task document approach" attempts to view nursing as an extensive number
of discrete interventions or tasks that have precise beginnings and endings.
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The premise here is that if one could list all care interventions and determine
the average time required to complete each intervention, then one could
quantify total time required for patient care. The critical indicator approach
allows effective and efficient classification of patients through the listing of a
limited number of specific care requirements or nursing interventions that are
associated with a significant amount of nursing care time. No attempt is made
to list all interventions or to quantify specific times per discrete task. The goal
of this approach is to quickly group patients sharing similar amounts of required
care time.
Only the critical indicators of nursing care are considered to effectively
and efficiently categorize patient care (Martinetto, 1986). Most research on
nursing workload identifies patient assessment, intervention based upon the
assessment, and the evaluation of the effectiveness of all interventions as the
basic work activities. The most accurate predictor of staffing needs is based
upon a measurement of average amounts of nursing time required to accomplish
these activities.

The critical indicators most often found to predict nursing

workload were patient ADL ability, medication administration, vital signs and
assessments, treatments and procedures, and psycho-social support and/or
teaching required (Martinetto, 1986).
In addition to nursing classification systems, many hospital social work
departments have developed their own pre-screening assessment tools for the
timely and efficient identification of patients who required discharge planning
for post-hospital placement.

However, their approach has been directed

primarily towards assessing social, financial, and functional status excluding
medical indicators.
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According to Giovanetti {1978), hospital systems typically classify patients
by counting service units such as assistance with Activities of Daily Living
(ADLs), special procedures and treatments, observations, instruction, and
emotional support.

But, patient classification systems designed for nursing

management have been criticized for their limitations as cost predictors since
services are measured rather than patient characteristics indicating need for
services. That is, use of services to predict services does not allow for the
discrepancy of whether the service was needed.
Another well utilized set of classification tools falls into the category of
screening or pre-screening tools for post-hospital placement.

An extensive

review of this literature identified several well-tested patient classification
instruments; including the Activities of Daily Living Tool (ADLs) (Katz et al.,
1963), the Older Americans Research and Service Center Instrument (OARS)
(Duke University, 1978), the Instrumental Activities of Daily Living Tool
(IADLs) (Lawton & Brody, 1969), the Health Status Scale (HSS) (Ballard &
McNamara, 1983), the Appropriateness Evaluation Protocol {ADP) (Gertman &
Restuccia, 1981), the Placement Information Base (PIB) {State of Oregon, 1982),
and the Mini-Mental Scale MMS) (Folstein, Folstein, &: McHugh, 1975).
However, many of these instruments require direct patient observation or
access to data typically not available in the patient's medical record.
Finally, studies comparing long term care placement instruments have
found that the common kinds of dimensions found on these tools are self-care
with ADL ability, mental and behavioral status, and need for nursing procedures
(Patterson, 1987). For example, Leatt, Bay, and Stinson (1981) reviewed some
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34 classification scales and studies and derived an instrument for assessing and
classifying long-term care patients by type of care. They observed 585 patients
using 130 measurement variables.

They found that the two most important

variables for discriminating between care needs were: requirements of nursing
services within an institution and the need for medical assessments.
The next most important variables were: level of independence in walking,
independence in grooming, and age. Their analyses showed that psychosocial
variables did not emerge as important· contributors for determining care
requirements (Leatt, Bay & Stinson, 1981). However, Giovanetti (1978), among
others, believes that age is a less universal predictor of nursing care.

In

addition, Foley and Schneider (1980) examined six assessment tools for long
term care placement and found that most of the instruments identified the
patient's ability to perform ADLs, mobility, mental and behavioral status, and
degree of nursing services and treatments performed as the most salient
characteristics of placement. In the home health field, researchers have found
that a patient's level of functioning was more predictive than the diagnostic
category for determining agency resource use (Ballard & McNamara, 1983;
Brill, Scholosser & Widmer, 1978).
Thus, the findings from the research on these patient classification
instruments indicated that the most salient, reliable, and valid factors defining
patient status are: deficits in the ability for self care and needs for nursing
assistance to maintain physiological stability. Although the focus of the NOHS
research was not designed to measure nursing care output, it was decided to
attempt to measure patient indicators rather than service descriptors.
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Objective Two: Sample Representativeness.

Because

of

constrained

resources and time for the project, the NOHS study limited analysis of
diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) to five (.5) DRGs.

The process of selecting

which DRGs would be included involved identifying the most frequent DRG
admissions for the Portland metropolitan area as well as identifying the most
frequent DRGs for the participating hospitals for which data were available.
Meetings were held with each of the participating hospital's discharge planning
and utilization review staff in order to identify which DRGs were most common
in each of the hospitals for the preceding year. In addition, hospital staff were
asked to identify a list of diagnoses they considered to be the most
"problematic'' for their hospital in regards to placement upon discharge and
reimbursement under PPS. The top ten medical and surgical DRGs from each
list were then compared by hospital to obtain a final list of ten DRGs. This list
would then be narrowed down to five DRGs (three medical and two surgical), by
comparing the hospitals' lists to regional admission diagnoses compiled by the
state's PRO.
The Oregon Medical Professional Review Organization (OMPRO), Oregon's
Peer Review Organization, was asked to conduct a computer run on all
Medicare discharges for the previous six months from hospitals in the Portland
metropolitan area to identify the most frequent discharges. The OMPRO list
and the hospitals' lists were then compared, eliminating those DRGs that would
identify the hospitals, such as cancer, heart surgery. The comparison revealed
the top five most freqJent diagnoses as:
DRG 14: STROKE
DRG 89: PNEUMONIA
DRG 127: HEART FAlLURE
DRG 209: HIP REPLACEMENT
DRG 210: MAJOR JOINT PINNING
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These five DRGs were then compared to national statistics on DRG
frequency which revealed that all five were within the top 10 DRGs at a
national level.

Selection for medical DRGs was done in four hospitals and

selection of surgical DRGs was done in three hospitals. Surgical DRGs were not
selected in one hospital because of the length of time needed to identify
eligible cases from the hospital's records.
The sample size was determined by power tables (Fleiss, 1973).

In order

to test for a result greater than chance (.05), a minimum of 150 observations
per DRG per time period were necessary.

The desired number of medical

records to be reviewed totaled 2,900. The sample distribution is illustrated in
Figure 1.
PRE-DRGs
10/&1 - 9/83

POST-DRGs
4/&4- 7J&5

TOTAL

MEDICAL DRGs
Hospital
Hospital
Hospital
Hospital

A:
B:

C:
D:

250
250
250
250

250
250
250
250

500
500
500
500

SURGICAL DRGs
Hospital B:
Hospital C:
Hospital D:
TOTAL

150 150
1.50 150
150 150

300
300
300
2,900

Figure 1. Desired Sample Design.
Feasibility of Data Collection. In terms of feasibility of data collection, it
was clear

that interviews of patients concerning discharge status for

hospitalizations one to three years in the past would be of questionable validity.
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Observation of patients could not be accomplished for a PRE-PPS sample.
Results from other studies indicated that a more efficient, valid and readily
available data source is the patient's medical record.
Although most classification schemes are based on direct observation of
the patient, secondary data have been utilized for classifying nursing home
needs and patients.

For example, Ballard and McNamara (1983) conducted a

retrospective review of 397 home health records and reported similar findings
to those of other studies which used direct observation. They found that the
critical predictors of post-hospital resource use tended to be deficits in selfcare for activities of daily living and for maintenance of physiological stability
via nursing intervention (Ballard & McNamara, 1983).

In addition, since all

American Hospital Association (AHA) affiliated hospitals have uniform charting
requirements, it was assumed that local area hospitals would

provide

comparable data from their medical records. Therefore, it was determined that
information from the patient's medical record would allow for feasible, reliable,
and valid data collection.

Still to be determined was the selection of items

which represented patient health status.

Instrument Development.

The

purpose

of

the

initial

instrument

development was to design and test a tool that would measure an individual's
level of independence and/or dependence in self-care at hospital discharge
(health status).

Three methods for validating the instrument were used:

a

literature review, medical record chart review, and an expert panel review of
the prototype instrument. The instrument developed for the NOHS study builds
upon the literatures reviewed and initiatially included the most discriminating
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items identified from this review. An initial instrument consisting of twentyone (21) items was constructed and measured the following: one group measured
physical

functioning

(that

is,

ADLs,

IADLs).

Examples

include

ambulation/mobility, toileting, bathing, eating, and so forth. These items were
identified in the literature as relevant to patient classification. A second group
measured mental functioning, such as awareness, coping skills, emotional
assessment (derived from the PIB and MMS). A third group measured treatment
components, such as management of medications, special treatments, referrals
for therapy and observation requirements (derived from nursing care literature).
Finally, a fourth group of items measured diagnostic and referral variables,
such as -diagnostic category, co-morbidity (secondary diagnoses or other
contributing conditions), continuing care requirements, services prescribed, preadmission living arrangements, post-hospital placement, length of stay and age.
In order to determine whether the selected variables could be measured
from data available in hospital records, the initial instrument was applied to
forty-seven (47) medical records from five Portland metropolitan hospitals.
This preliminary analysis revealed that sufficient medical record documentation
was available on: Activities of Daily Living (ADLs), Medications, Procedures,
Signs/Symptoms, and Age.

Little documentation was found for items for

Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs) or items from the Mini-Mental
Scale (MMS).

Specifically, information was found for the following items:

activity/mobility information (96% of cases), bathing/hygiene information (72%
of cases), medications information (100% of cases), and symptoms/procedures
(87% of cases) as observed by non-nurse reviewers. Information pertaining to
the patients' ability to feed themselves, mental functioning information, and
detailed emotional functioning information was far less consistent.
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Inconsistently documented or non-documented items were deleted from the
measurement tool.

Thus, the instrument was reduced to only the most

discriminant items, including: (1) Activity/Mobility (ADLs); (2) Bathing/Hygiene
(ADLs); (3) Signs/Symptoms (nursing care needs); (4) Number of Medications (5)
Procedures (nursing treatments needed); and (6) Age. It was felt that the term
that

most

accurately described

DEPENDENCY.

the combination

of

these

items was

The instrument was named the Dependency at Discharge

Classification Tool (DepD) and measured deficits in ability for self-care. A
copy of the instrument is included in the Appendix.
In addition to the medical record ratings on Dependency, other data were
identified as available to be collected.

This included sex, race, hospital,

DRG/Diagnosis, pre-admission living arrangements, post-hospital placement,
receipt of discharge planning, data collector/rater, and medical record review
date.
A model for the instrument was then designed, using ordinal rating scales
and cumulative scoring to achieve an overall classification rating for the
patient's level of Dependency, or acuity at hospital discharge. The model used
was based on an Apache

n Acuity rating format

with scores of 0 -2 - 4 - and 6

with 6 the most "dependent" and 0 the least "dependent" scores (Knaus, Draper,
and Wagner, 1984).
The overall scores for the six item scale used for rating the patient ranged
from 0 to 36. Using the revised instrument with the .six rating scales, ten (10)
additional hospital records were reviewed to determine the availability of
medical record content and feasibility of scoring patient status.

This test
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demonstrated that it was possible to fully rate each of the patients whose
record was reviewed. Protocols for record review were then developed in order
to outline decision-making steps for forming judgments about the ratings.
Expert Panel Validation. A group of nurses considered experts in hospital
patient assessment for the purposes of discharge planning were convened to
evaluate the instrument and protocols.

The group included two hospital

discharge planners, one director of a hospital-based home health agency, one
adult care clinical specialist-nurse educator, and one hospital medical unit head
nurse.
The evaluation process consisted of a series of independent assessments
and votes in answer to the following questions:
1.

Do the six items pertain to dependency at hospital discharge?

2.

Are there other items you would add to the concept of dependency at
hospital discharge?

3.

Do the descriptions for the ratings generally pertain to (are they
variations of} each tool item?

4.

Using the definition for each item, is each of the ratings discrete and
independent?

5.

Using the definition and the protocol for each item, are the ratings
discrete and independent?

Modifications were suggested by the group following each vote tally, and
the revisions were incorporated into the instrument and protocols.

The

instrument items were then coded onto printed optical mark (oP-scan) sheets
designed for data collection and input onto computer tape by machine reading.
The Dependency at Discharge Classification Instrument protocols for data
collection were completed in July, 1985.
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STUDY DESIGN

The major objective of the NOHS study was to gather and evaluate
preliminary evidence on the impact of the Prospective Payment System (PPS)
on the health status at hospital discharge for Medicare beneficiaries.

The

major objective of this dissertation was to evaluate exploratory data on
differences in Medicare beneficiary discharge placement in relation to their
discharge health status before and after the implementation of PPS.
The purpose of a research design is to control extraneous variance and
maximize the experiment variance. Kerlinger (1973) identifies four criteria by
which to judge the adequacy of research designs: one, does the design answer
the research questions; that is, does the design adequately test the hypotheses?
Two, does the design adequately control the independent variables? Three, does
the design allow for generalizing the results of the study to other subjects,
other groups, and other conditions?

And, four, does the design adequately

address the issues of internal and external validity (Kerlinger, 1973)?

The

following section will address these criteria as they relate to the NOHS study
design.
In a true experiment, the researcher can manipulate at least one
independent variable for optimal statistical efficiency.
experimental

variable

in

the

NOHS

study

was

However, the

implemented

almost

simultaneously in all local hospitals, including the sample hospitals. Therefore,
the research design could only approximate a true experiment. Because control
of the experimental variable, that is, the Prospective Pricing System for
Medicare hospital reimbursement, could not be manipulated, the NOHS study
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selected a PRE/POST time series design (Campbell & Stanley, 1966).

This

method is considered one of the most appropriate models for tasks such as the
NOHS study undertook.
Campbell and Stanley (1966) identify twelve (12) factors which may
jeopardize the validity of various experimental and quasi-experimental designs:
history, maturation, testing, instrumentation, statistical regression, selection,
experimental mortality, selection-maturation interaction, external validity, the
interaction effect of testing or unrepresentati veness, the interaction between
selection and the experimental variable, reactive effects, and multipletreatment interference.

Validity in this case means the extent to which

explanations other than the "program" under evaluation can be ruled out as
responsible for the observed effect (internal validity) and the extent to which
the findings can be generalized beyond the study sample (external validity)
(Campbell & Stanley, 1966).
While true experimental designs address most of the factors that threaten
validity, such a design could not be implemented for this study. Controlled
(true) experiments are typically carried out prospectively and generally involve
random assignment of subjects to an experimental or control group. Because
both groups are exposed to whatever simultaneous influences that might occur
during the experiment, differences between the groups can reasonably be
attributed to the experimental variable.

However, in the case of PPS, the

program was implemented universally in community hospitals and left no
hospitals outside the system suitable for comparison. Therefore, the PRE/POST
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comparison without a control group, a quasi-experimental design, was chosen
for the NOHS study.

While less efficient than a true experiment, the

PRE/POST comparison is the most efficient model to apply to the current PPSimpact question and does address many of the threats to validity identified by
Campbell and Stanley (1966).
A quasi-experimental design does not not adhere to the strict requirements
of true experiments in that it utilizes either pre/post program comparisons or
comparison groups whose representativeness is not established.

In order to

effectively utilize this model, the researcher must have a high level of
confidence that the comparison groups used

in the study are indeed

representative before such a design can offer much validity (OTA, 1985). The
groups used in the NOHS study were randomly selected from all Medicare
admissions for the selected DRGs and appropriate time periods (PRE/POST) and
thus provide a basis for such confidence in the comparison groups. The process
for random selection is described in a following section.
The PRE/POST time series design utilizes a measurement on each group or
individual at several points in time with the introduction of an experimental
change between the measurements (Campbell & Stanley, 1966). Although this
design was used for the data collection, the data were clustered for analysis.

While the design lacks a control group, it does control for maturation,
testing, regression, selection, mortality, and the interaction of selection and
maturation. However, the design does not control for history, instrumentation,
the interaction of testing and X, the interaction of selection and X, reactive
arrangements and multiple-X interference.
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Campbell and Stanley (1966) point out that the failure to control for
history is the most definite weakness of this design.

That is, the rival

hypothesis exists that not X but some more or less simultaneous event produced
the shift. It is the "plausibly'' ruling out of alternative hypotheses that is the
greatest challenge to the researcher utilizing this design (Guterman & Dobson,
1986).
The design is further threatened by the fact that other, simultaneous
influences are occurring in the health care system which could account for any
differences found.

This concern is relevant for the analysis of PPS in that

other, simultaneous changes have been identified as occurring in the health
system at the same time that PPS was implemented.

This confounds any

attempt to directly attribute many of the health system changes to PPS.
However, it is possible to conduct PRE/POST analyses that provide strong
evidence about the impacts of PPS.

Success, however, hinges on careful a

priori analysis of the likely magnitude and direction of other factors so that the
"effects" of PPS may be reasonably inferrred (Fleiss, 1973).
An alternative design which might have been used is the multiple timeseries design, in which the researcher utilizes an equivalent control group over
the same repeated measures as the experimental group (Campbell &: Stanley,
1966). However, there were no "equivalent'' institutions available which were
not undergoing the conversion to the PPS system, nationally or in the Portland
metropolitan area. Implementation of PPS began on October 1, 1983. By the
end of 198fl., a total of 5,405 hospitals (81 %) of all Medicare participating
hospitals were operating under PPS (Guterman & Dobson, 1986). Furthermore,
using other hospitals in another city was not feasible.
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Hospital Selection.

Four Portland, Oregon, metropolitan hospitals were

used as data collection sites for the NOHS study.

The hospitals, similar in

organization and type of patient services, included two large hospitals (300+
beds) and two medium-sized hospitals (100-300 beds). Two of the hospitals were
located in suburban areas and two were located in the metropolitan core. All
were private non-profit commtmity hospitals representative of hospitals in the
Portland metropolitan area.
The Prospective Payment System was mandated to go into effect at the
beginning of each hospital's fiscal year during 1983 and 1984.

Because each

hospital had different fiscal year schedules, the conversion date to the PPS
system was different for the four hospitals included in this study. The hospitals
all converted to the system between October, 1983, and April, 1984.
Medical Record Selection.

In order to control for possible effects of

changes in management polices and staffing practices as a result of the PPS
system, medical records were not eligible for inclusion in the NOHS study in the
six months before and the six months after each hospital converted to the PPS
reimbursement system. Allowing for the six month transition period to PPS,
the eighteen (18) months prior to the conversion to PPS reimbursement was
determined to be the PRE-period and involved sampling medical records from
1981; 1982, and 1983.

The POST-period covered the eighteen month period

after conversion to PPS reimbursement and involved sampling medical records
from 1984 and 1985. The two data collection time periods thus ranged from
October, 1981 through September, 1983 for the PRE-PPS sample period and
April, 1984 through July, 1985 for the POST-PPS sample period.
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Hospital medical records were randomly selected for inclusion in the study
from master lists of all Medicare admissions for five (.5) diagnosis-related
groups (DRGs). Each hospital provided master lists of admissions basedon the
following selection criteria: Medicare beneficiary, 60 years or older, discharge
date within PRE and POST time period, and diagnosis (DRG).
The NOHS study sample was randomly selected from each hospital's master
list according to the following criteria: Age (60 or older), did not expire on
selected admission, and had a length of stay between three (3) and twenty-two
(22) days. Selected medical records were then typed onto lists for the data
collectors to use in pulling and abstracting the medical records for data
collection. The total sample size goal was 2,900 charts. However, due to a
number of factors, 2,777 medical records were actually reviewed. The reasons
for a smaller number of charts to be abstracted in two of the four sample
hospitals include: the universe of cases to be sampled from did not equal or
exceed the required 1.50 cases per DRG, per time period. All admissions within
these DRGs in the two hospitals were then included in the study but the total,
in some cases, still did not equal the study's goals. Further, where possible,
oversam piing was done for the PRE and POST time periods to ensure an
adequate pool of replacement cases for charts found to be ineligible for
incluc;ion in the study (e.g., expired; that is, the patient died in the hospital on
the sampled admission).
Another problem encountered in the sample selection process was that two
hospitals did not have their PRE-period Medicare admissions on an in-house
computer system. Thus, a hard-copy printout of Medicare admissions, produced
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by an out-of-state abstracting service, had to be used to identify eligible cases
by hand. · In many instances, needed identification information was not readily
available from these abstract print-outs.

Additionally, two hospitals did not

have their PRE-period admissions listed by DRG. Thus, eligible cases had to be
identified from hard-copy listings of

admissio~s

using the ICD-9 (International

Classification of Diseases - Ninth Revision) codes in the appropriate DRGs.
Moreover, one hospital was excluded from the sampling of surgical DRGs due to
the length of time required to develop a valid list of cases eligible for selection.
Finally, protocols that were developed to coordinate the pulling and re-filing of
the medical records to ensure that all eligible records were available for coding
were not always followed by hospital staff.
Data Collector Training. AU data collectors were registered nurses. Seven
nurses were hired in August, 1985, and trained to use the Dependency at
Discharge Classification Instrument in two separate training sessions. The first
group of three data collectors was trained in August, 1985, using records from
the four study-site hospitals.

A second group of four data collectors was

trained in October, 1985 using charts from one of the study hospitals.
Training was the same for both groups. The data collectors assembled for
several hours in a conference room near the medical records departments of
one of the participating hospitals. The NOHS research team member who had
developed the data collection protocols served as both trainer and data
collector for the project.
The training sessions included a review of the history and purpose of the
Dependency at Discharge Classification tool (DepD), the data abstraction
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protocols, and rating several trial medical records for education and discussion.
Agreement rates, based on the Dependency rating scale, were tallied during the
sessions to monitor learning and achievement of consistency across raters.
When agreement rates reached at least 70 percent, raters were asked to
independently review records for reliability checks.
The data collectors were all baccalaureate-level nurses from various
schools with various levels and types of nursing experience. One was recently
retired after 40 years work as a medical-surgical nurse, two were recent
nursing school graduates, two were nursing graduate students and one was a
university faculty member.

An eighth nurse began the training and data

collection process in August, but soon moved out of the state.

All records

abstracted by this nurse were excluded from the data analysis.
Data Collection. Data collection for the NOHS study took place between
September, 1985 and April, 1986. Data collection in each hospital lasted from
two to three months. Problems encountered in data collection included limited
hours of access to medical record departments; difficulty in scheduling data
collectors to complete data collection due to conflicting schedules (e.g., school
demands, job demands); one hospital had its PRE-period medical records on
microfische which made identification and abstraction of charts more difficult
and time consuming; conflicts between the study versus the hospital work
demand upon hospital medical record personnel time; vacation time and
holidays made scheduling data collection problematic.

However, these

problems of scheduling, sample identification, and coordination with medical
record departments were minor on the whole.
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CONCLUSION
The NOHS Dependency at Discharge study (1986) was designed to measure
Medicare beneficiaries' health status, as measured by the Dependency at
Discharge Classification Instrument, at the point of hospital discharge.
methodological issues were addressed in the research design:

Two

one, the

development of a patient classification instrument that could be used with
medical records and that would accurately provide a picture of the health
status of the about-to-be discharged Medicare beneficiary; two, the issue of
selection of a sample of Medicare beneficiaries in a representative sample of
DRGs was addressed. A sample of Medicare beneficiaries was selected from
five representative DRGs (both locally and nationally).
A PRE/POST non-control group research design was used to select medical
records for analysis from PRE and POST-PPS samples in terms of Medicare
beneficiary health status at the time of hospital discharge. While this research
is exploratory, that is, it only used five of the top ten most frequent! y used
DRGs and it was conducted in only four hospitals in one geographic area, it is
an important first step in evaluating the impact of Medicare's PPS payment
system on the quality of care of Medicare beneficiaries. In essence, the NOHS
_research study analyzed the question, are Medicare beneficiaries being
discharged from the hospital "quicker and sicker" after the implementation of
the Prospective Payment System (PPS).
The question to be addressed by this dissertation concerns changes in the
post-hospital placement of Medicare beneficiaries before and after the
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implementation of the Prospective Payment System.

This dissertation is

exploratory in nature in that it is constrained by the same strengths and
weaknesses of the NOHS study from which the data are derived.

This

dissertation is distinct from the NOHS study and extends it to address the
question of whether there have been changes in discharge placement, in relation
to discharge health status (Dependency), before and after PPS.
While the data were generated from the NOHS Dependency at Discharge
research study (Coe, Wilkinson, & Patterson, 1986), the analysis presented in
this dissertation pertaining to the comparisions of patient status at discharge in
relation to post-hospital placement is a distinct and separate analysis from the
NOHS study. This dissertation focuses on changes in beneficiary status with
regard to post-hospital placement and quality of care while the NOHS study
examined the issue of "quicker and sicker".

The unique contribution of this

dissertation is its documentation of changes in beneficiary health status and
discharge placement setting (i.e., more dependent patients being discharged to
post-hospital care settings) and is one of the first studies in the nation to
address the issue in anything but anecdotal form.

Thus, this disseration

provides the basis for more comprehensive national studies which may explore
the longer-term impacts of the PPS system on the post-hospital care service
delivery setting.

CHAPTER IV
DATA ANALYSIS

The effects of Medicare's Prospective Payment System that are most
relevant to the performance of the health care system are the effects on the
cost of providing hospital care and the effects on the outcomes (benefits) of
that care (OT A, 1985).

However, direct measurement of health benefits is

infeasible and, as a result, incomplete, imperfect and overlapping proxy
measures have been used. Proxy measures for health outcomes are used here
also; i.e., discharge status and post-hospital placement, as a means of
assessing the impact of the DRG-based Prospective Payment System on the
Medicare beneficiary. The data utilized to address this issue are from the
Northwest Oregon Health Systems Dependency at Discharge research project
(1986) and are presented in Section I. National data from the first three years
under the PPS system; 1984, 1985, and where possible, 1986 are used to
evaluate the expenditure and quality of care impact of PPS and are presented
in Section II.

The specific question addressed by the NOHS study was to

determine if Medicare beneficiaries were being discharged "quicker and
sicker" after the implementation of the Prospective Payment System.

A

second analysis of the data regarding post-hospital placement is the focus of
this dissertation.

A great many areas of interest regarding the impact of PPS are beyond
the scope of this study induding such areas as the impact of PPS on access to
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health care, technology adaptation, clinical re:.earch, patterns of employment
in health care and related industries, the quantity and quality of health
profes:.ional education, physician/patient relationship and ownership of health
care businesses.

Although many of the predicted effects of PPS cannot be

addressed with the evidence available, this dissertation attempts to identify
patterns of change occurring within the health care system coinciding with, as
well as a result of, Medicare's Prospective Payment System (PPS).

SECTION I:
DEPENDENCY AT DISCHARGE DATA

This section presents descriptive information on a PRE/POST sample of
Medicare beneficiaries including sample distribution by sex and age, distribution
of length of stay by total sample and by DRG, and an analysis of beneficiary
discharge statu:. (Dependency at Discharge) by DRG, by Dependency Class, and
post-hospital placement by Dependency Class and by DRG.

For tests of

significance, the p = .05level of probability was used. For ease of presentation,
the 1981-1983 period is labeled PRE and the 1984-1985 period is labeled POST.
Data collection was based on the selection of a Medicare beneficiary's
medical record, identified from a master list of all admissions within the
PRE/POST time period from each hospital, using all of the following criteria:

:~···

1.
2.

3.

4.

Medicare patient,
Age 60 or over,
Did not expire on selected admission, and
Length of stay (LOS) between 2 and 23 days.

From the total potential discharges in the two study time periods, 2,777
medical records were randomly selected and reviewed. Of the 2,777 records
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reviewed, 158 (6%) were excluded for the following reasons:
1.

patient expired on the selected admission (N:68);

2.

ineligible length of stay (N=l8);

3.

incorrect identification of medical record (e.g, wrong DRG,
etc.) (N=29);

4.

unable to locate selected record in the records department (e.g.,
record was on the floor or being transcribed, etc.)(N=23); and

5.

the record has major sections of documentation missing (N:20).

The final sample was 2,619 records for most of this data analysis.

Sample Distribution- PRE/ POST.

The total sample of 2,619 records

included 1,258 (48%) in the PRE-period and 1,361 (52%) in the POST-period.
Table V presents the distribution of the PRE/POST subsamples by DRG.
subjects were Medicare beneficiaries, 60 or over.

All

A Chi Square test of the

PRE/POST samples showed no significant difference at the p

( .01 level

between the PRE/POST samples based on distribution by DRG.

TABLE V
DISTRmUTION OF SAMPLE BY DRG - PRE/POST
(N=2,619)

DRG 14 - Stroke

PRE
296 (23.5%)

POST
338 (24.8%)

DRG 89 - Pneumonia

289 (23.0%)

342 (25.1%)

DRG 127 - Heart Failure

352 (28.0%)

383 (28.1 %)

DRG 209 -Hip Replacement

180 (14.3%)

191 (14.0%)

DRG 210- Major Joint Pinning

141 (11.2%)

107 ( 7.9%)

DRG CATEGORY

TOTAL

1,258 (100%)

1,361 (100%)

Sex. Thirty-seven percent of the total sample were male (N=922) and 63%
were female (N=1,697).

Table VI presents the distribution of the PRE/POST
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subsamples by sex. A chi square test of the difference between the PRE/POST
subsamples by sex was not significant.

TABLE VI
DISTRIBUTION OF PRE AND POST SAMPLES BY SEX
(N=2,619)

PRE

SEX

POST

TOTAL

MALE

461

(36.6%)

461

(33.9%)

(N=922)

FEMALE

797

(63.4%)

900

(66.1 %)

(N=1,697)

1,258

(100%)

1,361

TOTAL

(100%)

Age. Age ranged from 61 to 104 years. Table VII presents data on the age
distribution of the PRE and POST samples. For convenience, age was grouped
into four age categories: 60-65; 66-75; 76-85; and 86+.

TABLE VD

AGE DISTRIBUTION BY PRE/POST
(N=2,557)

AGE CATEGORY
60-65
66-75

76-85
&5+

Missing Cases
TOTAL

PRE (n=1,22&) POST (n=1,329)
2.4%
23.5%
3&.7%
33.4%
2.0%
100%

6.2%
26.6%
40.5%
24.6%
2.1%
100%

Age Distribution.

Table VIII presents data on age distribution by total

sample and by DRG.

Of specific interest is the increase in the number of

"younger" Medicare beneficiaries in three DRGs: Stroke, Heart Failure, and Hip
Replacement in the POST period. No such pattern is evident on Pneumonia or
Major Joint Pinning.
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TABLE VW
AGE DISTRIBUTION BY PRE/POST AND DRG
(N=2,557)
DRG CATEGORY
Stroke
(DRG 14)
60-65
66-75

76-85
86+
Pneumonia
(DRG 89)
60-65
66-7.5

76-85
86+

PRE (n=285)
1.896
20.796
44.2%
33.396

3.0%
30.2%
45.4%
21.3%

PRE (n=278)
2.296
26.396
35.6%
36.096
PRE (n=345)

Hie Reelacement
(DRG 209}
60-6.5

PRE (n=180)

76-8.5
86+
Major Joint Pinning
(DRG 210)
60-6.5
66-7.5
76-85
86+

1.2%
20.396
41.496
37.1%

POST (n=372)
3 • .5%
29.3%
41.7%
25.5%
POST (n= 191)
9.9%
34.0%
46.196
9.9%

6.796
36.7%
35.6%
21.1%
PRE (n=140)
2.196
23.696
39.396
3.5.0%

Mean Age Comparison.

POST (n=331)
8.2%
23.0%
33.2%
3.5.6%

Heart Failure
(DRG 127)
60-65
66-7.5
76-85
86+

66-75

POST (n=328)

POST (n= 107)
6 • .5%
16.8%
39.3%
37.4%

TOTAL (n=613)
2.496
25.8%
44.9%
26.996
TOTAL (n=609)
5.4%
24.5%
34.3%
3.5.8%
TOTAL (n=717)
2.4%
2.5.0%
41.6%
31.196
TOTAL (n=371)
8.4%
3.5. 3%
41.0%
15.4%
TOTAL (n=247)
4.0%
20.696
39.396
36.0%

Table IX presents data from a comparison of

mean age between the PRE and POST periods. The average age of the PREperiod sample was 82.6 years and the average age for the POST -period was 80.4
years.

When tested for differences using a t-test, the difference was

significant at the p (.001 level.
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TABLE IX
COMPARISON OF MEAN AGE BY PRE/POST
(N:2,.552}

STANDARD
DEVIATION

SAMPLE

MEAN AGE

PRE

82.6 (1,227)

8.6

POST

80.4 (1,325)

8.4

t-Value
.000***

Key:
*** p (.001

The findings presented in Tables Vlll and IX regarding the age distribution
in the PRE/POST samples suggest that age could confound the PRE/POST
analyses. Therefore, age was treated as a co-variate in all subsequent analy5es
of the data.
Length of Stay.

Measurement of length of stay was constrained by the

sampling methodology. In order to control for the effects of DRG "outliers"
(i.e., those with extremely long lengths of stay), only discharges with a length
of stay (LOS) between 2 and 22 days were included in the sample. However,
thi5 limitation did not exclude a large number of potential cases.

Table X

presents data on length of stay for the total sample and by DRG. The mean
length of stay was 11.3 days in the PRE-period and 8.6 days in the POST-period.
This represents a reduction of 2.7 days between the PRE and POST periods
which is statistically significant at the .001 level. This dramatic drop in length
of stay was also reflected in summary Medicare data from Multnomah County,
Oregon which reported a drop of 2.4 days in length of stay between 1982 and
1984 (OMPRO, 1986). This pattern of decline in length of stay was found in
each DRG category.
level.

T-tests showed that all were significant at the p (.001
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TABLE X
LENGTH OF STAY BY PRE. & POST AND BY DRG
(N::2,528)

Mean Days

Standard
Deviation

t-values

DRG 14 (Stroke)
PRE (227)
POST (327)

11.4
7.7

5.3
3.3

10.10***

9.6
7.8

4.3
3.5

5.16***

9.2
7.2

4.7
3.1

6.67***

15.5

3.6
3.6

8.27***

4.3
3.8

4.45***

·DRG 89 (Pneumonia)
PRE (276)
POST (336)
DRG 127 (Heart Failure)
PRE (336)
POST (372)
DRG 209 (Hi~

Re~lacement)

PRE (177)
POST (189)

12.3

DRG 210 (Major Joint Pinning)
PRE (134)
POST (104)

13.8
11.5

Key:
***p (·001
When examining length of stay by DRG TYPE (e.g., Medical vs. Slrgical),
the medical DRGs (DRG 14 -Stroke; DRG 89 - Pneumonia; and DRG 127 - Heart
Failure) had far more variance in length of stay (a~ measured by standard
deviation) than did the surgical DRGs (e.g., DRG 209 - Hip Replacement and
DRG 210 - Major Joint Pinning).

This can be explained, in part, by the

similarities of procedures and acute care required in the surgical DRGs versus
the medical DRGS.
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The Measurement of Dependency at Discharge. The scale used to measure
dependency at hospital discharge was originally developed with six items:
ACTIVITY, BATHING, MEDICATIONS, PROCEDURES, SYMPTOMS and AGE.
A principal axis factor analysis of the six original scale items was performed
using squared multiple correlations as commonality estimates. Since only one
four-item factor with an Eigenvalue greater than 1.00 was extracted, no
rotations were performed. An analysis of internal consistency yielded an Alpha
coefficient of .86. These analyses suggested that Dependency be viewed as a
single construct.

The final scale induded four items: ACTIVITY, BATHING,

PROCEDURES, SYMPTOMS.
The Dependency instrument used a Likert-type ordinal scaling method for
rating the patient's dependency on four rating levels with increasing values
from 0- 2- 4 - 6. Possible scores ranged from 0 (complete independence) to 24
(complete dependence). The instrument was subjected to content validation by
a panel of experts and reliability checks were conducted throughout the study
period.

One hundred and sixty-two medical records were randomly selected

from the sample pool and used to test interrater reliability during data
collection. Independent ratings of the sub-sample showed the instrument had a
high level of interrater reliability as measured by an Intraclass R of .88.
Instrument development and reliability testing are described in detail elsewhere
(Coe, Wilkinson, & Patterson, 1986).
Dependency.

Table XI presents data on Dependency for the PRE/POST

periods. The average Dependency score for the PRE-period was 8.9 while the
average Dependency score for the POST -period was 9.7.

The difference

between the two scores was found to be significant at the p{.OOllevel.
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TABLE XI
DEPENDENCY SCORES BY PRE/POST

(N=2,.5.57)
OVERALL DEPENDENCY BY PERIOD

PRE

8.9
Key:*** p

POST

9-:r

t VALUE

3.79***

(.001

Dependency By Age- PRE/POST. Figure 2 presents data on Dependency by
age category. As expected, Dependency was higher in the older age groups and
was higher across all age groups in the POST period.

HEAN
OEPENOENCY
SCORE

m·PRE
12) POST

Figure 2. Mean Dependency Scores by Age category, PRE/POST.
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Dependency By DRG- PRE/POST. Since the difference in the distribution
of age between the PRE and POST periods could confound the findings
regarding Dependency, an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) comparing the PRE
and POST Dependency scores adjusted for age was conducted.
Interpreting the results of the analysis of covariance may be confounded by
the assumption of homogeneous regression coefficients (b) across the PRE and
POST periods.

Therefore, an F test for homogeneity of variance was al.so

conducted in order to assess homogeneity of variance across the DRGs. The
re.sul ts of the two analyses are presented in Table XII.

The F test for

homogeneity (Column 2) results suggested that the assumption of homogeneity
was untenable in two of the five DRG categories (DRG 127 and DRG 210). This
called into question the results of the covariance analysis on these two
comparative tests (Pedhauser, 1982; Reichardt, 1979).

In three of the DRG

categories, the F test for homogeneity showed no significant difference (DRG
14, DRG 89, and DRG 209). Therefore, the covariance analysis was accepted in
these DRGs.
Further analysis was conducted to explore the two cases in which the
analysis of covariance results were questioned. A matched pair analysis was
conducted in the two DRG catagories where homogeneity of variance was not
found.

Cases from the PRE and POST subsamples in the two DRGs were

matched on age by computer. Cases not matched were eliminated from this
analysis, producing a smaller N but which was fundamentally equivalent with
respect to age.

Matched sample t-tests were then performed using the

Dependency scores of the two subsamples. Table XII presents the results of the
ANCOVA analysis with age as a covariate and the analysis of homogeniety.
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Results from these analyses showed a .significant increase in Dependency
between PRE and POST for DRG 14 - Stroke but not for DRG 210 - Major Joint
Pinning.

Thus, the combined analyses suggest that Dependency increased

between the PRE and POST periods in DRGs 14- Stroke, 89- Pneumonia, 127Heart Failure, and 209 - Hip Replacement but not in DRG 210 - Major Joint
Pinning.

TABLE XII
ANALYSJS OF COVARIANCE: DEPENDENCY WITH AGE AS A
COVARIATE AND ANALYSJS OF HOMOGENEITY
(N:2,619)

F (Pre/Post)

DRG Category
DRG
DRG
DRG
DRG
DRG
Key:

14- Stroke
89- Pneumonia
127- Heart Failure
209 - Hip Replacement
210- Major Joint Pinning

8.11 **
6.64**
12.94***
24.93***
.46

F (b)

.67
.89
5.01*
.33
4.09*

<
<

* p .05
** p .01
*** p <-001
Dependency by Length of Stay.

For ease of interpretation and utility,

Dependency scores were reduced to four classes. These classes were:
SCORE:

DESCRIPTION:

0 - 5:

Minimally Dependent

6 - 11:
12 - 17:

Somewhat Dependent
Moderately Dependent

18 - 24:

Severe! y Dependent

179
Dependency Class. Table XIII presents data on the percent distribution of
the total sample by Dependency Class. A Chi Square test showed a significant
difference between the PRE/POST periods at the p ( .001 level. These results
were consistent with the prior analysis concerning Dependency at Discharge
PRE/POST.

TABLE XIII
DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE BY DEPENDENCY CLASS

PRE (n=1,256)
Class I
Class II
Class III
Class IV
Total

28.7 %
42.8 %
15.1 %
13.3 %
100.0%

POST (n=1,358)
22.5%
44.2 %
17.5 %
15.8%
100.0%

TOTAL (n:2,614)
25.5%
43.5%
16.4%
14.6%
100.0%

Chi square test = *** p = (.001
Dependency Class By Length of Stay. Dependency Class was then com pared
to length of stay for the PRE and POST periods.

Length of stay declined

significantly between the PRE and POST periods (p .001). Figure 3 presents
data on Dependef.lCY Class by length of stay. While one would expect length of
stay to increase as Dependency increased, this was not the case. In both the
PRE and POST subsamples, the mean length of stay for Class IVs (Severely
Dependent) was less (PRE LOS = 12.9 days; POST LOS = 8.9 days) than that for
Class Ins (Moderately Dependent) (PRE LOS = 13.1 days; POST LOS = 9.5 days).
Thus, length of stay declined while Dependency at discharge increased.
A possible explanation for shorter lengths of stay for Class IV compared to
Class III is that approximately half of the Class IV cases came from nursing
homes and may have had skilled beds awaiting them post-discharge. Thus, the
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!~POST

Length
ol

Stay

(Days)

CLASS I
(o-5)

CLASS II

CLASS Ill

(8-11)

CLASS rl

(12-17)

(18-24)

Figure 3. Dependency Class by Length o:f Stay, PRE/POST.
hospitals may have discharged th("se cases "earlier" because they had an
established post-hospital placement readily available to them. In contrast, the
Class Ills generally came from a home setting into the hospital and may have
had to wait in the hospital until an appropriate placement could be arranged for
them. What these data do point out is that the relationship of length of stay to
Dependency is a complex issue and likely to be influenced by other factors.

Post-Hospital Placement By PRE/POST.

In

addition

to

Dependency

information, data collectors recorded information from the medical charts
which identified the discharge destination of the sample patients.
categories were:

The
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1.
2.
3.

Home Alone
Home with Another (Spouse, Relative, Home Health)
Group Home (e.g., retirement community, foster care)

4.

Nursing Home (SNF, ICF)

5.

Transfer to Another Acute Care Facility (e.g., hospital)

Table XIV presents the sample distribution on the total percent of posthospital placements for the PRE and POST period. In looking at the numbers,
there was a tendency for increased placements to home alone, to group home
(adult foster care, residential care facilities) and hospital transfers while there
was a decrease in placements to home with another (family, home health).
There appeared to be no change in nursing home placements in the POST period.
When tested by Chi Square, the difference between the PRE and POST periods
was found to be significant at the p (.001 level.

TABLE XIV
PERCENT POST-HOSPITAL PLACEMENT BY PRE/POST
PRE (n=1256)

POST (n:1358)

TOTAL (n:2614)

13.7%

14.1%

13.9%

Home wI Another 52.3%

47.7%

49.9%

3.4%

5.4%

4.5%

27.4%

26.1%

26.7%

6.1%

4.0%

1.5%

0.7%

1.1%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Home Alone
Group Home
Nursing Home
Hos p. Transfer
Info Unclear
Total

1.7%
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TABLE XV
PERCENT OF POST-HOSPITAL PLACEMENTS
BY DEPENDENCY CLASS- PRE/POST
(N=2,614)
DEPENDENCY CLASS

m

n
Placement
Home Alone
Home With Other
Group Home
Nursing Home

f!:!
7.7
18.0
1.0

·'.2

Hospital

Information Unclear
Column Total

~

!!!!·

f!!!

!!!!

f!!!!

7.~

5.7

6.1
27.3
3.0

.3

.If

13.0
1.0

2?.3

.7

7.,

1.6

28.6

'·"

'·'·' '·'

1.0

8.0

--:.!

_,&.

·'

2.1
_:l

_:.!

·'

8.0
2.4
_:.!

22.,

42.9

44.2

U.2

17.1f

.1

1.0

IV

~
0
l.llj

~

.3
11.2
.4

.4
12.0

.1
l.S

_.!

1.3
__Q

13.3

U.9

COMPARISONS:
Group Home versus All other PRE/POST- Chi Square value significant at .05
Home Alone/Home w/ Another versus All - Chi Square value significant at .01
Hospital Transfer versus All other PRE/POST - Chi Square value sig. at .001
Figures 3 through 7.

Figures 3

~hrough

7 present Table XV data

graphically. The data suggest that there was a tendency for more placements
Home Alone in Class II, III, and IV (Figure 3) but fewer placements to Home
with Another in Dependency Class I and about the same in the- other classes
(Figure 4) in the POST period. The data also indicate an increase in Class lis
and Ills being placed in a Group Home setting (Adult Foster Care, Residential
Care} (Figure 5).

There was little change in PRE/POST placements by

Dependency Class for Nursing Home placements, except for a decrease in
Class Us in the POST period (Figure 6}. The Group Home and Nursing Home
findings suggest that Class lis are now being placed in the relatively new care
setting of Adult Foster Care or Residential Care as opposed to being placed in
a nursing home.

Finally, there was a significant increasing trend across

Dependency Classes for placement in another hospital for Class Us, IUs, and
IVs (Figure 7).
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fli PRE
Sl POST

4(.3%)5(.4%)

2(.1%)

3

CLASS
Figure 4. Placement at Home Alone, PRE/POST Dependency.
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468
371 27.3%)
(27.3%)"343

rl1 PRE
II POST

1

3

CLASS
Figure 5. Placement at Home with Others, PRE/POST Dependency.
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IZi

PRE

II POST

4

1

6

3

CLASS
Figure 6. Placement in Group Home, PRE/POST Dependency.
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18
16

14

163

f:a

PRE

II POST
101

16

68
48
2

CLASS
Figure 7. Placement in a Nursing Home, PRE/POST Dependency.
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32

f:a PRE

ell

18

(2.4%)

POST

6

2

2

1

2

3

4

CLASS
Figure 8. Placement in Another Hospital, PRE/POST Dependency.
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Comparisons- Table XV.

When comparing the combined categories of

placements Home Alone and Home with Another to All Other Placements
PRE/POST, a Chi Square test showed the difference to be significant at the .05
level. When comparing Group Home placement against All Other Placements
PRE/POST, a Chi Square test showed the difference to be significant at the .01
level.

And, comparing Hospital Transfer versus All Other Placements

PRE/POST, a Chi Square test showed the difference to be significant at the
.001 level.

The change in nursing home placement PRE/POST was not

significant. These findings suggest that changes have occurred in the volume of
placements

being

made

to

community-based

care

settings

after

the

implementation of PPS. Fewer placements appear to be being made to home,
both Alone or with Another (Spouse, Family, Home Health) and an increasing
number of placements are being made to Group Home (Adult Foster Care,
Residential Care Facilities) and transfers to other hospitals.
A possible explanation for this significant increase in POST placements to
"other" categories, especially for hospital transfers, is that some of the DRGs
used in the sample selection generally required rehabilitation support (stroke,
hip replacement, major joint pinning). There may be an unbundling of services
that were previously provided as one unit of service, which may spread across
all DRGs. Under PPS, hospitals have the incentive to discharge patients and
then readmit them, to unbundle services, and to transfer patients along a new
"oontinuum of care." In order to explore the possible influence diagnosis might
play in post-hospital placement, an analysis of placement by DRG for
PRE/POST was conducted.

Tables XVI and XVII present the frequency

distribution for post-hospital placement by DRG by PRE/POST.
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TABLE XVI
PERCENT OF POST-HOSPITAL PLACEMENTS BY DRG -PRE/POST
(N=2,614)
DRG 89

DRG 14
Plar:ement
Pre
6,8
Home Alone
Home wI Another 46.'1
Group Home
3.7
3,,6
Nursing Home
Hosp, Tmsfr.
5.8
Info, Undear ·
1.7
Column Total

23,,

DRG 127

DRG 209

Post

Pre

~

~

Post

fr!.

9.6
37.6
3.6
32.2
17,0

19.0

1'1.6
50.0
7.6
26.9
.9

24.5
49.6

9.4
66.1

0

21.1
5ll.7
,,1
17 .I
.6
1.4

25.2

27.9

23.2

0

50.5
3.8
211.2
.7
1.7

2'1.7

23,0

5.5
17.2
1.3
1.&

~

~

2.2

5.2
65.11
5.3
U.7
6.&
1.0

14.:4

14.1

1.1

21.1
0

DRG 210
~

fl.~

411.7
0,1
50.4
0
0

11.7
32.7
3.7
,2,2
4.7

11.2

0

7.9

Table XVII presents data on total placements (percentage of all
PRE/POST) by DRG for the PRE/POST period. When tested by Chi Square, the
difference between the PRE/POST periods was found to be significant at the
.001 level.

TABLEXVll
TOTAL PERCENT PLACEMENT BY DRG -PRE/POST
(N=2,614)
DRG

PRE (n=l 22.56)

POST (n=1 23.58) TOTAL (n=2 2614)

Stroke

23 • .5%

24.7%

13.9%

Pneumonia

23.0%

2.5.2%

49.9%

Heart Failure

27.9%

28.2%

4.5%

Hip Replacemt.

14.3%

14.1%

26.7%

Major Joint Pin.

11.2%

7.9%

1.1%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Total
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Percent Placement By DRG. As can be seen in Tables XVI and XVII, those
diagnoses requiring rehabilitation after acute hospital stay did, in fact, increase
dramatically.

Increases in post-hospital placements occurred for DRG 14 -

Stroke, DRG 209 - Hip Replacement, and DRG 210 - Major Joint Pinning. The
slight increase for DRG 127 - Heart Failure is more difficult to explain.
Correspondingly, there was no, or very slight, increase in post-hospital
placements to other hospitals in DRG 89 - Pneumonia, which is· not usually a
diagnosis associated with post-hospital rehabilitation. However, the fact that
these placements follow a trend for diagnosis does not explain the increase in
volume between the PRE/POST period.

Meiners and Coffey (1984) analyzed

1980 discharge data from Maryland hospitals in terms of diagnosis and discharge
destination.

Their data indicate that discharges to nursing homes fell more

frequently in diagnostic categories that required skilled rehabilitation services
(DRG 210 and DRG 209), that reflect mental or behavioral problems (DRG 429),
or that specifically reflect frailty or old age (DRG 89 and DRG 320). Similar
results were found in this study.
Di.~charges

to home health comprised diagnostic categories that may

require long-term management but to not necessarily represent debilitating
conditions (DRG 82, DRG 294, DRG 148).

PPS is expected to encourage

hospitals to unbundle services (provide needed services on more than one
admission), shift patients vertically to lower-cost care settings within a single
hospital system (a hospital's affiliated nursing home, a rehabilitation unit within
the same hospital), and perhaps, discharge and readmit patients in order to
"game" the system. Unfortunately, the data collected for this study did not
collect information on which hospital or care setting these hospital transfers
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were going to. However, the increase in hospital transfers found here may be
an indication of this shift in discharge patterns.
Further analysis was conducted to explore post-hospital placement by age
category.

Table XVIII presents a frequency distribution of

po.~t-hospital

placement by age category. The distribution of the sample by placement and
age shows an interesting pattern. Placement.-; to Home Alone declined for the
younger age categories in the POST period (60- 65; 66 - 75) and

increa~ed

for

the older age groups while placements to Home with Another declined in all age
categorie.<> from PRE to POST.

Placement.~

to 65 year olds, stayed about the

.~me

to Group Home increa!)ed for the 60

for 66 - 75 year olds, and increased

dramatically in the two older age categories (76 - 85 and 85+). Nursing Home
placements increased dramatically for the 60 to 65 year olds, the 76 - 85 year
olds, and the 86+ age group in the POST period. Finally, Tramfer to Another
Hospital increased dramatically across all four age groups in the POST period.
When tested by Chi Square, the difference between PRE/POST is significant at
the p .001 level. These differences in PRE/POST placement may reflect the
increase.-; in Dependency in the age group.s requiring more intensive and higher
level of post-hospital care.

TABLEXVBI
PERCENT PLACEMENT BY AGE CATEGORY- PRE/POST
{N=2,.5.57)

PJa~ement

fr!.

Home Alone
Home wI Another
Group Home
Nursing Home
Hospital
Information Unelear
Column Total

16.7
76.7
0

3.3
3.3
0

~

~

67.1
1.3
13.2
6.6

16.,
66.1
4.0
10.3
2.3
.7

u.&

0

2.i T.7

n.,

35+

76-35

66-73

60-6S

~

u.s

61.7
11.1
10.1
7.4

.s

2"i'3

f!:!.

~

f!!.

f!!!

Iff.~

15.3

10.2
36.3

,.,

31.7

46.3
.7
1.7

llfl.2

,,.o

llfl-.9

'·'

2.:J
2fJ.2

27.8

2.1

,.9

1.8

.-..&

39:7

.0.9

3M'

u.o
8.1

. '1.7
.3

ro
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A final analysis was conducted comparing PRE/POST Post-hospital
Placement in terms of Dependency. The question being evaluated was whether
there were any differences in mean Dependency by post-hospital placement
before and after PPS implementation. That is, had Dependency increased for
any of the placement categories. T-tests were conducted on all five placement
categories, comparing PRE to POST on Mean Dependency score. Only one posthospital

placement

category

showed a

significant

increase

in patient

Dependency between the PRE and POST periods. Post-hospital placement to
Home with Another showed a significant increase in mean Dependency at the p
.01 level. This finding is consistent with the data in the literature indicating a
trend toward "sicker" Medicare beneficiaries being discharged to community
care providers and requiring more intensive care than before PPS.

TABLE XIX
MEAN DEPENDENCY BY PLACEMENT- PRE/POST
PLACEMENT

PERIOD

MEAN
STANDARD
DEPENDENCY DEVIATION

Home
Alone

PRE
POST

4.48 (n=172)
5.13(n=191)

3.03
3.55

.061

Home w/
Another

PRE
POST

6.78 (n=677)
7.48(n=647)

4.35
4.67

.004**

Group
Home

PRE
POST

7.86 (n=43)
8.41 (n=74)

5.41
4.73

.57

Nursing
Home

PRE
POST

14.94 (n=344)
15.69 (n=354)

5.85
5.73

.084

Hospital
Transfer

PRE
POST

12.76 (n=21)
13.28 (n=83)

5.60
4.89

.676

Key:
**

p(.01

t-Value
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Summary. The data presented in this dissertation suggest that hospitals are
discharging Medicare beneficiaries more quickly (shorter length of stay) and in
a more Dependent state than before PPS was implemented. Further, the data
indicate that younger beneficiaries are being admitted to acute care facilities
POST-PPS, suggesting that older, less acute beneficiaries and beneficiaries
needing chronic verus acute care are being sent to other care settings (nursing
homes). In addition, these more Dependent beneficiaries are being discharged
to community-based care settings (Home Alone, Home with Another, Group
Home) and to other hospitals with greater care needs than before PPS.

The

impact of these changes in discharge practices by hospitals will be felt most by
families and by community-based care providers as the locus of sub-acute care
of Medicare beneficiaries shifts from the hospital to other settings. Thus, the
data presented here suggest that PPS has resulted in Medicare beneficiaries
being discharged "quicker and sicker" to community-based care providers,
families, and perhaps, rehabilitation units in other hospitals and the hypothesis
of this dissertation must be rejected.

There were differences in patient

discharge status and post-hospital placement after the implementation of PPS.

SECTION D:
NATIONAL DATA

The ultimate objective of PPS was to reduce the rate of growth in
Medicare outlays for inpatient hospital care while maintaining an acceptable
level of access to quality health care for beneficiaries. The goal of reduced
expenditures was to be achieved through a restructuring of the financial
incentives facing hospitals.

Data published by the Health Care Financing
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Administration (HCF A) and by other researchers are presented below to assess
the degree to which Medicare's DRG-based Prospective Payment System (PPS)
met its stated objective. Data are presented on inpatient hospital expenditures,
non-hospital services expenditures, out-patient hospital services, skilled nursing
facility (SNF) expenditures, home health (HH) expenditures, and hospital
revenue data.

Impact on Expenditures and Hospital Revenues
The predicted effect of PPS on hospital costs was that costs per admission
would go down (Guterman & Dobson, 1986; OTA, 1985).

Thus, one primary

indicator of the success or failure of PPS would be its effect on the volume and
rate of growth in Medicare program expenditures.

Between 1974 and 1982,

inpatient hospital payments increased at an annual rate of 19.9 percent and
never fell below 14 percent in any given year. However, in 1983, the rate of
increase was only 10.2 percent, lower than at any time in the previous ten
years. The rate fell to 8.2 percent in 1984 and by 1986, the rate of increase in
hospital inpatient benefit payments had fallen to 4.6 percent, the smallest
increase in the program's history (Guterman et al., 1988). Thus, PPS appears to
have slowed the rate of increase in the inpatient hospital benefits portion of
Medicare.

However, it is important to remember that costs are, to a large

extent, utilization-driven and thus, rates of growth in hospital expenditures
could be slowing, not because hospitals have improved productivity, but because
fewer people are going to the hospital and those going are leaving sooner (Davis
et al., 1985). However, whatever the cause, PPS was intended to slow the rate
of growth in inpatient hospital expenditures, which it appears to have done.
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Non-hospital Sa-vices Expenditures.

The non-hospital services funded by

Medicare include services provided by physicians, outpatient departments,
skilled nursing facilities, home health agencies and non-physician suppliers such
as laboratories and durable medical equipment suppliers. If lengths of stay are
reduced, as is expected under PPS, these services could be substituted for inpatient hospital care. For example, the· number of physician visits in hospital
settings should decline as should physician inpatient costs. Shorter stays would
also reduce the potential for consultative visits for both medical and surgical
discharges.

However, if Medicare admissions increase, which was also

predicted to occur, then there should be an increase in physician visits and thus,
physician payments by Medicare.

Between 1975 to 1983, the annual rate of

increase in physician payments was never smaller than 15 percent (Guterman &
Dobson, 1986).
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) data from the first year
evaluation of PPS show that the annual rate of increase in physician benefit
payments declined slightly, down to 10.7 percent in 1984. Overall, the rate of
growth in non-hospital expenditures was down from 8.9 to 8.1 percent for the
first three years of PPS {Guterman et al., 1988). Thus, a change in the pattern
of growth in Medicare payments for physicians services is supported, which is
consistent with the decrease in inpatient expenditures rate of growth.
·Out-patient Hospital Services. In 1984, outpatient hospital payments grew
by only 11.9 percent but this rate continued to outpace the inpatient
expenditures rate for the eleventh consecutive year (Guterman & Dobson,
1986). By 1986, payments for outpatient services grew by less than 7.1 percent,
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the smallest percentage increase since 1973.

Still, the outpatient services

payment rate of growth was again larger than the increase for inpatient
services (4.696). Overall, hospital outpatient benefit payments grew a total of
15.7 percent in the first three years under PPS versus an average annual rate of
increase of 8.8 percent for the five years prior to PPS (Guterman et al., 1988).
This may indicate that some of the savings on inpatient services under PPS are
now being spent on outpatient services as care is shifted from the inpatient to
outpatient setting.
Skilled Nursing Expenditures.

One of the anticipated effects of PPS

incentives was that they would encourage hospitals to discharge patients to
post-hospital care more frequently and at an earlier stage of recuperation.
These actions could potentially increase the demand for skilled nursing and
home care. Yet Medicare coverage of skilled nursing care is quite limited (20
days of care with total coverage, and an additional 80 days with a 50 percent
copayment), and there has been a chronic shortage of nursing home beds since
Medicare's inception.
nun~ing

This shortage is likely to continue since most skilled

facility (SNFs) expenditures for Medicare patients are actually made by

State Medicaid programs. Largely because of limits to coverage, spend-down
requirements and low reimbursement rates under Medicare, there has been
little incentive to add nursing home beds for Medicaid patients (Feder &
Scanlon, 1982). The net expenditure impact of increases in the use of nursing
homes by Medicare beneficiaries may thus be greatest for the beneficiary, who
must pay up to 50 percent of the SNF cost after 20 days. There are few data
available on increases in out-of-pocket expenditures for skilled nursing home
care as a result of PPS.
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Overall, the growth in skilled nursing payments has accelerated since the
implementation of PPS. Between 1983 and 1984, SNF expenditures increased at
a rate of 5.6 percent compared to a decrease in the rate of growth prior to PPS.
The program grew at an average rate of 4.7 percent between 1984 and 1986
although the projected rate of increase for 1984 was 5.7 percent. However, the
lower than expected rate of increase may indicate a relative upturn when
comapred with the decreases in the pre-PPS period (Guterman et al., 1988;
Guterman & Dobson, 1986).
Home Health Expenditures.

Between

1974

and

1983,

Medicare

reimbursement of home health providers grew at an average annual rate of 25
percent and has never been below 19 percent (Guterman & Dobson, 1986;
Leader, 1986). Put another way, total reimbursements in 1983 were ten times
larger than the amount disbursed in 1974 (House Aging Committee, 1986;
Leader, 1986). Amendments to the Medicare home health benefit, expanded in
1980, began covering an unlimited number of home health visits (versus the 100
visit per benefit period limit under existing law) and eliminated the 3-day prior
hospitalization requirement (OTA, 1985). As a result, Medicare payments for
home health services have increased rapidly in recent years. Medicare home
health payments increased at a somewhat higher rate than did inpatient hospital
payments during 1983. Since 1984, the growth has accelerated to a rate about
4.5 times as high as that of inpatient hospital payments and more than twice as
high as for any other major benefit category. Specifically, the growth in home
health benefit payments increased an average of 12.7 percent in the first three
years of PPS versus an average increase of 11.2 percent in the five years prior
to PPS (Guterman et al., 1988).

Although constrained by strict limits on it's
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use, shifts in service delivery as a result of PPS have meant an increase in
nursing home and home health expenditures.
Hospital Revenues.
financial viability.

Another area of concern under PPS was hospital

Because PPS generally pays hospitals a fixed price per

discharge while the use of resources for patients in any given DRG may vary
widely, PPS established a pattern of financial winners and losers across
Medicare patients and the hospitals that serve them. However, such an uneven
distriwtion of profits and losses among hospitals has three basic problems
associated with it. First, it creates an incentive for hospitals to treat winner
cases and avoid "loser cases" (Newhouse, 1983). To the extent that such cases
can be identified before admission, serious implications for patient access arise.
Second, random and unpredictable variation in treatment costs creates a
financial risk that is borne only by the hospital. This risk varies inversely with
the volume of cases a hospital sees. Small hospitals or those with low volumes
are likely to suffer a disproportionate burden of financial risk resulting from
cost variations. Third, some hospitals, by virtue of their mission or location,
may end up serving a disproportionate share of high cost patients.

Referral

centers and public hospitals, for example, may be subject to this type of bias.
Making such hospitals bear the financial burden of higher cost patients is not
only inequitable but may threaten quality of care for those served by these
institutions (OT A, 1985).
Revenues will also vary across hospitals independent of differences in
patient characteristics since hospitals are paid different rates per DRG,
depending on their area wage index, urban or rural location, and until national
rates kick in, the region of the country the hospital is located in. In addition,
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teaching hospitals receive an extra payment to account for the extra patient
costs associated with teaching.

The assumption is that differences in DRG

payment rates mirror differences in costs of providing care. Whether the DRG
pricing structure is refined enough to reflect differences in input costs
accurately is subject to much debate.
The American Hospital Association (AHA) as well as many hospitals in
rural counties or on the fringe of major metropolitan areas have daimed that
urban/rural rate differentials discriminate against them (Mickel, 1984; Wallace,
1984; Washington Report, 1985b). On February 17, 1984, eleven hospitals in
Ohio sued the federal government seeking to redress the undue penalty imposed
by PPS dassifications on rural hospitals, charging that the urban/rural
classifications were "arbitrary and bear no national relationship to health care
or to health care costs'' (Mickel, 1984, p. 37). Furthermore, it was argued that
the classifications were unconstitutional, violating the 5th Amendment because
the boundary dassifications amounted to the taking of private property without
just compensation (Mickel, 1984).
The federal court decided on September 15, 1984, that the jurisdiction does
exist and that Ohio hospitals had no basis to challenge the PPS system
(Hospitals, 1984a,c).

However, members of Congress, especially those with

larger rural populations, introduced bills to remedy the situation and in March,
1985, the Congressional Record documented the belief that rural hospitals were
getting "the short end of the DRG stick" (Mcilrath, 1985, p. 33).
Political pressure on HCFA resulted in regional rates being eliminated,
even though there is ample evidence that such differences exist (OT A, 1985). In
addition, while rural hospitals will benefit from the change, some urban
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hospitals will not (Lefton, 1985b).

It is also unclear whether hospitals can

adjust to uniform rates by changing physician behavior quickly enough or
whether such uniformity of practice style is even desirable.
Based on the urban/rural example, it is clear that if DRG pricing does not
adequately

reflect

differences

in

input

costs,

certain

hospitals

will

systematically have higher or lower surpluses than average. Changes in the
payment structure could also produce redistributions of revenue unrelated to
hospital behavior.

Arbitrary redistributions are unfair to hospitals but even

more so to the patients treated by these hospitals who may have their access to
and quality of care jeopardized (OTA, 1985).

Three studies simulating the impact of PPS revenues verus cost-based
revenues predicted that small hospitals would fare well under PPS while large
hospitals would fare relatively poorly (OT A, 1985).

Teaching hospitals that

qualify for large Medicare teaching allowances were generally expected to fare
better than non-teaching hospitals.

Government owned hopsitals were also

predicted to do well, perhaps because many government owned hospitals are
also teaching hospitals. Urban hospitals and hospitals in the North section of
the country were expected to fare better than rural hospitals and hospitals
located in the North Central and West Regions (Congressional Budget Office,
1984; Vaida, 1984; Wennberg, 1984a). However, these simulation studies did not
take into account changes in hospital behavior (e.g., staffing layoffs) or hospital
characteristics (e.g., changes in case mix) or structural aspects of PPS
(teaching allowances).

Moreover, these studies were one dimensional.

For

example, small hospitals are predicted to do well but rural hospitals are
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expected to fare poorly under PPS. It is possible for the predicted results to
hold but only as long as a few large urban hospitals suffer heavy losses or as
long as small, urban hospitals do well. It is dear that the financial distribution
patterns of PPS were not well understood before the program was implemented.
~

Although occupancy has fallen, hospital revenues have increased.

Surplus revenue (the difference between income and expenses) for all U.S.
hospitals more than doubled during the first year of PPS, with for-profit
hospitals reporting a 44 percent increase in net income.

The Inspector

General's Office (IGO) of the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) reported that Medicare payments were an average of 14 percent
greater than operating costs for Medicare patients in 1984 (Guterman &
Dobson, 1986).

Data from the American Hospital Association's National

Hospital Panel Survey Report (1985) found that hospitals as a group saw a larger
financial gain in 1984 (a $8.3 billion surplus) than in any year since the survey
began. However, as predicted, the distribution of this surplus was not even
across geographic areas or across hospitals.

Hospitals in the West, South

Central, and Mountain regions experienced financial declines and the smallest
hospitals (those with 25 beds or less) suffered absolute losses (AHA, 1985).
The percentage of hospitals with positive payment margins fell slightly
between the first and second years of PPS, dropping from 83.1 percent to 79.2
percent. As predicted, large urban hospitals and major teaching hospitals did
well tnder PPS while small and rural hospitals did not. One hundred percent of
the largest urban hospitals and 98.1 percent of major teaching hospitals had
positive payment margins whereas only 67.8 percent of the smallest rural

202
hospitals did.

Urban hospitals had larger payment margins than did rural

hospitals by the second year of PPS (13.6% versus 7.8%). Hospitals which had
exceptionally high payment margins were large urban hospitals and major
teaching hospitals (17% with 685 or more beds and 18.3% of teaching hospitals).
Of the hospitals that had negative payment margins in the first year of PPS,
40.8 percent had positive payment margins by the second year of PPS, and only
13 percent had negative payment margins in the second year of PPS (Guterman
et al., 1988). The evidence suggests that large hospitals were able to cut costs
rapidly while small hospitals were not, even though hospitals as group did well
under the first two years of PPS (Lefton, 1985).
It was expected that PPS would produce a significant redistribution of
inpatient

payments

among

hospitals,

especially

between

urban

and

suburban/rural hospitals (Vladeck, 1985). A recent study by Ashby and Darmer
(1988) supports the claim that Medicare payments are unevenly distrib.Jted
across hospitals.

Their study of 257 hospitals in five large urban areas

examined the cost factors affecting core city and suburban portions of the same
metropolitan areas. They found that the average unadjusted Medicare cost per
case was 33 percent higher in core city hospitals relative to the suburban areas
and that less than half of this difference was accounted for by the adjustment
for case mix complexity and teaching costs.
The data also indicated that core city location was associated with a $654
higher cost per case with all other factors held constant.

The authors

conduded that there are other essentially non-controllable factors affecting
hospital costs per case; such as urban core location requiring higher wage levels
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to attract employees, service to patients at an advanced acute stage of illness
and with more frequent comorbidities not included in the DRG criteria, more
difficulty in arranging post-hospital placement for patients, greater patient
assistance costs (education and counseling, transportation), additional property
related costs (parking structure operations, security), and added costs for
patient account collection efforts and eligibility determination for Medicaid
and charity care programs. Cutting accross these factors is the added cost of
treating larger numbers of low-income or indigent patients. The average loss in
the first year of PPS was estimated at $331 per case in city hospitals compared
to only $74 in suburban hospitals (Ashby&: Darmer, 1988). Because neither core
city location nor caring for indigent patients is recognized by PPS, the cost
impacts of these factors translate directly into greater payment losses for
many urban hospitals. The study demonstrated that current wage index systems
in the DRG-based PPS system lmfairly penalizes core city hospitals and rewards
suburban hospitals, resulting in a redistribution of Medicare funds away from
those hospitals serving the poor and indigent.

Summary. Medicare benefit payment under both the HI and SMI programs
grew at annual rates exceeding 20 percent prior to PPS. However, the rate of
growth in the HI benefit payments was sharply reduced after PPS and both HI
and SMI benefit payments grew at about half of their pre-PPS rates during the
first year of PPS (Guterman &: Dobson, 1986). Over the three year period since
PPS was implemented, the overall level of benefit payments has increased at a
slower rate, due to a sharp decline in the growth of HI payments while SMI
payments increased at a somewhat faster rate than before PPS.

Thus, PPS
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appears to have slowed the rate of increase in Medicare inpatient hospital
benefit payments.

Although this increase is still above the general rate of

inflation, it does represent a downturn in the rapid growth of inpatient costs.
The increase in Part B expenditures (SMI payments) may mean that there is a
shift in the location of service delivery, such as from inpatient to outpatient
sites, and that some of the savings being achieved in Medicare's Part A
(inpatient hospital expenditures) may now be being spent on outpatient services
(physician's services, outpatient surgeries, post-hospital care). The next section
examines the impact of PPS on quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries.

PPS IMPACT ON QUALITY OF CARE

Medicare's PPS incentives for inpatient hospital services clearly have the
capacity to alter the quality of care delivered to the elderly, both in positive
and negative directions. However, in order for PPS to reduce inpatient hospital
expenditures, one or more of the following has to occur: A) the cost of treating
patients must be shifted from hospitals to other care settings; B) hospitals must
reduce the cost of treating inpatients; or C) a portion of the cost of treating
Medicare patients must be borne by payers other than Medicare. Each option
has implications for the efficiency and fairness of PPS. Absolute reductions in
the cost of treating hospital patients without shifting costs to other settings
would be the most desirable provided this does not come at the expense of
quality hospital care.
If cost reductions are accomplished by shifting patients to care sites

outside the hospital, which must also be paid for, then actual savings in
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hospital expenditures will be offset by expenditures in other parts of the
program or by beneficiaries themselves.

However, if hospitals finance the

treatment of patients by raising charges to other patients, questions of equity
arise. Or, hospitals could reduce costs of care to such a degree that Medicare
inpatients become profitable, generating a surplus that could be used to
subsidize other kinds of care. These considerations lead to three critical policy
evaluation questions (OTA, 1985):
(1) What, if any, negative effects has PPS had on the quality of
hospital care for Medicare beneficiaries?

(2) What is the net effect of PPS on the quality of hospital care for
Medicare beneficiaries?
(3) How has PPS affected the quality of care in nonhospital settings?
Quality of Hospital Care
Several outcome measures can be used to detect serious negative effects
of PPS on the quality of hospital care, including in-hospital and post-discharge
mortality rates, rates of occurrence of complications or iatrogenic events,
admission and readmission rates, changes in length of hospital stay and
discharge rates, changes in case-mix severity, levels of hospital staffing, and
changes in the management and organization of hospitals.
Mortality Rates.

In-hospital and post-discharge mortality rates can be

measured as total death rates across institutions for specified types of
facilities.

Some rates are specific to patient populations (e.g., the frail

elderly), and some rates are specific to diagnosis, surgical procedure, or DRG.
Post-discharge death rates can also be measured at various intervals following
discharge.

It has been suggested that an increase in in-hospital and post-
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discharge mortality rates are to be expected if less seriously ill patients are
shifted to outpatient while more seriously ill patients are hospitalized. The
question to be addressed is whether elderly patients with given medical
conditions or with similar levels of severity of illness are dying in the hospital
or shortly after discharge at rates demonstrably above those in the pre-PPS era
(OT A, 1985).
Data from the three-year evaluation of PPS show that hospital mortality
rates for the Medicare population did increase between 1984. and 1985.

The

population-based mortality rate for aged persons in 1985 was 5,140 per 100,000;
this was somewhat, but not significantly, higher than the rate predicted by a
time-trend model of mortality rates since 1979.

The 30-day post-admission

mortality rate for beneficiaries rose from 6.6 percent in 1984 to 7.2 percent in
1985, representing a 9.3 percent increase in one year.
number of deaths actually decreased by 3 percent.

However, the total
The fact that total

population-based mortality did not change and there was a large decline in
admission rates strongly suggests that hospital-based mortality has been
affected by PPS; that is, hospitals are discharging patients to other care
settings to die (Guterman et al., 1988).
While not an intended consequence of PPS, the cost cutting incentives of
the program have resulted in changes in hospital behavior. One consequence
has been the admission and discharge of sicker patients, some of whom were
expected to die. Adjusting the fiscal year 1985 mortality rates according to the
case-mix changes both within and between DRGs, Conklin et al. (1988) found
the increase in crude 'mortality rates between 1984 and 1985 fully accounted for

207
by an increase in the case mix severity. Adjustments for stage of disease, high
risk comorbidity, age and sex resulted in expected mortality rates for 1985 of
7.3 percent, which is slightly higher than the observed 1985 mortality rate of
7.2 percent.

The results indicated that despite the increase in morbidity at

hospital admission and the incentives to reduce service delivery and length of
stay, PPS apparently has not increased the risk of mortality following hospital
admission.
Iatrogenic Events.

Iatrogenic events, often called "sentinel. events,"

including infections acquired by patients during a hospital stay, drug reactions
and other mishaps due to treatment in the hospital.

These and other

preventable problems can signal that quality of care has declined (OT A, 1985).
Since they help in distinguishing between very bad care and adequate care, they
can serve as useful screening indicators of the direction that inpatient quality
of care may be taking. The question under PPS is whether the rates of such
problems

increa~e

as PPS incentives to reduce services and personnel begin to

be applied. However, there has been no information published to date regarding
the level of iatrogenic events pre-and-post-PPS.
Admissions. PPS was expected to increase admissions, especially in those
DRGs for which the cost of treatment was expected to be less than the DRG
payment rate. Hospitals also have the incentive to increase admissions. Since
both the aged population and the average age of the elderly is increasing, added
admissions would generate added revenue and since decreases in length of stay
were anticipated under PPS, increased admissions would fill empty beds.
Furthermore, hospital admissions of Medicare patients had increased every year
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since the program was implemented with an annual increase never falling below
3.3 percent. Contrary to expectations, Medicare admissions actually dropped 4
percent in 1984, the first decline since the program was initiated (Guterman &
Dobson, 1986).
By contrast, admissions had risen over 2 percent in 1983 (OTA, 1985).
Since 1984, an unprecedented decline in hospital admissions has been observed
for both Medicare and non-Medicare patients (Davis, 1985).

Medicare

admissions fell another 4.3 percent between 1985 and 1986 and Medicare
admissions overall fell by a total of 11.3 percent between 1983 and 1986
(Guterman et al., 1988). Thus hospitals appear to be limiting admission to only
those severely ill and shifting more routine care to other, non-PPS covered
sites.
Hospital admissions have declined for all age groups also; falling by 10.3
percent between 1983 to 1986 while the number of inpatient days fell by 15.7
percent for the same period. Results from a preliminary study of the impact of
PPS on general hospital admission rates suggest that admission rates per 1,000
Blue Cross/Blue Shield members and hospital days per 1,000 Blue Cross/Blue
Shield members have declined at rates exceeding those for
beneficiaries (Scheffler & Gibbs, 1986).

Medicare

The proportion of all community

hospital admissions for people 65 or above increased 10 percent between 1979
and 1986.

These data tend to reinforce the conclusion that PPS has had a

system-wide impact versus an impact on Medicare beneficiaries only (Guterman
et al., 1988). The data may also reflect the changing role of the hospital in the
contemporary health care system as a result of increased cost and utilization
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controls used by private insurers, the increase in alternative delivery system
enrollment, the increase in the shift in care to alternative delivery sites, and/or
changes in utilization in rate setting and PPS waiver states (Davis, 1985).

Readmission Rates. Readmissions can reflect a deterioration in the quality
of care for a variety of reasons. Some patients will require rehospitalization
for problems unrelated to the original admission. Readmissions can also occur
if routine testing or specialized consultations are curtailed, so that unsuspected
condititions are not detected or confirmed on a first admission. Readmission
can also be prompted by complications arising from surgery or because of
inappropriate care or inadequate recuperation before discharge

~'premature

discharge"). One form of readmission arises from sequencing of admissions, one
admission for diagnostic testing and workup and a second for surgery or other
definitive therapy. Thus, it is important to determine if PPS incentives for
curbing length of stay, routine testing, follow-up of diagnostic tests, and
specialty consultations seem to be associated with a rise in readmissions of this
sort.
Readmission rates within 30 days of hospital discharge have remained
relatively stable under PPS (Guterman et al., 1988).

However, very little

detailed information on readmissions has yet been published but the decline in
admissions probably means that the readmission rate has not significantly
increased (OT A, 198.5). A study of 270,266 Medicare readmissions before PPS
(between 1974 and 1977) indicated that approximately .5 percent were
readmitted within .5 days and that 22 percent of Medicare patients dishcarged
from the hospital were readmitted within 60 days (Anderson & Steinberg, 1984).
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The fact that admissions declined in the first year of PPS, rather than
rising as predicted, suggests three different explanations: one, that there may
be strong counteractive forces operating to keep hospitals from admitting more
Medicare patients; two, that strategies aimed at increasing admissions takes
time to be developed; or three, that admissions are difficult for hospital
managers to influence directly.

Thus, it may be easier for hospitals, at least

initially, to increase outpatient visits (since they are reimbursed on a cost basis)
than to increase inpatient admissions in profitable DRGs (OTA, 1985).
Length of Stay.

Statistics compiled by the Health Care Financing

Administration (HCF A} tend to support the notion that hospitals have resorted
to an "early discharge" strategy in response to the financial incentives of PPS.
Although average length of stay (ALOS} has been declining over the past 15
years, PPS appears to have accelerated this trend for the elderly. Annual data
on average length of stay for Medicare beneficiaries for the period between
1967 and 1984 show length of stay has been steadily declining over the 15 years
prior to PPS.

Average length of stay declined from 10.3 to 10 days between

1982 and 1983 (when TEFRA provisions were in effect}, a 2. 9 percent decline.
Between 1983 and 1984 (when PPS was implemented}, average length of stay
dropped to 9.1 days, a 9 percent decline (Guterman et al., 1988). The Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA, 1985} and Davis (1985) both report an even larger
decline for the elderly, from

10.4 days in 1981 to 8.8 days in 1984,

approximately a 15 percent decline.
While Medicare beneficiaries experienced declines in the overall use of
hospitals in both 1984 and 1985, the two years differed greatly in the nature of
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the declines. The sharp decreases in length of stay in 1984 were followed by
more moderate declines in 1985 and 1986.

Average length of stay for all

Medicare beneficiaries declined just 3.5 percent in 1986, for a total of a 17
percent decline since 1984.

The declines in length of stay also varied across

age groups. Length of stay declined more for the oldest age group (86+), with a
drop of 6.5 percent in 1985, than for the youngest age group (65- 75 years),
with a drop of 4 percent (Guterman et al., 1988). Finally, the decline in the
elderly's length of stay was more dramatic for those hospitals under PPS the
longest. Hospitals under PPS since 1984 had a 14.6 percent decrease in LOS
between 1982 and 1984. Because the need for sub-acute post-hospital care is
greatest for older persons, length of stay reductions could pose significant posthospital care problems for this older group.
Although length of stay for all ages under 65 has also been declining, the
rate of decline has been more modest. OTA (1985) reports that average length
of stay in the under 65 population declined from 6.6 to 5.8 days between 1974
and 1983.

The American Hospital Association (AHA) reports a 7 percent

decline in general average length of stay, from 5.9 days in 1981 to 5.5 days by
1984 (Davis, 1985). Overall, average length of stay for all community hospital
patients under age 65 has decreased only 5.1 percent since 1979 (Guterman et
al., 1988).
Case-Mix Severity.

It was hypothesized that elderly Medicare patients

needing long-term care services, most often referred to as Medicare "outliers"
(those with hospital stays greater than the geometric mean length of stay),
would be much more likely to be discharged earlier

~han

those discharged to

212

self-care (Meiners & Coffee, 1984). Contrary to expectations, it appears that
the decline in length of stay under PPS has been achieved through shorter stays
across the board, rather than efforts aimed specifically at patients who have
the longest stays and are, presumably, the most severely ill. This conclusion is
supported in the data reported by the Health Care Financing Administration
(Guterman et al., 1988) as well as in the data presented in this dissertation
where length of stay declined significantly in all five DRG categories examined.
If less severely ill beneficiaries are being diverted, then there should be a
corresponding increase in the average severity of illness among Medicare
patienh admitted to hospitals.
While LOS has decined, there has been a marked increase in the average
severity of illness among those Medicare patients who are admitted to the
hospital.

The Medicare Case-Mix Index (CMI) increased sharply with the

implementation of PPS. The CMI was 8.4 percent higher in 19&4 than in 19&1,
exceeding estimates that were made prior to the implementation of PPS. Some
of this increase could be the result of changes in documentation (upcoding),
improvements in data collection, and/or changes in physician practice patterns
(Guterman & Dobson, 19&6). However, the CMI has continued to increase at an
annual rate of 3 percent per year between 19&4 and 1986. In addition, HCFA
found that the percentage of hospital days spent in special care units by
beneficiaries increased, from 6. 4 percent to 7.1 percent, in 1984, reinforcing
the perception that the only the more severely ill are being admitted to
hospitals in the post-PPS period (Guterman et al., 1988).
However, a study by GAO (1985b) found that the use of intensive care units
was lower in 1984.

GAO atributed the decrease to PPS.

Moreover, the
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Commission on Professional and Hospital Activities (CPHA) found that the use
of cardiac care units decreased in the first year of PPS (CPHA, 198.5). More
data over a longer term are needed to sort out the relative impacts of PPS on
case-mix and utilization.
Hospital Staffing.

It was also expected that hospitals would reduce

expenses by laying off staff, eliminating beds, and negotiating lower prices with
suppliers (OT A, 198.5). Restructuring staffing patterns under DRG-based PPS to
reduce unit labor costs and increase efficiency stems from reduced LOS, shifts
to oupatient services and general pressures to decrease health care costs. One
method of cutting costs is by "down substitution of staff" (replacing staff with
less skilled staff; e.g., RNs with LPNs).

These activities have definite

implications for quality of care. Inadequate staffing ratios and changing mix of
professional and ancillary personnel save money, yet PPS is predicted to
increase the acuity of those admitted as less ill patients are shifted to
outpatient and ambulatory care.

Decreasing personnel ratios may delay or

hamper restoration to full function and even increase chances of morbidity or
mortality through decreased patient education activities, increased infection
rates, reduced CPR time, etc.
A decrease in hospital occupancy frequently corresponds with a decrease in
staffing. There is clear evidence that hospitals have been reducing their staffs
in response to PPS. Data from the American Hospital Association (AHA) show
that after having increased at an annual rate of 4.1 percent between 1974 and
1983, there was a 2.2 percent decline between May 1983 and May 1984,
primarily because of a decrease in full-time employees (Washington Report,

214
1984). The number of part-time workers decreased only .2 percent during the
same period (OT A, 1985). The American Nursing Association reports that there
has also been a shift away from licensed practical nurses towards the more
highly trained registered nurses (American Medical News, 1985).
Berki (1985) reports a 1.5 percent decline in hospital personnel nationally in
1984 and a 4 percent decline in the first quarter of 1985 while admissions
increa!>ed by 6 percent during the same quarter.

Similarly, after an annual

increase in hospital beds of 1.4 percent between 1975 amd 1983, hospital beds
were reduced by .6 percent between 1983 and 1984 (Davis, 1985). Moreover,
health care labor costs had been rising at a three percent annual rate before
PPS, whereas they decreased by almost one percent in the first year of PPS
(Hellinger, 1985). Data from specific states and regions reinforce this picture
of hospital cost containment through staff reductions (OT A, 1985).
A reduction in staffing does not necessarily mean less staff time per
hospitalized patient.

Because of recent trends towards fewer admissions and

reduced LOS, the number of full-time-equivalent (FTE) employees per 100
patients actually increased between May, 1983 and May, 1984.

Full-time

equivalent personnel per 100 patients increased 3.2 percent annually from 1975
to 1983 but increased by 7.4 percent in 1984 (Davis, 1985; Washington Report,
1984). There is little research published to date regarding the impact of staff
reductions on the quality of care beneficiaries are receiving within the hospital
setting.
Hospital Management and Or@!niza.tion.

PPS appears to be having an

impact on hospital information systems and their use in management. The use
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of DRGs as the basis for payment has led to a proliferation of computer
packages aimed at helping hospitals estimate their actual costs per case and
predict the reimbursement levels per patient (Business Week, 1984; OTA, 1985).
Furthermore, the medial records departments of hospitals are assuming a
greater role in management since accurate records processing is necessary for
prompt maximum reimbursement (Johnson & Appel, 1984). This has resulted in
automated medical records processing.

One market research survey showed

that the use of automated processing among sampled hospitals jumped from
28.3 percent in 1981 to 48.1 percent in 1984 {Hospitals, 198.5).

While the

increasing use of computers has taken place in many industries, PPS may be a
contributing factor in their rapid application to hospital management.
The relationship between the financial pressure imposed by PPS and the
resulting changes in hospital behavior, such as the steep declines in ALOS and
admissions, may indicate that PPS has been effective in encouraging hospitals
to change the way they provide inpatient care. However, PPS is not the only
factor that has contributed to changes in patient care and management
practices in acute care hospitals.

Other factors such as competition among

providers and increased utilization review by third-party payers have also
influenced provider behavior. It is difficult to disentangle the specific effects
of PPS from these other, equally influential, forces.
Net Effect of PPS on Quality of Hospital Care
Evaluating the net effect of PPS on the quality of hospital care is limited
by the fact that mortality rates, readmission rates, or sentinel events alone are
poor measures of more subtle changes in patient care of the elderly.

Even if
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death or readmission rates show little or no change, as they appear to have done
from the data published so far, PPS may have an effect on changes in discharge
status, time to full recovery, impact on chronic impairments, and the emotional
status of beneficiaries. Moreover, because standard measures (i.e., mortality)
are relatively rare events, relying on these more general quality indicators is
inappropriate and insufficient to trigger corrective action (OT A, 1985).
Examination of the processes of care and "proximate," that is, short term,
outcomes of care rendered in the hospital will provide a more balanced
approach to the evaluation of PPS effects than just using studies of crude
outcome measures.

Only medical record audits, examining condition-specific

process and outcomes related to medical and nursing care are likely to provide
pre- and post-PPS data with the requisite reliability, validity, and clinical detail
necessary to convince the medical profession, policymakers, and beneficiaries
about the impact of PPS.
General questions to be addressed in evaluating whether treatment
patterns have changed include: (1) has PPS resulted in changes in treatment
patterns? (2) have changes in treatment patterns adopted in response to PPS
affected outcomes of care? and (3) have changes in treatment patterns adopted
in response to PPS negatively affected outcomes of care? (Lewin & Associates,
1986).

Incentives for changes in care include reducing length of stay,

developing a preference for the more lucrative surgical rather than medical
treatments, decreases in the utilization of ancillaries, intensive care or heroic
measures, maximizing pre-admission or post-discharge care as a substitute for
inpatient care, use of less expensive treatments even if they are potentially less
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effective over the long term, and the implementation of administrative and
other changes in plant operation and maintenance procedures (OT A, 1985).
Specifically, there is the potential for delayed diagnosis (e.g., failure to
diagnose a condition at an earlier stage due to a less extensive diagnostic
workup), and a reduction in less tangible aspects of quality of care. The two
major determinants of these changes are hospital administrators and physicians.
The pressure placed on hospital administration concerning the costs of care
for the elderly has, in turn, created pressures on physicians in the allocation of
health care.

The trend towards shorter lengths of stay and early discharge

could pose specific clinical problems for the care of the elderly. For example,
while research has shown that multidisciplinary geriatric assessment and
therapy can improve the functional level of outcome, reduce readmissions,
reduce nursing home admissions, and decrease mortality rates, none of these
services are covered under PPS (Rubinstein, et al., 1984). Instead, acute and
intensive care continue to be emphasized in the new payment system,
promoting continued over-utilization of some services and the loss of others
which may be more relevant to the elderly's needs (Cassel, 1985).

There i:.

little published research on this issue.
Surgical versus Medical Treatment.

The incentives for physicians are

complex and likely to occur within the hospital's organizational structure since
PPS impacts physicians only indirectly. Hospital administrators are encouraged
to specialize in those DRGs in which they can offer the most efficient and
profitable treatment since PPS reimbursement continues the fee-for-service
bias favoring surgical and procedure-based services over diagnostic judgment
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and nonsurgical treatment.

Hospital managers thus have the incentive to

influence physicians to admit more patients in those DRGs with high profitmargins and to develop "product lines" that maximize the hospital's net
revenues (Berki, 198.5). For example, hospital management may choose to shift
bed allocations from medicine to the more lucrative surgical DRGs, selectively
grant staff privileges to physicians who are more likely to admit desired cases,
and to de-emphasize special technology and support services for low-profit
services, such as problem new-borns (Berki, 198.5; Omenn & Conrad, 1984). All
these actions would, in fact, impact physicians practicing in the hospital.
Lewin and Associates (1986), in a survey of current research on the impact
of PPS, found some changes in treatment patterns since 1984 but most of these
changes could not clearly be attributed to PPS. Moreover, a Rand study (Carter
& Ginsberg, 198.5) compared the proportion of medical versus surgical DRGs in

1984 to the number that would have been expected if prior trends had continued
since 1981.

These data were analyzed for each of the 1.5 Major Diagnostic

Groups (MDCs) that have both medical and surgical DRGs.

The results

indicated that the proportion of Medicare discharges in surgical DRGs rose
from 21 percent to 27 percent between 1981 and 1984, particularly in the MDCs
where there was a substantial difference in the reimbursement of the DRG.
The researchers were unable to determine if the shift towards surgical cases
reflected more complete coding of minor surgical procedures or PPS induced
surgery.
Garrison and Neuman (1988) conducted a study examining trends in the
concentration of six surgical procedures under PPS.

Three principal findings
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reported from the study were: first, there was little evidence of significant
concentration of surgical procedures in higher volume hospitals during the first
three years of PPS.

Although average volume increased for five of the six

procedures, the number of hospitals performing the procedures also increased.
The authors suggest that the increase can be attributed to general growth,
rather than a significant shift from low-volume to high-volume surgery in
hospitals. Second, consistent with previous studies, there was a statistically
significant negative relationship between volume and in-hospital mortality,
controlling for case mix differences across hospitals, for five of the six
procedures. For all six procedures, there was a negative relationship between
volume and average Medicare hospital costs-per-case. Third, changes in volume
of procedures between 1984 and 1986 at individual hospitals were associated
more with

historical operating margins than PPS.

Thus, increases in

concentration were small and changes in concentration did not result in
significant improvements in mortality or cost savings.

The authors conclude

that, contrary to expectations, PPS did not lead to a concentration of
procedures in facilities that were more efficient or that provided higher quality
of care.
In addition, PPS was predicted to lead to a restructuring of the physician's
role in hospital decision-making (Omenn & Conrad, 1984). Organization theory

suggests that all organizational systems have a variety of mechanisms available
to influence behavior, ranging from indirect controls such as positive and
negative incentives to more direct controls such as bureaucratic rule making.
Bureaucracy uses red tape, specialization of function, adherence to fixed rules,

220
and hierarchy of authority as control mechanisms.

In hospitals, the use of

treatment protocols that make clinicians adhere to fixed rules, the requirement
that medical student orders be countersigned or that standing orders be
periodically reviewed by the chief resident are examples of fixed rules {Berki,
1985). The change predicted under PPS is that these rules which were, prior to
PPS, almost exclusively determined by hospital practitioners, now are being
evaluated and changed by hospital managers.
Management may be pressuring medical staff to develop clinical treatment
protocols.

The thrust of managerial control would be to make individual

physicians accountable for costly behavior on the basis of data on length of
stay, use of specific types of ancillary services, and total treatment costs per
physician in relation to the treatment protocols {Omann & Conrad, 1984).
Under such circumstances, physicians will lose much of their historical
dominance of hospital operations (Berki, 1985; Young, 1985).

There is the

suggestion that hospital staff are, in fact, being asked to determine the kinds of
resources necessary to successfully treat a condition {Young, 1985). With the
management imperative to restrict decision making by physicians in order to
minimize costs, conflicts may arise between clinicians and administrators as
PPS incentives force managers to bureaucratize the practice of medicine.
The major questions regarding PPS-physician impact; that is, has PPS
resulted in changes in treatment patterns and have these changes affected the
outcomes of care are still largely unanswered {GAO, 1985; Lewin & Associates,
1986; OTA, 1985).

Early reports from officials of the American Medical
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hospitals is diminishing under PPS. The AMA has been monitoring physicians'
experience with PPS through its DRG Monitoring Project. Overall, 66 percent
of physicians surveyed in 1985 stated that quality of care had deteriorated and
73 percent stated that hospital admission and discharge policies had changed
since the introduction of PPS. The information collected so far indicates that
there is more pressure on physicians to discharge patients prematurely, to limit
laboratory tests and to more carefully select 'patient mix' so that sicker
patients aren't admitted to hospitals (Rogers, 1986).
Similarly, responses to HCFA's Physician's Practices, Costs and Incomes
Survey (Pretest, n=200 physicians in five states) are consistent with the AMA
data; 37 percent of physicians agreed that hospitals have encouraged physicians
to shorten length of stay, 16 percent agreed that hospital administrators had
pressured them to reduce ancillary services, 13 percent agreed they had been
pressured to increase admissions, and 50% of radiologists, anesthesiologists and
pathologists surveyed stated they had been encouraged to reduce outpatient
testing (Guterman & Dobson, 1986). Moreover, the decrease in admissions in
hospitals may partially be explained by the increased pressure on physicians to
treat patients in non-hosptial settings.
Ancillary Services.

A report by the Prospective Payment Assessment

Commission (Pro-PAC) in 1985 indicated that some changes in the use of
ancillary services occurred between 1981 and 1984-. Laboratory and radiology
charges declined, from 31.7 percent to 28.6 percent, as a proportion of total
ancillary charges for Medicare. However, no conclusions could be drawn since
the change may have occurred because the services were being shifted from

222
inpatient to outpatient settings. Drugs, however, increased from 18.4 percent
to 19.9 percent and medical supplies increased from 12.5 percent to 14.3
percent of total ancillary charges.

These data support the contention that

patients are leaving the hospital in greater need of care than prior to PPS.
There are little data on the provision of pre-admission or post-hospital care
pre/post PPS (Lewin & Associates, 1986).
AmbulatoryCare. Changes in medical technology and financial incentives
have resulted in a marked trend towards ambulatory care. In terms of hospital
pressures on physicians to treat patients on an outpatient basis, data from an
analysis of Medicare reimbursement data between 1983 and 1985 show that
ambulatory care continued to be the fastest-growing segment of the health care
industry (Leader & Moon, 1988). Outpatient revenue per visit has grown at an
accelerated rate since PPS, although the increase in the rate of growth is not
statistically significant.

Both Medicare and non-Medicare outpatient visits

declined in the first year after PPS implementation but both increased during
the second year of implementation (Guterman, et al., 1988). Again, it is not
clear how much of an impact PPS may have had on the shift to ambulatory care
in relation to other forces affecting the health care market. Longer term (i.e.,
5 to 10 years) longitudinal studies are needed to determine the relative impact

of each of these factors in the changes occurring in the health care industry.
Quality of Care in Non-hospital Settings
Some of the most important quality of care questions raised by the
introduction o:f PPS can be addressed by focusing on two issues related to care
delivered in non-hospital settings: 1) the condition of Medicare patients when
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they are discharged from the hospital and 2) the appropriateness of posthospital placement for patients who require sub-acute care (GAO, 1986). Prior
to PPS, hospitals had the incentive to provide too much health care.

There

were also problems of access to post-hospital care services, most notably
skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), resulting in patients remaining in hospitals
longer than was medically necessary (GAO, 1983).

Further, limitations in

Medicare coverage for post-hospital services reinforced the incentives to
extend hospital stays past the point where patients' acute care needs were met.
Some of this extended care provided in hospitals could have been covered by
Medicare in post-hospital settings.

In other cases, the extended care was

probably custodial or supportive care for chronically ill patients and would not
have been covered by Medicare (GAO, 1986).
In shifting to a system of prospective payment, Medicare removed the
financial incentives to provide more health care services than were needed in
the hospital setting. Since hospitals can profit financially only from cutting
back on medically appropriate as well as inappropriate services, the discharge
of patients still in need of hospital care has become a major quality of care
concern.

In addition, the fact that only inpatient acute services are paid

prospectively under PPS provides additional incentives for hospitals to use other
services which are paid retrospectively, including skilled nursing facilities (SNF)
and home health (HH) care, wherever possible.
Patient's Condition at Hospital D.isdlarge.

A major concern about the

effect of PPS was that hospitals would discharge patients to post-hospital care
more frequent! y and at an earlier stage of recuperation; that is, "q.Jicker and
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sicker."

Premature discharge may necessitate readmissions (or cycles of

discharges and readmissions), illness treatable at an early stage could progress
undetected to a much more serious degree, or patients could be forced to
acquire follow-up care in inappropriate settings with ramifications for the
elderly's physical and mental well-being (OTA, 198.5). While reducing lengths of
stay may not influence whether or not a patient needs post-hospital follow-up
services, it is also possible that some patients may be discharged at a time in
their illness when they have substantial needs for care (GAO, 1986).

Such

patients are likely to experience quality of care problems if they do not receive
appropriate and competent post-hospital care.

In other cases, patients

discharged with needs for post-hospital care could be more likely to seek out
such services on their own after they leave the hospital.

Both of these

possibilities mean that patients who might not have used post-hospital care in
the past may now use home health (HH) or skilled nursing facility (SNF) services
during their recovery (GAO, 1986).
Measuring patient condition at the time of hospital discharge is essential
for three reasons:

in order to determine whether Medicare patients are

receiving adequate hospital care, to assess the appropriateness of discharge
decisions, and to anticipate the demand for post-hospital services.

Thus,

patient condition at discharge provides information about the process of care
inside the hospital and post-hospital care requirements (GAO, 1986).

While

HCF A is current! y funding a number of research efforts to develop measures of
patient condition, these studies tend to focus on ways to compensate for
variations in severity of illness and resource requirements of particular patients
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whose hospital stays are classified under the same DRG. These measures may
then be used to adjust DRGs in order to more accurately reflect variations in
the total cost of providing appropriate treatments for patients with varying
needs.

Indeed, this area of concern has been the focus of the ProPAC

deliberations almost to the exclusion of other, equally important, issues related
to quality of care.
The reimbursement research efforts generally share two characteristics; 1)
for the most part, the focus is on resources expended or required for
appropriate care rather than patient condition per se and 2) most attempt to
describe the seriousness of the illness and are not designed to track changes in
patient condition and needs at different points in the course of hospitalization
(GAO, 1986).

The exception is the Northwest Oregon Health Systems study

(1986) which specifically focused on assessing patient condition at discharge.
The study, as described in this dissertation, applied a newly developed
instrument, the Dependency at Discharge Classification Instrument, to medical
records in 5 DRGs in order to measure patient dependency at discharge.
Dependency was used as a proxy measure of patient care needs at the time of
hospital discharge and was based on four items: Activity, Mobility, Symptoms,
and Procedures.

As reported earlier, the data showed that length of stay

declined significantly in all five DRGs and that Dependency significantly
increased in four of the five DRGs examined between the PRE and POST
periods.

While the study was limited (e.g., non-generalizable to larger

populations, one city data collection}, the study represents the only systematic
effort published to date that attempted to develop valid measures which can

226
measure changes in patient condition at discharge (GAO, 1986). This study was
important to the quality of care in non-hospital settings because of concerns
regarding patient functional status upon hospital discharge. Problems related
to patients' ability to function independently when they leave the hospital are
most relevant to patients entering into post-hospital, community-based care.
The findings of the Northwest Oregon Health Systems study concerning
dependency and of this dissertation concerning post-hospital placement are
supported in more recent work conducted by Systemetrics (Guterman et al.,
1988). Analysis of a large sample of hospital records using the medical illness
severity grouping system (MEDISGRPS) measure showed that average severity
of illness at both and admission and discharge was greater in the post-PPS
sample (1985) than in the pre-PPS sample (1982).

The proportion of live

discharges with the lowest severity level at admission decreased by 5.6 percent;
that is, sicker patients were being admitted, and the proportion with the lowest
severity level at discharge decreased by 9.6 percent between the pre and post
measures; that is, sicker patients were being discharged.
Furthermore, the proportion of live discharges with no dependencies in the
activities of daily living (ADLs) index decreased from 44.8 percent to 37
percent and the proportion of discharges with the maximum of 5 dependencies
increased from 23.4 to 29.2 percent between 1982 and 1985 (Guterman et al.,
1988). The data from both the NOHS and Systemetrics studies support the
contention made by post-hospital care providers that Medicare beneficiaries are
being discharged earlier and with greater needs for sub-acute care.

When

combined with the data on the decline in average length of hospital stay, the
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NOHS and the Systemetrics studies suggest that Medicare patients who are
hospitalized are, on average, likely to be sicker than those who were
hospitalized before PPS and are likely to leave the hospital earlier than they
would have before PPS was enacted.
What these changes mean for the long-term care system has yet to be
systematically examined. Did those patients who were discharged earlier have
better or worse outcomes?

Anecdotal evidence of patients encountering

problems in obtaining adequate post-hospital care in the home or in nursing
homes has increased public awareness of the possibility that the gains in
hospital efficiency have come at the cost of quality, at least for some people.
However, there is no large scale study providing valid information concerning
the quality impacts of earlier discharge (Wagner, 1986).
Post-Hospital Placement.

Patients not acutely ill do not, by definition,

need acute care hospital services and an important benefit of PPS is that it
discourages excessive lengths of hospital stay. Many concerns raised about PPS
relate to the discharge of elderly patients who, while they may not have needed
acute care, were discharged either before they could take care of themselves
adequately at home or without providing for needed non-medical services. It is
not appropriate to attrib.Jte all such problems to PPS, since they also derive in
large part from problems with discharge planning or the availability or quality
of community-based long-term care services. However, it was feared that PPS
would exacerbate any problems of access or quality already existing in
community-based care settings.
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It is likely that there will be differential effects on quality of posthospital care for different groups of Medicare patients. Because most Medicare
patients do not use post-hospital care, PPS incentives pose fewer quality
problems for them. However, the patients who do require post-hospital care
tend to have had longer-than-average stays.

An analysis of 1980 Maryland

hospital discharge data has shown that about 67 percent of recorded discharges
to home health care and about 70 percent of discharges to nursing homes stayed
in the hospital longer than the computed averages for their DRG (Miners &
Coffee, 1983). This could make these types of patients more susceptible to
hospital cost-control efforts. In addition, a recent study of hospital discharges
found circulatory and cardiovascular DRGs to be among the most frequent selfcare cases. Stroke, hip and other joint procedures and mental disorders were
the most prevalent DRGs among nursing home cases. Home care patients were
most frequently cancer and diabetes DRGs (Miners & Coffey, 1985).

&lch

patients are often frail or chronically ill and have multiple health care problems
which make them less attractive for hospitals to admit and harder for them to
place upon discharge.

Thus, the frail and chronically ill could experience

disproportionate access and quality of care problems under PPS through a
combination of premature discharges, inappropriate or sub:tandard posthospital care, or no care at all since they typically rely heavily on family and
friends for help (GAO, 1986).
Variations in hospital practices and long-term care resources across the
country could mean that there will be substantial differences in the way that
PPS affects the quality of care in non-hospital settings.

There are, for

example, large variations in average lengths of stay in hospitals in different
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sections of the country as well as in the availability of different types of posthospital care.

Hospitals which have relatively low lengths of stay or are

located in areas with relatively extensive networks of post-hospital care
providers will probably have less difficulty adapting to the incentives of PPS
than those with longer lengths of stay or without networks of post-hospital care
providers.
Furthermore, it is not clear whether post-hospital care providers, including
nursing homes, home health agencies and community service organizations are
ecpipped to handle sicker patients. To the extent that the decreases in length
of stay for Medicare beneficiaries represent a reduction in unnecessary care
and the substitution of suitable non-hospital services for inpatient care, then
PPS may be seen as encouraging appropriate utilization. However, if patients
are being discharged premature! y to inadequate post-hospital care settings,
then the system may be stimulating inappropriate post-hospital care.
An investigation into the two most common problems predicted to occur
under the prospective payment system I) premature discharge of Medicare
patients; that is when they still require hospital care and 2) inappropriate
transfers; that is, when they no longer need acute care but have inadequate
arrangements for post-hospital subacute care was conducted by the Inspector
General's Office (IGO) of the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) in 1986.
The IGO study reviewed 3,549 problem cases reported to the Health Care
Financing Administration during the period October, 1983, to May, 1985. Of
the 3,549 cases, discharge was determined to be premature in 2,907 cases
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transfers were determined to be inappropriate in 491 cases (1496), and other
problems existed in 151 cases (496). Sixty percent of the cases reviewed implied
poor quality of care while 40 percent were determined to be premature
discharges or inappropriate transfers not related to quality of care. The IGO
concluded that the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) was not
effectively addressing the issue of quality and continuity of care under PPS
(Senate Finance Committee, 1986).
Investigations conducted by the Senate Aging Committee {1985) also found
that large numbers of Medicare patients still in need of heavy medical care
were being prematurely discharged from hospitals into their communities for
care. Data obtained from reports prepared by HCFA indicated that "there had
been a 40 percent increase in discharges to skilled nursing facilities and a 37
perent increase in discharges to home health care" in the first full year of PPS.
The number of older Arnericanc; affected by these trends is substantial. It was
estimated that, by the end of 1985, more than 50,000 additional patients were
being discharged yearly to skilled nursing facilities and to horne health care
than had been discharged to these same providers prior to PPS (Senate Aging
Committee, 1985).
Skilled Nursing Facility Utilization.

A study by the General Accounting

Office (GAO, 1983) reported a growing need for nursing home care by the
elderly. The report also documented problems of access for elderly as a result
of constraints on the supply of nursing horne beds due to state Medicaid rules
and certificate of need laws.

GAO concluded that both factors had led to

increasing access problems for the elderly.
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Another study conducted by GAO (198.5) on the potential impact of DRGs
on post-hospital care indicated a marked increase in the use of skilled nursing
facilities as well as problems associated with arranging placements for patients
who depend on Medicaid for reimbursement and those who require "heavy" care
or the use of sophisticated high technology services. The report pointed out
that a community's ability to effectively meet this increased need may be
limited by such factors as the shortage of nursing home beds and the
importance of state Medicaid reimbursement policies for nursing homes.
Because of the limited coverage for a skilled nursing facility under Medicare,
nursing homes may avoid accepting too many Medicare patients. In addition,
since Medicaid reimbursement rates for skilled care are not always sufficient to
cover costs, nursing homes may limit the number of Medicaid patients as well.
Thus, PPS may significantly impact the skilled nursing facility system.
With hospitals seeking to reduce lengths of stay for Medicare patients
under PPS, an increase in the rate of transfers of Medicare cases to nursing
homes was anticipated.

Data on skilled nursing facility (SNF) admissions

showed a slight acceleration in the projected rate of increase during fiscal year
1984 after a period of no increases from 1981 to 1983 (Guterman et al., 1988).
However, the number of covered days per SNF admission declined from 29.2
days per stay in 1981 to 23.4 days in 198.5, a decrease of 20 percent, indicating
a trend toward more short-stay patients. The percentage of Medicare patients
using SNF services within 60 days of a hospital discharge did not change
substantially from 1981 to 1983 but increased by 44 percent between 1983 and
198.5. By age group, the increase in SNF use from 1983 to 198.5 varied from 31
percent for the 8.5 or older group to 71 percent for the group 6.5 to 74 years of
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age.

Finally, patients discharged from hospitals with large length of stay

r<:>ductions in 1982-1984 increased their use of SNF care from 1981 to 1985 by
83 percent, compared with only 58 percent for patients dishcarged with small
length of stay reductions (Guterman et al., 1988).
Data from this dissertation indicated almost no impact on the discharge
of patients to nursing homes POST-PPS. However, the data were confounded
somewhat by the fact that many of the cases included in the study were
admitted from a nursing home and therefore were to be discharged back to
their nursing home bed. In addition, in Oregon, certificate of need regulations
and a Medicaid waiver program designed to place discharged patients in the
community rather than institutions may have had an impact on the availability
of beds for Medicare patients.

It is clear that more research is needed to

evaluate the true impact of PPS on access and quality of care in skilled nursing
facilities.
Home Health Care Utilization. Although expenditures for Medicare home
health benefits represent only about 2.4 percent of total program expenditures,
it historically has been one of the fastest growing components of the Medicare
program.

By nearly every measure, home health utilization has increased

dramatically: i.e., charges per visit, visits per user, total number of visits, and
visits per 1,000 Medicare enrollees have all increased.

The Health Care

Financing Administration attributes most of this growth to an increase in the
rate of utilization by Medicare beneficiaries: up from 17 per 1,000 enrollees in
1974 to 33 visits per 1,000 in 1981 to 46 visits per 1,000 in 1983 to 51 visits per
Medicare enrollee in 1985 (Guterman, 1988; Leader, 1986; House Aging
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Committee, 1986).

Rowland (1987) documents growth in home health visits,

growing from $6.1 million for 8.5 million visits in 1970 to $801 million for 24.4
million visits in 1981.
While utilization rates per 1,000 enrollees have increased sharply,
increased use is clearly linked with beneficiary age. The oldest old use home
health much more than do younger beneficiaries. This is to be expected due to
age-associated frailty, lack of family support, and diminishment of recuperative
powers. It also means that the growth of the aging population will continue to
increase the demand for home care.

For example, from 1983 to 1985, the

increase in use of home health services 60 days after discharge increased 27
percent.

Although rapid, this was less than the PRE-PPS rate of increase.

However, it should be noted that Medicare home health benefits are restricted
to recovery from acute illness and can only be- provided to an elderly person
who is homebound and nee-ds intermittent skilled nursing, spe-ech or physical
the-rapy. The rigor with which these restrictions are applie-d by Medicare- could
significantly influence the- volume- of use of these services.
A national surve-y of Area Age-ncies on Aging (AAAs) indicated that
community-based long-te-rm care providers reported major shifts in service
delivery patterns due, in part, to PPS.

With few exceptions, most agencies

surve-yed reported incre-ased service unit provision in the- post-PPS period.
Service unit provision for case- management services increased 365 pe-rce-nt and
in-home skilled nursing care se-rvices increase-d 196 pe-rcent (Harlow &: Wilson,
1985).
Substantial increases we-re- also noted for house-kee-ping (69.2%) and
personal care se-rvices (63%).

The substantial incre-ase-s in in-home skilled
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nursing, housekeeping and personal care indicate a clientele which may be
experiencing increased levels of temporary or permanent health impairment-;.
In addition, for most responding agencies, both length of service delivery and
number of units per client have increased and this increase was more dramatic
among those agencies where DRGs had been in effect the longest (Harlow &
Wilson, 1985). Similar results were found in Oregon. An analysis of client and
service data for Oregon Project Independence (OPI) services and Medicaid
senior services conducted in June, 1984 by the Multnomah County Aging
Services Division, showed a marked increase in the demand for publicly funded
community-based services over the pre-DRG period (Murray, 1984).

Thus,

earlier discharge under PPS could affect outcomes of care if that care is
inappropriate for their needs, provides inadequate care, or is unavailable.
Between 1974 and 1983, Medicare reimbursements grew at an average
annual rate of 25 percent versus just under 15 percent in 1985.

Evidence

suggests that regulations for eligibility have been more stringently applied by
Medicare in recent years, both through increased denials of claims and
reinterpretations of regulations such as the "intermittency" requirement and
homebound status.

Denials of claims increased 133 percent from the first

quarter of 1984 to the first quarter of 1986.

Moreover, there is great

variability across fiscal intermediaries in these denial rates (Leader, 1986).
There are three major concerns raised by advocates for the elderly
regarding

Medicare's home health benefit under PPS.

One, the dual

requirements of intermittency and homebound status can act as a "catch-22"
for patients, particularly those newly discharged from the hospital.

More or
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less stringent interpretations of eligibility requirements (e.g., needing daily
care for more than 2 or 3 weeks is not considered intermittent or requirements
that the person be confined to home and need skilled care) can affect the
ability of Medicare patients to receive needed care. Second, quality of care
concerns arise for those lucky enough to receive home care. In contrast to its
efforts to constrain eligibility, Medicare has few regulations to ensure quality
or to regulate the home care industry (House Aging Committee, 1986). Further,
quality concerns are even more important for those receiving services not paid
for by Medicare where there is no regulation. Finally, Medicare's home health
benefit has largely been interpreted as an extension of acute care services
instead of a program for those with chronic conditions; leaving the non-acute,
frail elder! y uncovered and perhaps, underserved (Leader, 1986).
In response to the increased acuity of patients being referred to home
health agencies, a study by Eastern Washington AAA (EWAAA, 1986) found that
home care providers were purchasing more sophisticated equipment, such as
intravenous pumps and hospital beds and were securing training for personnel in
topics ranging from use of more sophisticated medical equipment to the
performance of complicated nursing procedures in the home. In addition, the
study found the HH agencies were experiencing an increase in the use of
traditional nursing supplies, such as skin care kits, gauzes, irrigation sets, and
intravenous kits; an increase in the demand for the delivery of rehabilitative
services, especially speech and physical therapy, and an increase in the growth
of staff nurses, aides, and office personnel.
A study analyzing the impact of New Jersey's DRG system on home health
care (Cushman, 1986) documented an increase in hospital referrals to home
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health care of 67 percent since the DRG system was phased in and a significant
increase in the provision of high tech care in the home, such as catheter care
(98%), tracheostomy care (88%), intravenous therapy (51%), respirator care
(33%), and chemotherapy (26%) between 1981 and1983. The study also found
that home health agencies expanded their hours of operation, both business and
service.

Before the DRG system, only 66 percent of the New Jersey home

health agencies provided services seven days a week or during the evening.
After the implementation of the New Jersey system, over 82 percent of home
health agencies scheduled admissions and visits seven days a week and provided
services during the evening.
While data from the Health Care Financing Administration indicate an
increase in HH and SNF placements, HCF A also reports that there is no
systematic evidence that access to needed post-hospital care has been affected
by PPS (Senate Aging Committee, 1986). However, the General Accounting
Office (GAO, 1987) surveyed hospital discharge planners in 985 Medicare
certified hospitals regarding problems in placing Medicare patients in posthospital care. The results indicated that most discharge planners experienced
problems in obtaining access to appropriate post-hospital care for Medicare
patients.
In general, discharge planners viewed Medicare rules and regulations (i.e.,
eligibility determination problems and limited coverage of needed services) as
the most important barrier to placing patients in both skilled nursing facilities
(SNFs) and home health care (HH).

The problem most often identified as a

barrier to placement in a nursing home was Medicare rules and regulations
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(71%) while the availability of beds and need for complex services (e.g.,
respirator care) were the next most frequently cited factors (63%) inhibiting
placement. In terms of home health care, over half of all responding discharge
planners cited Medicare rules and regulations as the most important barrier to
arranging HH care for beneficiaries. Availability of services was cited as the
next most frequent barrier (13%).

Finally, more than half of all discharge

planners reported that the percentage of Medicare patients waiting in the
hospital for appropriate care was greater in 1985 than in 1982 (GAO, 1987).
Concern about discharge planning has accelerated sharply since the
advent of cost containment policies.

Of major interest is the key role of

discharge planning in reducing unnecessary days in the hospital, thereby
reducing hosptial costs. However, social workers report that discharge planners
are caught between the conflicting goals of providing the continuity of health
care while at the same time trying to stimulate hospital efficiency. Like the
GAO survey of discharge planners, a Senate Committee on Aging (1985)
investigation found that hospital discharge planning services had been severely
taxed under the new payment system and that they were often inadequate.
According to a national survey of hospital discharge planners, caseload since
PPS has risen faster than resources and, as a result, necessary followup on
patients has been unavailable (Senate Aging Committee, 1985). While hospitals
have set specific guidelines for those who may receive discharge planning
services, most of these systems were established well before PPS and may not
be responsive to new conditions in the current PPS environment and the type of
patient being admitted.
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CONCLUSION

The

data

presented

in

this

dissertation

indicate

that

hospital

administrators have resorted to operational, labor, and structural changes in an
attempt to control costs and increase the viability of their hospitals under PPS.
Operational changes are occurring; such as shortening length of stay (resulting
in increased dependency at discharge and increased use of post-hospital
community-based care); reducing the use of ancillary services and decreasing
admissions/readmissions; treating less severely ill patients on an outpatient
basis (increasing the severity of hospital case-mix); eliminating or converting
beds to new services; and shifting dying patients to other care settings.
Labor changes include staff reductions and skill-mix reconfigurations
while structural changes have included emphasizing profitable DRGs (surgical
versus medical treatment}, shifting control of hospital operations from
physicians to management; the implementation of computerized case-mix
management data systems and horizontal and vertical integration (hospitalbased home health services). All these actions are just some of the strategies
being used to reduce costs, improve market share and maintain hospital
profitability. However, how much and to what degree the changes implied by
the data presented in this dissertation were prompted by DRG-based PPS is
difficult to determine.
The relationship between the financial pressure imposed by PPS and the
resulting changes in hospital behavior, such as the steep declines in average
length of stay and admissions, may indicate that PPS has been effective in
encouraging hospitals to change the way they provide inpatient care.

Support
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of this interpretation of the data published to date comes from the declines in
the rate of growth in Medicare inpatient hospital expenditures for the first
three years of PPS. Rates of growth fell to 4.6 percent between 1984 and 1986,
the smallest increase in the program's history. However, PPS is not the only
factor that has contributed to changes in patient care and management
practiCes in acute care hospitals. Other factors such as increased competition
among providers; increased utilization review by third-party payers; increased
consumer awareness and media attention paid to the problem (e.g., Medicare's
impending bankruptcy) may have influenced provider behavior. Consequently, it
is difficult to disentangle the specific effects of PPS from these other, equally
important, forces in the health care arena.
In terms of discharge status and post-hospital placement, the data
generated for this dissertation indicate that Medicare patients are being
discharged earlier, in poorer states of health, and in need of more intensive
post-hospital care services than before the new payment system and as a result,
these patients may now be experiencing inadequate treatment or inappropriate
placement.

For example, skilled nursing facility services may either be

tu1available locally or the Medicare patient may not satisfy stringent eligibility
criteria for SNF care.

But, because of

t~e

intermittency requirement for

Medicare HH care, the patient may not be able to obtain home health care
either. Available data do not permit a precise assessment of the extent to
which the Medicare benefit for either SNF or HH care actually meets the
demand for this care. Futhermore, those patients requiring the most intensive
forms of post-hospital services, such as respirator care, may also be
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problems with access to appropriate post-hospital care.

The data presented

suggest a profound change in the use of post-hospital care services. Demand
for nursing home and home health care is increasing, even under Medicare's
stringent utilization requirements. Problems of quality and access in the skilled
nursing home setting are still evident and may be exacerbated by PPS. Quality
assurance in home health care is virtually non-existant and has been called the
"black box'' issue of home care services (Senate Aging Committee, 1986).
Finally, because many technologies are new to the post-hospital care
setting, providers may not have the equipment or enough properly trained staff
to administer the equipment. It may be that the complexity of these prcedures
and greater vulnerability of patients dependent upon them increases the
likelihood of problems of quality (GAO, 1986). Subacute care providers may
respond to a rise in the demand for services or changes in the types of services
needed by discharged Medicare patients, by increasing the volume or changing
the type of services they provide.

However, if providers do not respond to

increases in demand or to a need for different or more extensive services, the
quality of post-hospital care could be compromised. As has been pointed out,
there are little data available regarding the changes PPS has caused in the posthospital care system (GAO, 1986).

The next chapter summarizes the data

presented in this dissertation, identifies needed research, and discusses the
findings in relation to the future of PPS and the U.S. health care system.

CHAPTERV
THE POUCY IMPUCATIONS OF PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT
The recent changes (in the health care system) are
important because they abandon the prindple, in fact if
not in rhetoric, that medical care should be provided
whenever it is needed, that costs should not be
considered when life or health is at stake ••• This
represents a fundamental change from the philosophy
that has driven the system for a long time, and the
beginning of a search for a new balance between costs
and benefits (Lave, 1984, p. 254).
The American health care system has undergone significant change in the
past two decades prompted by national policy responses to rapidly escalating
costs and increased utilization of health care services.

Among the most

prominent of these changes have been the significant shift in the relationship
between supply and demand (surplus of physicians and hospital beds}, the
corporati.zation of many sectors of the health care industry (multi-hospital
systems, vertical integration of services}, the introduction of capitation and
other forms of alternative health care delivery systems (HMOs, PPOs); the
emergence of organized buyers of medical services such as commercial insurers,
employer and union cnalitions, and Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans; a growing
reliance on market forces as compared to economic regulation to deal with
c:Osts; and dramatically different incentives arising from changes in the way
health care services are financed (state-wide rate regulation).

These changes

have created unprecedented challenges for the traditional health care providers
as the contemporary health care market rapidly changes.

For example, the
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dominance of physicians and the central role hospitals have historically played
in medical care delivery ironically now places them in a precarious postion as
the once dominant structure of the community, not-for-profit hospital with its
independent, largely sola-practitioner medical staff becomes a thing of the past
(Grey &:: McNerney, 1986).

THE "OLD" HEALTH CARE SYSTEM

Over the past 20 years, policy makers at the federal level have responded
to the dramatic rises in health care costs using two policy approaches:
regulation and competition. National policy initiatives during the 1970s relied
heavily on various forms of regulation:

including ·health planning and

certificate of need regulation (CON); state-wide hospital rate-regulation;
professional standards review organizations (PSROs); health care wage and
price freezes; and continually more stringent interpretations of eligibility for
Medicare and Medicaid services (Brown, 1986b). While some of these regulatory
programs were successful in moderating spending increases, they were either
not successful enough or they generated significant opposition from provider
groups to the point where many of the programs were dismantled or eliminated.

For example, health systems agencies (HSAs) were established to control
the formation of expensive new capital projects, such as building or renovating
a hospital, or the purchase of new medical equipment costing more than
$1.50,000.

No new major hospital expansion or capital expenditures were

permittted without state-approved certificate of need (CON). However, HSAs
were severely constrained by their lack of direct control over hospital
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reimbursement and state regulatory processes.

Furthermore, HSAs had to

contend with organized provider groups with enormous resources, able to 'fight'
CON decisions, as well as conflicting goals written into the health planning
legislation (i.e., cost containment, improved access, upgrading facilities, etc.).
These forces combined to prevent HSAs from achieving effective cost control
regulation (Altman & Rodwin, 1988; Brown, 1986b; Havighurst, 1985; Marmor &
Marone, 1980).
The closest the federal government came to effective regulatory cost
control was during the Economic Stabilization Program of 1971 to 1974.
However, even under this freeze, controls were placed only on what could be
charged for services not on what could be spent. Nevertheless, the Economic
Stabilization Program was successful in limiting spending for hospital care.
Hospital costs per admission grew by 11.2 percent just prior to the program.
During the program, the growth rate slowed to 8.5 percent.

After controls

were lifted in 1974, hospital and total medical care spending returned to prefreeze levels (Altman & Rodwin, 1988; Brown, 1986b).
Overall, the research on the impact of regulatory efforts on costs
suggests that CON controls had little effect on costs or utilization while the
economic stabilization program of the early 1970s generally had a short-run
positive, but long-run negative, impact on hospital costs. The evidence also
suggests that rate regulation worked better when the programs were mandatory
(state-wide) and were in effect for several years (Coelen & Sullivan, 1981;
Vladeck, 1981). Merrill and McLaughlin (1986), in an analysis of HMOs, rate
regulation, certificate of need (CON), and professional standards review
organizations (PSROs), found that regulatory efforts produced mixed results.
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None of the existing regulatory efforts appeared to have had a significant
effect on overall per capita hospital costs; although mature mandatory rateregulation programs did appear to have lowered the growth rate in cost per
admission and cost per day. In addition, Worthington and Piro (1982) found that
rate-regulation 3,!so led to longer lengths-of-stay while PSROs led to shorter
lengths-of-stay but higher admission rates.
By the late 1970s, regulation strategies were being replaced by three
competition or 'market-oriented' cost-containment approaches: one, increased
consumer awareness of health care costs through individual cost-sharing, e.g.,
deductibles and copayments; two, the encouragement of health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) and other alternative delivery systems that would
compete with traditional providers by marketing diverse blends of quality,
access and cost health care plans; and three, the development of market power
of organized purchasers of medical services in order to achieve more favorable
payment arrangements (Brown, 1988a; Meyer, l983b).
Businesses, which paid more than $100 billion in health insurance
premiums in 1986, had begun to feel the pressure of increased insurance costs
on their ability to compete in foreign and domestic markets.

Prompted by

studies showing that consumers reduce utilization when they are required to
bear a portion of the costs, employers began to limit their financial liability for
medk.al services by redefining what they would (and wouldn't) pay for. The
evidence regarding consumer behavior has also prompted insurers to design
health plans with more frequent and extensive use of deductibles and
copayments thereby requiring patients to pay more from their own pockets for
each service.
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Prudent purchaser programs, a second market-oriented approach, have
included self-insurance options for employers and the use of competitive
bidding for contracts. Groups of employers formed health care coalitions in
conjunction with labor, insurers, and providers in an effort to reduce health
care costs through the sharing of information and joint bargaining. Similarly,
large employers used their purchasing power to demand more favorable terms
of payment and greater provider efficiency.

The primary result of this

approach appears to be the fact that payers have now become involved in
"managing" the delivery of medical care (Altman & Rodwin, 1988, p. 329).
Employers as well as unions are beginning to require second opinions and preadmission screening, promote wellness programs, and to emphasize outpatient
services. They have begun to shop for health plans among competing insurance
companies, to monitor the cost and quality of medical services received, and to
lobby among practitioners for reduced fees (Havighurst, 1983a; Meyer, 1983a;
Samors & Sullivan, 1983).
Recent evidence suggests that a well-operated managed care program can
save between 8 and 10 percent of total premium dollars (Gertman, 1987). Even
with these changes, more than 70 percent of all medical expenses are still being
paid by public and private third-party payers (Gibson & Waldo, 1984). It also
should be pointed out that many of these private sector initiatives could not be
successful without the corresponding influence of a physician surplus and the
establishment of PSROs and PROs, which have provided important data on
utilization and methods of monitoring provider performance, and that both of
these influences are the result of government regulation (Altman & Rodwin,
1988).
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The major competitive activity of the last ten years has been the
encouragement of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) as a means of
introducing competition into the health care marketplace.

It is well-

documented that HMOs have been able to reduce their own costs by cutting
down the number and duration of hospitalizations.

However, some of these

reductions may be offset by increased utilization of outpatient services since
HMOs typically include more outpatient benefits than traditional insurance·
plans (Brown, 1988b; Luft, 1984, 1985; Luft, Maerki, & Trauner, 1986).
Proponents have argued that the growth of HMOs will create health care
price competition.

These advocates hypothesize that as HMOs gain large

market shares, the cost-containment features of HMOs; for example, fixed
budget financing, reducing inpatient utilization by keeping patients out of
hospitals and using fewer resources once a patient is admitted, and controlling
significant amounts of patient volume, will require other third-party buyers of
care to adopt the same behavior if they are to become more price-conscious
and cost-effective (Feldman et al., 1986).

That is, HMOs will create a

"spillover effect" to other providers in a medical market (Merrill & McLaughlin,
1986).
There have been a number of empirkal tests of the competitive impact of
HMOs at the community level.

Chiswkk (1976), analyzed variation in

occupancy and admission rates in 192 SMSAs.

His results indicate that the

presence of an HMO in a state did, on average, reduce the admission rate by 7.6
percent.

Goldberg and Greenberg (1981) found that the greater the market

share of HMOs, the lower the hospital utilization rate for privately-insured
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individuals in a given state. Feldman et al., (1986), in a study of the effects of
HMOs on utilization, found certain types of HMOs (staff network versus IPA
HMOs) did lower utilization.
However, some of the ways HMOs compete appear to have shifted costs
among payers and increased, rather than decreased, total spending for medical
care. There is some evidence that HMOs market themselves in such a way so as
to encourage a favorable selection of patients; that is, patients that will cost
less (e.g., creaming). This is accomplished through such techniques as offering
services that will attract young and generally health people (e.g., well baby
care; sports medicine); locating in neighborhoods that are middle class; and they
do not "cater" to groups with high-cost illnesses (Altman & Rodwin, 1988;
Etheridge, 1986; Luft, 1985; Wilensky & Rossiter, 1986).
While there was some initial evidence that the presence of HMOs in a
market lowered the costs of competing providers, more recent evaluations
suggest that this is not the case. Merrill and McLaughlin (1986), in their study
of 25 medical markets, found that competition (as measured by degree of
market penetration) had no significant spillover effect on reducing overall
hospital costs. Further, the researchers found that HMOs had no impact on the
growth rate of hospital expenses per capita or per patient-day. Another study
of HMOs in Hawaii, Rochester, and Minneapolis/St. Paul (Luft, Maerki, and
Trauner, 1986) found that in none of the three markets was there a reduction in
hospital use that could be attributed to HMOs.

Instead, reductions were

attributable to other factors; such as biases in the data, long term trends
predating the HMOs, indirect effects of other policy changes, and other forms
of competition.
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Many of the so-called competitive initiatives (i.e., employer-based
initiatives, HMOs) have been restricted to a rather narrow 'corridor' of
purdlasers, usually at the high end of the market. While producing a sort of
competition, it was not the kind that occurs for most other goods or services
where options range from inexpensive to expensive (Altman & Rodwin, 1988).
As Altman and Rodwin (1988) persuasively argue, the new incentives promoted
competition but only between high-quality benefit packages or delivery systems
and higher quality services and benefits. The authors state:
Such competition does little to reduce the expense of
basic coverage, and it may even encourage the market to
sell policies that carry additional protection. Since
insurance policies still largely insulate patients from
most costs, the increased use of consumer incentives has
at best only a marginal effect on resource utilization or
expenditure control (p. 326).
It is striking that approximately 1.5 years after the introduction of
competition in health care (e.g., Nixon's HMO legislation), there appears to be
little agreement on what is actually meant by a competitive approach to health
care cost-containment. There appears to be no central core or unified theory
of ex>mpetition in health services, we seem to know very little about the
workings of competition or about the outcomes of competition, and as Brown
(1988a) points out, " •••while sifllificant progress has been made toward
enhancing competition, in whatever form, there is little data that shows this
'progress' has saved the system money •••or why there is nearly a complete lack
of documented progress toward cost-containment'' (p. 362).
Summary. Based on the data reviewed, neither competition nor regulation
appears to have had a significant impact on reducing overall health care costs.
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The results from these studies suggest that competition must encompass more
than just HMOs if oompetitive strategies are to succeed and that regulation
must involve more than just certificate of need or wage and price freezes to
contain rises in costs.
Competition and regulation have converged in the contemporary health
care market, blurring the traditional health care boundaries as providers deliver
new types and levels of care, become involved in both the financing and
provision of care; and form for-profit/not-for-profit hybrids.

The Reagan

Administration, more than any other, has encouraged both competitive and
regulatory activities in health care to create a "health care system in which
measures of a>mpetition and regulation unthinkable ten years earlier were not
only present but accepted and applauded'' (Brown, 1986, p. 580).

With the

government's retreat from system-wide regulation in the 80s and its pressing of
the anti-trust attack upon monopoly practices in health care, decision-making
power has begun to devolve upon the consumer and on the private entities
accountable to them in the competitive marketplace. In light of the historical
development of the health care system and the degree of control providers have
wielded since the turn of the century, this decentralization of decision-making
is significant (Havighurst, 1986). It has resulted in the movement from cost to
price, from unconstrained provider behavior to intensive scrutiny, from
paternalism to self-responsibility and reflects the seminal changes driving
health care from a public good to a private good (Brown, 1986).
While some form of a prospective payment reimbursement system had been
advocated for Medicare since the early 70s as a means of containing rising

250

costs, Congress's reluctance to alter the basic structure of the program
combined with fierce opposition by the health care industry, stood in the way of
fundamental reform. In 1972, Congress mandated the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) to grant waivers to states wanting to experiment with
prospective reimbursement.

Several states experimented with a variety of

systems and some had favorable results (e.g., New Jersey's DRG-based system).
With the ink hardly dry on the New Jersey waiver application, the Reagan
Administration already was touting DRG-based prospective payment as its
"competitive" solution
Administration

officials

to the Medicare
as

the

first

financial

crisis.

significant

change

Viewed
in

by

Medicare

reimbursement since its passage in 1965, the intent of PPS was to constrain
rising hospital rosts while ensuring continued access to quality health care for
Medicare beneficiaries (Guterman & Dobson, 1986; Thompson, 1986).

The

ftndamental issue central to the new payment system was the radical change in
incentives that PPS represented.

THE NEW HEALTH CARE SYSTEM

Changing the method of reimbursement for hospital care alters two major
dynamics of the health care system: the incentives facing hospitals and the
behavior of physicians.
center to a rost center.

PPS changes the role of the hosptial from a revenue
Before PPS, more care meant more revenue. Now,

more care can mean less revenue. Similarly, before PPS, the hospital's role was
to provide the facilities to produce the maximum combination of services
physicians wanted to order.

Under PPS, providers must reduce costs by

reducing services and they must produce those services more efficient! y (Berki,
1985).
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Many observers fear that the Medicare payment reform is actually a
"euphemism" for minimizing federal fiscal responsibility and a strategy to "shift
the burden of payment from government to individuals" (Cohodes, 1987, p. 66).
They fear that the changes now occurring in the health care system may reduc:e
the accessibility and quality of care available to the public and that the elderly
will be paying more out-of-pocket costs for their health care. There is also a
great deal of concern that the emphasis on cost-containment will result in
permanent damage to the health care system. Others fear that the health care
system will equally be damaged if costs are not brought under control. It is not
clear that ei.ther group's fears will be proven right but what is dear is that
budget realities (i.e., the large federal deficit and Medicare's continued fisc:al
problems) will continue to bring pressure to bear on the scope of federal
welfare programs.
Although the direction of the incentives under PPS and some of the
resulting impacts were predicted by the designers of PPS, the assumptions
behind the new payment system are still largely untested.

Both positive and

negative impacts have been predicted, including serious undesirable results of
.PPS on patients' access to and quality of health care (OTA, 1985).

The

widespread concern regarding the threat to the health care system that PPS
poses as well as the fact that very little is known or understood about the short
and long term consequences of .such a reimbursement system underscores the
need for valid and timely data on the impacts of PPS.

Without such

information on which to base decision-making, policy makers will be unable to
nurture the positive effects, or ameliorate the negative effects, of PPS without
doing major damage to the health care system and to Medicare beneficiaries.
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WHAT DO THE DATA SHOW?
The data presented in this dissertation indicate that PPS does appear to
have slowed the overall rate of increase in inpatient hospital expenditures.
Although the rate of growth was still above the general rate of inflation, it
represents a downturn in the rapid growth of inpatient hospital payments prior
to PPS. However, the data also show a corresponding increase in outpatient
expenditures, expenditures for skilled nursing facilities (SNF), and expenditures
for home health (HH) care.

The data also show a significant decrease in

average length of stay for Medicare beneficiaries, an increase

~n

patient

severity of illness at hospital admission, an increase in patient Dependency at
Discharge, and an increase in discharge placements of more dependent patients
to community-based care, especially to home health care.

Hospital Expenditures
Data from the Health Care Financing Administration (HCF A) (Guterman,
. et al., 1988) on the first three years of PPS show that, as predicted, the rate of
growth ·in Medicare inpatient hospital expenditures decreased after the
implementation of PPS. After having increased at an average annual rate of
19.9 percent since 1974, inpatient hospital expenditures grew at a rate of 10.2
percent in 1983, at 8.2 percent in 1984, and fell to 4.6 percent in 1986. This
was the smallest rate of growth in the program's history. In addition,
expenditures for non-hospital inpatient services (e.g., physicians services)
declined slightly, down from 8.9 to 8.1 percent for the first three years of PPS
(Guterman et al., 1988). However, it was not clear that the decline was a result
of PPS or whether it was a result of a 15 month physician's fee freeze instituted
by the Health Care Financing Administration in 1984. The freeze was expected
to save Medicare $2.9 billion over a three year period.
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Outpatient Expenditures
Outpatient hospital payments grew at 11.9 percent in 1984, an increase
larger than the rate for inpatient expenditures for the eleventh consecutive
year. While payment rates grew by less than 7.1 percent in 1986, this was still
larger than the rate of increase for inpatient expenditures.

Skilled Nursing and Home Health Expenditures
An anticipated effect of PPS was the encouragement to hospitals to shift
the care of many Medicare patients to community-based care settings. This
prediction turned out to be accurate.

The growth in skilled nursing facility

(SNF) payments has accelerated since the implementation of PPS.

Between

1984 and 1986, SNF payments grew at an average rate of 4.7 percent as opposed
to a decrease in the rate of growth in SNF expenditures prior to PPS. SimilarI y,
home health (HH) expenditures have grown.

Payments for home health care

grew at an average of 12.7 percent over the first three years of PPS versus an
average rate of growth of 11.2 percent for the five years prior to PPS
(Guterman et al., 1988). Both SNF and home health care growth are significant
in light of strict eligibility requirements and limited benefits under Medicare
rules. These data indicate a profound shift in the delivery of health care since
the implementation of PPS.

Severity of Illness
Severity at admission appears to have increased since PPS. The Medicare
Case-Mix Index {CMI) increased 8.4 percent between 1981 and 1984, exceeding
predictions made prior to the implementation of PPS.

In addition, the CMI

continued to increase at a rate of 3 percent per year between 1984 and 1986

254

(Guterman et al., 1988).

Furthermore, hospital-based mortality rates, which

were expected to rise as a result of PPS, showed an increase in populationbased mortality rate. However, this rate of increase was somewhat, but not
significantly, higher than was expected based on trends since 1979. Analyses of
these data in light of case-mix changes suggest that the increase in mortality
was fully accounted for by the increase in case-mix severity.

Admissions
Admissions, which were expected to increase, actually decreased by 4
percent in 1984, dropped another 4.3 percent between 1985 and 1986, and
declined a total of 11.3 percent between 1983 and 1986 (Guterman et al., 1988).
Readmission rates remained relatively stable.

Length of Stay
Length of stay has dropped significantly, down from 9.5 days in 1983 to

7.5 days nationally in 1984 (GAO, 1985).

Length of stay also declined

significantly in the sample studied by Northwest Oregon Health Systems (NOHS)
where average length of stay dropped from 11.3 days in the PRE-PPS period to
8.6 days in the POST -PPS period, a drop of 2.7 days. Length of stay for those

under 65 did not evidence this dramatic decline.
Patient Status at Discharge
Although national data on patient status at discharge are lacking,
anecdotal evidence from surveys of health and social service providers suggests
that elderly patients are leaving the hospital at an earlier stage in their
recuperation and more in need of intensive, high technology sub-acute care than
before PPS was implemented. The NOHS data indicate that patients in four of
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the five DRGs studied were being discharged significantly more Dependent than
before DRGs. Furthermore, the Northwest Oregon Health Systems data show
that there was a significant increase in the numbers of patients being
discharged to community-based care and a significant increase in the number of
highly dependent patients being discharged to home health care.

Hospital Operations
Hospitals appear to have responded to the incentives in PPS by reducing
staff;

acquiring

automated

case-mix

data

management

systems;

and

emphasizing high-return DRGs. For example, data from the American Hospital
Association (Washington Report, 1984) show that there was a 2.2 percent
reduction in full-time employees between May 1983 and May 1984.

This

decrease is in sharp contrast to the 4.1 percent increase in staff annually since
1974.

In addition, in a survey of OJrrent research on changes in treatment

patterns since 1984, Lewin and Associates (1986) found some changes in
treatment patterns since 1984 but these changes could not clearly be attributed
to PPS alone. Furthermore, a Rand study (Carter & Ginsberg, 1985) found that
the proportion of Medicare discharges in surgical DRGs rose from 21 to 27
percent between 1981 and 1984, particularly in diagnoses where there. was a
substantial difference in the reimbursement of the DRG.

However, the

researchers were unable to determine if the shift toward surgery cases
reflected a more complete coding of procedures or if PPS had induced the
change.
Finally, it appears that PPS may be causing a redefinition of hospital care
and a restructuring of the physician's role in hospital decision-making (Omenn &
Conrad, 1984). Hospitals are no longer viewed as the primary site of treatment
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but rather are now seen as a part of a continuum of care based in institutions
and in the community. Physician's roles have also changed and they have lost
some of the dominance over the health care system.

With the emphasis on

business principles for the maintenance of hospital financial viability, managers
(i.e., hospital administrators) rather than the physician-staff appear to be

taking control of hospital operations and pressuring physicians to be more
accountable for their treatment decisions.

EVALUATION OF PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT

After three years under PPS, it is not clear that it has achieved its full
objective. There appear to be two views:

one, the official government view,

that DRG-based PPS has worked fine; producing the intended economic
transformation of the health care system. Advocates point out that in less than
one year of implementation, startling reductions in average length of stay,
admissions, and costs were identified.

According to the Inspector General of

HHS, hospitals were financially doing better under Medicare PPS than anybody
had thought possible.

The Inspector General reported that hospital profits on

Medicare had risen to 14 percent in the first year of PPS (Spiegler & Kavaler,
1988).

There was praise for the Reagan Administration for its leadership in

regulatory reform of the hospital sector and the introduction of competition into
hospital service delivery resulting in hospitals adopting modern cost accounting
procedures, business management techniques, and actual price development
mechanisms. For example, the New York Times (June 12, 1985) editorial stated
that " •••the Reagan Administration has managed an apparent taming of hospital
cost inflation. While caution may still be in order, so is credit for a triumph of
social policy'' (p. 2).
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Even while claiming credit for its policy "success," HHS and the Health
Care Financing Administration acknowledged certain limits to the DRG system
by officially recognizing the inequities in the reimbursement formulas (e.g.,
rural/urban differences; lack of a severity of illness factor; teaching/nonteaching hospital status). For the most part, however, supporters of the system
agreed that, even if PPS did not produce the total results anticipated, the
health care system has been fundamentally altered.
" •••the U.S.

As one observer put it:

health care system won't ever go back to a retrospective, cost-

based reimbursement system" (Friedman, 1984b, p. 33).
A second and, in my view, more compelling conclusion is that DRG-based
PPS has only been a "qualified'' success. PPS can be called a qualified success
for three reasons. In the first place, it is not clear that the reductions in costs
and utlization are specifically due to PPS.

Many of the 1984-1986 trends

identified by HCFA as effects of PPS (e.g., decreases in length of stay, reduced
utilization) predated PPS. In addition, the impact of PPS on average length of
stay (ALOS) is complicated by the fact that ALOS under PPS is influenced by
two separate incentives. First, if hospitals are able to attract patients with
less severe conditions, ALOS will decline. Conversely, ALOS could rise in the
same DRGs if all but the most severely ill are treated as outpatients. A second
incentive influencing ALOS is the incentive for "early discharge." Reported
ALOS will decline if patients are discharged earlier in their recovery to other
care settings.
Related to the issue of utilization reductions is that the decline in
inpatient volume has not been uniform across hospitals or geographic areas.
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The shortened stay of Medicare beneficiaries and sharp decline in admissions of
nonelderly patients have had a tremendous impact on all hospital days.
Although community hospitals overall experienced a 8.4 percent decline in
admissions between 1983 and 1985, hospitals with less than 50 beds experienced
a 22.3 percent decline and .hospital with 50 to 99 beds had a 17.1 percent
decline. Thus, the combination of declining admissions and short stays for all
age groups has been concentrated among small hospitals and confounds any
clear connection to PPS (Guterman et al., 1988).
The dramatic declines in ALOS may be leveling off. There has been little
change in the decline in length of stay since the first year of PPS. In addition,
the distribution of average length of stay has not changed much since PPS was
implemented. Hospitals with short stays before PPS have had about the same
decrease as hospitals with longer average stays.

Data from the Medicare

Provider Analysis and Review files show a decrease in average length of stay
averaging only .6 percent per year (Guterman et al., 1988). This "leveling off"
may be due to the strong initial response by hospitals to the PPS incentives
while more stringent enforcement of utilization review nationwide may also
have impacted the declines by diverting the less severely ill from inpatient to
outpatient and other ambulatory care settings (Davis, 1985).
Furthermore, other than shortening stays and reducing staff, there is no
evidence published to date that indicates that physicians have altered their
practice patterns or that hospitals are changing their basic methods of
providing hospital care. Consequently, total hospital costs may have slowed,
not because hospitals improved productivity or that physicians ordered fewer
tests, but because fewer people utilized hospitals and because they were
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discharged earlier (Davis, et al., 198.5).

Without more comprehensive

evaluations of inpatient hospital care practices to determine if PPS created the
incentive for increased efficiency rather than just decreased utilization, PPS
cannot be adequately evaluated nor defined a "success."
Second, other factors may have had an equal or greater influence on the
reductions in hospital ex>sts documented by HCFA, including the initial costcontainment forces enacted under other federal health programs (e.g., TEFRA);
a surplus of physicians (179 physicians per 100,000 population in 197.5 versus 207
physidans per 100,000 population in 1981); the increased availablity of
alternative treatment settings (e.g., an increase in free-standing emergency
centers, growing from 44 in 1979 to almost .500 in 1982) and alternative health
care deliverers (HMOs, PPOs); increased utilization review; increased pressure
on employers to keep health care costs down; and the growth in the awareness
of consumers regarding health care costs and avoiding hospitalization (Davis,
1988; GAO, 1986; OTA, 1985). Therefore, the cost savings for the elderly may
be more the result of systemwide changes than changes in the Medicare

program.
On the one hand, given the rapid multiple changes in the hospital sector,
it is difficult not to attribute cost-reductions to these plausible alternative
explanations. On the other hand, it is equally likely that the changes in the
Medicare program contributed to the decline in hospital length of stay and may
have affected other payers and patients (e.g., a spillover effect). It is just not
clear what contribution each of the above mentioned forces has had on the
health care system. The real test of the effectiveness of PPS on hospital cost-
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containment will be experienced in the long term and its effects on the longterm care system with the shifts in the costs and site of care may influence the
ultimate judgment of PPS's success.
Finally, while the data presented in this dissertation suggest gains for the
government, the control over costs has come at the expense of quality of care
for the general public as well as the Medicare beneficiary. That is, controlling
costs has required unacceptable trade offs; namely, the establishment of an
explicit cost-based rationing of health care, specifically of inpatient hospital
care; a slowing of the development, testing and adoption of new medical
technology; the negative impact PPS has had on the long term care system; and
the implementation of a largely untested policy that provided only short-term
financial gains and ignored the larger health care financing problem.
Rationing Hospital Care
While rationing (i.e., refusing to care for or limiting care for patients who
cannot pay) has always been a part of the American health care system, PPS
has exacerbated the problem by placing some hospitals at such financial risk
that they must turn away patients.

Urban core hospitals and small, rural

hospitals have been partirularly vulnerable to the cost-containment pressures of
PPS. Similarly, decreases in the allocation of funds under PPS could influence
physicians to undertreat patients or to discontinue treatment to the terminally
ill.

It was feared that PPS would rachet down hospital revenues to such an
extent that hospitals would be forced to limit or forgo providing charity care to
the medically indigent. For example, the medically indigent in California had a
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22.6 percent decline in Medicaid hospital days in the first six months of 1984
(Kinzer, 1984). In addition, the "dumping" of the undesirable poor and elderly
on public institutions is increasing under PPS, with some hospitals carrying the
burden on behalf of the rest of their communities. Cost-containment could
force hospitals to adopt an "out of sight, out of mind" mentality to those
needing emergency care due to the financial burden it might place on the
facility. Arnold Reiman (1985) suggests that:
As economic pressures grow and hospital managers
are •••forced to act like businessmen concerned primarily
with profit margins, more and more patients will be
denied access to urgently needed care •••In such a
climate, we cannot expect the emergency care of
indigent and uninsured patients to be given a very high
. priority- and it is not (p. 372).
The question whether DRGs promote efficiency or rationing leads to a
more fundamental ethical issue:

whether hospitals and physicians are the

appropriate actors to undertake the awesome responsibility of this new role in
health care; i.e., allocators of scarce resources. Policy makers and society as a
whole have yet to deal explicitly with the issue of rationing nor have they
provided the medical profession with clear guidelines. As Spiegel and Kavaler
(1988) have put it:
We cannot ignore the fact that DRGs, and similar
schemes, are simply ways of covertly rationing health
care, without subjecting Congress to the wrath of the
American electorate. The responsibility is shifted to the
medical profession, which continues to serve as the
scapegoat (p. 510).
Thus DRGs change the method of allocation; that is, "who does the rationing
and who is affected by it'' (Fuchs, 1985, p. 1332).
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Impact on Medical Tedmology

One of the objectives of DRG-ba.sed PPS was to eliminate unnecessary
care, induding tests and procedures, that did not contribute to patient
recovery.

According to a report by the Office of Technology Assessment

(OTA), medical costs increased over 107 percent between 1977 and 1982 and
that approximately 28 percent of this rise could be attributed to the overuse of
medical technology. OTA, in an evaluation of the impact of DRGs on medical
technology, found that there was substantial evidence that the inappropriate
use of medical technology is common and raises " •••costs without improving
quality of care" (American Medical News, 1984b, p. 2). The study went on to
condude that, due to PPS, the number and intensity of ancillary inpatient
procedures will decrease while procedures that can be shown to lower costs will
increase.

Furthermore, DRG payments will encourage the movement of

technologies into the home, particulary for post-hospital care and that
incentives to reduce costs will result in a concentration of capital intensive
technologies in fewer institutions while increasing competition will ·create
incentives for widespread acquisition of high return technologies. Finally, the
report suggested that DRGs will promote greater product standardiation as
more expensive models and procedures are eased out of the market through
a>mpetition.

In general, the report concludes, technologies that are cost-

reducing will be encouraged; cost-raising technologies will be discouraged.
Many fear that these trends will mean that, under PPS, technology will

wither away and the cheapest treatment will be used. A representative from
the

Health

Industry

Manufacturers

Association

(HIMA)

stated

during

263
Congressional hearings on PPS that the Association was concerned that PPS
could jeopardize quality of health care by inhibiting the development of new
diagnostic and therapeutic technologies. Since the reimbursement formula is
based on historical data applying to established technology, this could bias
reimbursement levels (Buzzel, 1983). Dr. David Banta, of the OTA, has stated
that DRG-based PPS will mark the first time that concern for medical
technology assessment will become part of the decision-making process on rates
of payment for health care services. What this means, he said, is that "the
hospital administrator is going to become very conservative about technology"
(OTA, 1983, p. 11).
At issue is the ability of policy to encourage the production and
distribution of equipment and procedures that are both rational (i.e., better
matched to the needs of the population) and more economical (i.e., more likely
to yield maximum ouput from the dollars expended) (Brown, 1988b, p. 9). This
means devising the criteria needed to govern the introduction, diffusion,
application and withholding of technological advances. Important consideration
in the development of these criteria is the impact on mortality and morbidity,
the ethical issues involved in withholding treatments, the difficulty of
prospective versus rei:rospective technological evaluation, and the intricacies of
rationing care. Aaron and Schwartz (1984), in their analysis of the impact of
cost containment on resource use, point out that:
The idea that by getting rid of the fat we can keep the
current system is a myth. The only way to cut costs will
be to deny benefits to some people or deny benefits for
some diseases (p. 117-118).
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Impact on Long-Term Care
With the introduction of PPS using diagnostic related groups (DRGs) to
pay hospitals on a predetermined rate per case rather than by costs, average
length of stay (ALOS) and hospital admissions decreased. While the former was
anticipated, decreases in admissions were not. The hospital admission rate for
those 65 and over was 377 admissions per 1000 Medicare enrollees. However, in
1984, the hospital admission rate declined to 361 admissions per 1000 enrollees
and by 1985, the admission rate fell to 352 admissions per 1000 enrollees
(Gornick & Hall, 1988).
Plausible explanations for the declines in hospital admission include a
trend toward inceased provision of health care on an outpatient basis (e.g.,
hospital outpatient units, ambulatory care settings, surgicenters, physicians'
offices) as well as more stringent utilization and quality control review
programs.

PPS incentives for shortened length of stay, earlier discharge and

increased use of outpatient services have focused attention on assuring that the
system does not have a detrimental impact on the quality of care or on the
health status of the Medicare population. Two major issues related to early
discharge and changes in the site of care need to be considered in any
evaluation of the efficacy of the PPS program: one, the impact of the program
on the availability of needed post-hospital care (called after-care) services and
two, the impact of these changes on the quality of

~are

delivered to the

Medicare population (Gornick & Hall, 1988).
Under PPS, many Medicare patients are now expected to receive care
outside the hospital, in nursing homes or at home, for conditions that four years
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ago would have kept them in the hospital.
post-hospital

care

services

are

The availability and adequacy of

especially

important

because

of

the

sociodemographic characteristics of the elderly population and the resulting
implications this has for health care delivery. For example, after the death or
institutionalization of a spouse, many elderly live alone and may face special
care needs after discharge from the hospital for an acute care episode. If the
needed services are not available or are not adequate, there is the potential for
delayed or interrupted recovery, readmission to the hospital, increased
morbidity and even death.

Moreover, acute illness often strikes those who

already suffer from chronic illnesses. Those chronically ill or disabled elderly
living in the community and who experience an acute care episode are likely to
have greater care needs than other elderly discharges.
Thus, appropriate placement and adequate after-care treatment are of
major concern for these greater care elderly now leaving the hospital sooner
and in more debilitated conditions. Skilled nursing. facility (SNF) services may
either be unavailable locally or the Medicare patient may not satisfy stringent
eligibility criteria for SNF care. But, because of the intermittency requirement
for Medicare home health (HH) care, the patient may not be able to obtain
home health care either. Available data do not permit a precise assessment of
the extent to which the Medicare benefit for either SNF or HH care actually
meets the demand for this care.
Nursing Home Servi~.

Until

the

implementation

of

the

1988

Amendments to the Social Security Act, skilled nursing facility (SNF) benefits
were available only to persons who were previously hospitalized for at least 3
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days prior to the request for service. The patient also needed to have required
daily skilled nursing or rehabilitation (physical, occupational, or speech therapy)
services usually available only in a nursing home.

Medicare did not cover

skilled nursing or rehabilitation services that were required intermittently (i.e.,
one or two times a week) or if the person did not need to be in a SNF to receive
the care.

Further, Medicare covered only 100 SNF days for each episode of

illness induding a maximum of 20 SNF days with no cost sharing. The 1988
Amendments eliminated the 3 day hospitalization requirement, increased the
number of covered days to 50 days per year and altered the co-payment
requirements. These changes in coverage will take effect on January 1, 1990
(Gornick & Hall, 1988).
Federal, state, and private spending for nursing home care add up to more
than $30 billion per year. Total annual expenditures ·from private sources is
over $15 billion. Medicaid spends more than $14 billion yearly and Medicare
spends approximately $650 million (Senate Aging Committee, 1986).

On any

given day, 1.5 million patients occupy beds in the nation's 15,000 nursing homes.
National occupancy rates are stable at 95 percent, indicating a

tight

demand/supply situation.
With the implementation of PPS, skilled nursing payments, which
comprised a steadily decreasing share of total Medicare expenditures, increased
slightly. It has been suggested by a number of analysts that this slight increase
is significant in light of the fact that Medicare's nursing home benefit is limited
by the number of allowable days and the skilled care need requirement (Leader,
1986; Senate Aging Committee, 1986). Due to these factors, Medicare's share
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of the total outlay in nursing home expenditures constituted only about 2
percent of all funds spent for nursing home care in 1985 (Waldo, Levit &
Lazenby, 1986).
Data from the HCF A show that 3.2 enrollees per 1000 hospitalized
Medicare benefidaries used covered SNF services in 1981. This figure rose to
4.6 enrollees per 1000 hospitalized Medicare benefidaries between 1983 and
1985. Similarly, there was an increase in the number of SNF users per 1000
Medicare enrollees during the same time period. Between 1983 and 1985, SNF
users per 1000 enrollees rose from 9 per 1000 in 1981 to 10 SNF users per 1000
enrollees in 1985, an increase of 11 percent (Gornick & Hall, 1988).

These

increases not only reflect the decline in hospital admissions but also the trend
toward early discharge under PPS.

Another measure of SNF utilization, the

mean number of covered SNF days per user, declined from 27.4 days in 1981 to
21.7 days in 1985, reflecting both an increase in short Medicare-covered SNF
stays and a decline in long SNF stays in general (Gornick & Hall, 1988).
However, there are gaps in the long-term care system.

Medicare, the

primary source of funding for acute care services, was not designed to provide
long-term or sub-acute care assistance. While Medicaid finances approximately
40 percent of all nursing home care, it is available only to those who deplete
their income to impoverishment and does not cover care in the community. A
study by the General Accounting Office (GAO) found that some nursing homes
will avoid accepting Medicare patients who might become eligible for Medicaid
after exhausting their Medicare benefitis since Medicaid reimbursement usually
does not cover the costs of care (GA.O, 1983). There are also access problems
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for nursing home patients needing intensive or "heavy care" services. Thus, PPS
may be increasing problems of access to nursing home care for Medicare
beneficiaries.
Furthermore, hospitals have historically augmented the effective supply
of long-term care beds by providing "back-up" days, i.e., days waiting in the
hospital for an available nursing home bed, largely at Medicare's expense.
Access to post-hosptial care becomes critical in a hospital where attending
physicians or a utilization and quality control peer review organization
determines that a patient no longer needs acute care. Moreover, existing rules
and regulations concerning the range of services covered under Medicare's
skilled nursing care benefits are so limited that it is likely to heighten
difficulties of nursing home access.
Access to nursing home care has been a problem in many, but not all,
states prior to PPS. With the incentives of PPS, the hospital is penalized while
the patient awaits an available bed and is therefore motivated to discharge the
patient as soon as possible to almost any care setting that is available.
However, with occupancy rates exceeding 90 percent, experts are in general
agreement that there are serious shortages of nursing home beds throughout the
country. Extra nursing care needs and the requirement of co payment by the
beneficiary make many nursing homes reluctant to admit short-stay Medicare
patients.

In addition, Medicare coverage for skilled care is liminted and the

uncertainties of coverage following hospitalization put nursing homes at
financial risk. Medicaid has become the major public financing mechanism for
long term care for the elderly and poor. It provides full coverage and is fairly
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comprehensive and predictable, but the level of reimbursement is lower than
that provided by Medicare. Moreover, many states have chosen to hold down
the costs of their Medicaid programs by reimbursing at a level such that the
supply of beds is insufficient for the demand. This "back-up" of patients may
allow nursing homes to discriminate among patients in a variety of ways; such
as source of payment or intensity of care required (OTA, 1985). Consequently,
the waiting list for both Medicare and Medicaid patients is, in effect,
permanent.

Thus, it appears that PPS has contributed to the problem of

permanent excess demand for nursing home beds.
Access to care will be affected by more than the behavior of the nursing
home industry. Most significant will be the potential for an increase in the
provision of post-hospital care by hospitals. Such developments as "swing beds"
and hosptial-based home health services are early indicators that hospitals may
choose to deal with the early discharge problem by providing care themselves.
However, some states, induding Oregon, have not extended the concept of
extended care beds from rural to urban hospitals and, despite the growing
demand for nursing home care, deny certificate of need applications that would
authorize new nursing home construction.
Distribution of ex>st is another matter for concern. Medicare coverage for
nursing home care is significantly more limited than coverage for inpatient
hospital care. Substitution of care may shift costs from Medicare to patients
and their families. It is estimated that the elderly not covered by Medicaid and
J

their families pay an average of $20,000 to $30,000 per year in nursing home
costs (Holahan & Palmer, 1988). A recent Senate Committee on Aging (1986)
report noted that near! y 70 percent of single elderly nursing home residents are
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impoverished after only 13 weeks in a nursing home while impoverishment for a
couple takes an average of only six months.

To the extent that Medicare

patients eventually become sufficiently impoverished to go on Medicaid, costs
will be shifted to the state Medicaid programs (OTA, 1985).
Finally, quality of care has always been an issue in the nursing home
industry. Findings from a two-year investigation by the Senate Committee on
Aging (1986) into the quality of care provided in nursing homes found five
significant problems in the nursing home industry. One, thousands of patients in
nursing homes still suffer from the poor nutrition, inadequate nursing care and
squalid conditions which were to have been corrected by state and federal
reforms of the past 10 to 15 years. Nursing home inspection reports reveal that
over one-third of the nation's 8,800 certified skilled nursing homes failed to
comply fully with essential health, safety, and quality standards of the federal
government. Nursing home inspection reports also reveal that in 1984, about 11
percent (1,000) certified skilled nursing homes were cited for violating three or
more critical minimum standards for health and safety.
Two, federal inspection reports show that between 600 and 800 certified
skilled nursing homes in the

U.s. chronically fail year after year to meet

minimum quality standards. One reason cited for poor quality is inadequate and
poorly targeted reimbursements by Medicare and Medicaid which force some
SNF operators to "cut corners" (Senate Aging Committee, 1986).
Tfree, finding a vacancy in a nursing home, let alone one that offers
quality care, is extremely difficult and one in which the consumer has little
control. A serious shortage of nursing home beds exists in many communities
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which effects Medicaid eligible patients, those who will shortly spend down and
become Medicaid eligible, and those with heavier care needs. Four, HHS has
failed in its Congressionally mandated responsibility to ensure that nursing
homes receiving federal funds provide high quality medical and rehabilitative
care. Five, existing federal penalties for use against sul>-standard homes are
ineffective in that they limit the number of enforcement actions that can be
taken against sub-standard nursing homes and expose residents to serious risks
from transfers.
The Report recommends that Congress strengthen the nursing home
inspection system, develop a case mix reimbursement system for Medicaid
nursing homes, expand the hospital swing-bed program to ease the tight bed
supply, provide a larger array of intermediate sanctions, strengthen nursing
home patients' rights, and strengthen the national long term care ombudsman
program. Many of these recommendations were incorporated into the Quality
of Care Amendments to the Social Security Act passed in 1986.

Still, PPS

incentives for early discharge continue to exacerbate the problems of access
and quality of care in the nursing home sector.
Home Health Care. Home health benefits are covered by Medicare for
beneficiaries who are home bound and who require 'intermittent' skilled nursing
care or physical or speech therapy.

This benefit does not cover general

household services (housekeeping, meal preparation, shopping, etc.) or other
personal care needs. No prior hospitalization is required, there is no limit to
the number of visits covered and there is no beneficiary cost sharing (Gornick&:
Hall, 1988). The 1988 Amendments to the Social Security Act expanded the
interpretation of skilled care, which had traditionally been conservatively
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defined, to cover 38 consecutive days of care at any given time and redefined
intermittent to cover up to 6 days of care a week for those qualifying (versus
the prior limit of 4 days a week).

These changes take effect on January 1,

1990.
Between 1974 and 1983, Medicare home health (HH) expenditures grew at
an average annual rate of 25 percent. However, after the introduction of PPS,
growth in the HH oomponent of Medicare declined to 15 percent, although this
was still 4 1/2 times faster than the rate of growth in inpatient hospital
expenditures (Guterman et. al., 1988; Moon, 1986). Additionally, HH use rose
from 35 users per 1000 Medicare enrollees in 1981 to 51 per 1000 enrollees in
1985 (Gornick & Hall, 1988). Attributing increases in HH expenditures to PPS is
difficult since the program was growing rapidly before PPS.

However,

Medicare expenditures alone are not a good indicator of HH use due to the
limits on eligibility for the HH benefit.
Other indicators, such as elderly out-of-pocket expenditures, should also
be examined. It was estimated that the elderly spent over $2 billion in out-ofpocket expenses for home health care in 1985 (Leader, 1986).

In addition,

absolute expenditures by Medicare add insight into the issue of PPS impact on
HH use. Total Medicare benefits increased from $41.2 billion in 1981 to $74
billion in 1986, an increase of 80 percent. Included in that increase is a 65.9
percent increase in inpatient hospital benefits, a 32.7 percent increase in skilled
nursing facility (SNF) payments and, in contrast, a 147.9 percent increase in
home health benefit payments. The relatively small increase in SNF payments
reflects, in part, the high percentage of beneficiary cost sharing required after
the 21st. day of nursing home care (Gornick & Hall, 1988).

Thus, the most
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visible impact of PPS appears to be on the home health industry. ''It appears
that home health agencies are bearing the brunt of •••earlier discharges under
the PPS system (Cushman, 1986, p. 3).
Analysis of a sample of Medicare hospital discharges in 1981 and 19841985 showed that, if a patient was discharged from the hospital in 1981, there
was a .41 percent chance that the patient would go into a SNF and be covered
for 7 or fewer days. In 1984-1985, that chance would have increased to .65
percent. The chance that the patient would go into an SNF and be covered for
more than 30 days increased only slightly, from .86 in 1981 to .88 in 1984-1985.
Analysis of HH use suggests that PPS has increased the percentage of patients
receiving home health visits within 7 days of discharge by 14 percent (Guterman
et al., 1988).
However, home health care outlays have not kept pace with this increase
in need/demand. It appears that this is the result of a variety of factors. First,
legislative changes in the program enacted since 1980, such as ceilings on home
health reimbursements, eliminating occupational therapy benefits, and requiring
copa.yments for durable medical equipment all reduced expenditures somewhat.
Second, there has been tremendous variability in the annual rate of change in
total Medicare reimbursements for home health. Therefore, the recent decline
in rate of outlays may be a temporary phenomenon. Since the bulk of charges
for home health services reflects labor costs, lower inflation rates could have
led to lower rates of increase in charges, but it is not dear how much this
factor contributed to the lower rates of growth.
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Third, another source of limits to growth in home health has been
administratively induced reductions in access to care. For example, HCFA has
implemented a series of administrative rules and guidelines intended to tighten
eligibility, coverage and reimbursement for services. One consequence of this
administrative reduction in benefits is an increase in the denial rate for
provider claims. As an example, between 1978 and the first three months of
1986, the percent of all Medicare bills denied for any reason rose from 2.8
percent to 3.9 percent, a 39 percent increase. In comparison, recent national
data on Medicare denials for home health claims show that the denial rate
increased 133 percent from the first

q..~arter

of 1984 to the first

q..~arter

of 1986

(House Aging Committee, 1986; Leader, 1986). Tightened eligibility and more
stringent determinations of the "intermittency" and "home bound" requirements
for home health services have also added to an impossible siutation for
Medicare beneficiaries needing home care.

That is, they must be basically

confined to their home in order to obtain home health services, yet the amount
of care provided under Medicare may be insufficient to meet their needs.
Furthermore, if family members supplement Medicare-covered services, they
may jeopardize the receipt of those services (Leader, 1986).
Continued restrictions on growth in the home health benefit could
jeopardize access and quality of care for home health services. Further, the
General Accounting Office (GAO, 19853.) reported that a prospective payment
system for home health care would increase expenditures if payments were set
at 75 percent of costs per visit. Cost control measures will adversely affect
beneficiaries in that small and rural providers will be bankrupted; that costly
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services will be curtailed; that heavy care patients will be rejected as
unprofitable; and that the volume of indigent care provided by on-profit
providers will decline.
Even with the 1988 Amendments, significant gaps in coverage of
Medicare's home health benefit remain in effect. HCFA's guidelines primarily
reflect the focus on acute care of the Medicare program which effectively
eliminates the home health benefit from those elderly requiring part-time
skilled care or to the frail elderly or those with chronic conditions. In addition,
while Medicare pays for hospital beds, canes, and walkers, the program will not
pay for bathroom equipment, occupational therapy, home intravenous antibiotic
therapy supplies, equipment, or services, and excludes all drugs and biologicals
when provided by a home health agency (House Aging Committee, 1986). These
gaps in coverage, specifically when combined with the increased severity and
intensity of care needed in post-hospital care as a result of early discharge have
meant increased beneficiary costs.
There are significant issues of quality of care in the home health industry.
The rapid growth in Medicare utilization of home health care has occurred in
virtual "regulatory vacuum" in which consumer needs and interests are poorly
understood or protected (Leader, 1986). Medicare dollars are being spent on
services for which there is little knowledge and few quality standards •. Existing
regulatory organizations (e.g., PROs; ProPAC) are inadequate, the effects of
home care on patient well-being and satisfaction are unknown, and there is
little understanding of the extent of unmet need for services. The increased
demand for home health care in lieu of more costly hospital

car~

has resulted in
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the growth of private home care agencies in the home care market. Between
1966 and 1986, the number of home health agencies inceased from 1,275 to
6,005 and recent average annual growth rates in the industry have ranged from

20 to 25 percent. Since 1982, the number of home health agencies certified
under Medicare increased by more than 55 percent (Leader, 1986).
There has also been a dramatic shift toward proprietary ownership in the
home health industry with large chains and hospitals seeking to vertically
integrate home health care into their systems.

By 1984, 42 percent of all

hospitals offered home health care. In 1985, the percentage increased to 65
percent.

In addition, the greatest growth has occurred in investor-owned

agencies with their numbers increasing 300 percent during that period (Leader,
1986). Proprietaries now make up more than 30 percent of Medicare certified
agencies, up from less than 6 percent in 1979 (House Aging Committee, 1986;
Leader, 1986). The proliferation of private home care agencies is a fairly new
phenomenon and there is little information comparing service delivery in
private versus public agencies.

There is a lack of information about who is

providing these services, how many people are being served and how many
public and private dollars are going to home care.
Concerns have been expressed by advocates for the elderly that private
home health agencies might be "skimming the cream off the top" of the home
care market by caring primarily for paying patients and referring them to
public agencies only after their funds have run out. In a study comparing a
public and a private home health agency, Kornblatt et al. (1985) found that the
public agency studied had clients req.Jiring more frequent visits, a longer length
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of care and greater nursing intensity than the private agency.

The public

agency also had a larger proportion of Medicaid and medically indigent patients.
The private agency, which served approximately the same number of home
health referrals during the study period, had clients with needs for less frequent
visits, shorter length of care, and less intensive nursing services. The private
agency also had a larger proportion of Medicare and Blue Cross/Blue Shield
patients. Thus, public and private agencies serve different patient populations,
the types of visits made by public and private agencies are not equivalent in
terms of intensity, and they serve different populations with respect to ability
to pay.
The growth of the home health industry is of concern for a number of
reasons. One, the growth in the numbers of and the increased vulnerability of
elderly persons receiving health care and personal support services in the home
setting require greater knowledge regarding the cost and the quality of services
than is current! y available. It is estimated that about 8 million persons needed
assistance with personal care in 1985 -- 5.2 million of them were over age 65.
Every month since 1960, an average of 149,000 persons joined the ranks of the
elderly. The total age 65 population doubled between 1950 and 1980 and is
expected to double again by 2020 (House Aging Committee, 1986). The kinds of
home care services needed by this burgeoning population encompass health and
social support services, many of which are provided by the home care industry.
Two, because of the location of delivery of home health services, i.e., in
the home, their actual delivery makes them essentially invisible and, therefore,
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largely beyond the reach of public or professional scrutiny. Furthermore, the
industry is underregulated.

As of June 198.5, only 34 states required a

certificate of need (CON) for new home health agencies.

There is some

evidence that when states drop their CON requirement, the number of providers
increases dramatically. For example, when Texas dropped its CON requirement
in 1981, the number of agencies in the state quadrupled by 1984 (Leader, 1986).
Some states, such as Massachusetts, do not require either a CON or a license.
In 198.5, only 32 states required any licensure of home health agencies at all. In
some of these states, only proprietary agencies are licensed and there is no
uniformity among licensure laws and state regulations.
The American Bar Association's Commission on Legal Problems of the
Elderly recently reviewed state regulation of home health agencies and found
that most states simply cite the Medicare home health regulations and to not
regulate the non-health component (homemaker, personal care) at all.

Few

states require home health aides to meet minimum training requirements and
there is little evidence of state capability of investigating complaints against
providers. Further, the study found that effective consumer protections in
home health care are rare, if not wholly absent (House Aging Committee, 1986).
Furthermore, Medicare monitoring of home health agencies is virtually
nonexistent. Medicare regulation primarily consists of surveys of home health
agencies to ascertain compliance with standards and does not even stipulate the
amount of training reqJired by home health aides. Clients are not routinely
interviewed and there is no independent assessment of quality of care provided.
Very vew providers have been terminated from the Medicare program for
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failure to comply with requiared standards. This virtual lack of effective
independent quality ·control and consumer protection in the industry has
significant consequences because of the explosive growth in home health
service utilization since the implementation of PPS (Leader, 1986).
Three, the lack of knowledge regarding horne health services is also of
concern because a great deal of money is now being spent for home health care.
An estimated $9 billion was spent for horne health care products and services in
1985 with an expansion to $16 billion predicted by 1990 (House Aging
Committee, 1986). There is concern because Medicare's home health benefit is
the only service which is reimbursed on a cost basis and is exempt from
beneficiary cost-sharing.

Thus, Medicare provides the industry's "life blood"

because 80-90 percent of those served are age 65 and older and because only 20
percent of the market consists of private pay patients (House Aging
Committee, 1986; Leader, 1986).
Finally, there is little, if any, objective data on the quality of home care
(House Aging Committee, 1986). Most literature on the issue of long-term care
focuses on the frail and chronically ill in terms of the cost/benefit of
community versus institutional care.- This focus is of little relevance to the
current home health beneficiaries where the Medicare benefit is primarily being
used for post-acute care; that is, the focus of current Medicare home health
services is on recuperation, not on maintenance of those with chronic
conditions.

And, the requirement that skilled nursing care in the home be

provided on a part-time or intermittent basis precludes the substitution of home
care for skilled nursing facilities.
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Policy issues that need to be addressed regarding the "black box'' of home
health care include more effective oversight and regulation of the home health
industry in order to protect consumers and ensure the quality of services being
purchased by consumers, including Medicare.

Furthermore, standardized, as

well as useful, measures of quality of care and outcome are needed in order to
establish and achieve high levels of quality and compliance with those
standards.

Finally, policymakers need to establish incentives and graduated

sanctions within the home health regualtory process in order to maintain high
standards of quality of care (House Aging Committee, 1986; Leader, 1986).
In addition, policymakers should examine HCFA's efforts to arbitrarily
reduce access to services by means of vague and inconsistently applied
eligibility rules. With the implementation of PPS, demand for home health care
has become the "growth industry" in health care. It is important to accurately
assess policy options concerning the shift in health care to community-based
settings that focus on more than just budgetary issues.

Because of the

capricious manner in which eligiblity is determined and the increase in need for
home health benefits due to PPS, more and more "beneficiaries may need care
and yet fail to qualify for either SNF or home health care" (Leader, 1986, p.23).
Furthermore, HCF A's strict adherence to regulations that exclude the
frail elderly and the chronically ill from access to home health care benefits
needs to be reexamined. Such an exclusion creates a serious gap in coverage,
generates large out-of-pocket expenses for the elderly who must privately
purchase needed care, and may serve to increase the rate of institutionalization
of these elderly in nursing homes (Leader, 1986; House Aging Committee, 1986).
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In terms of needed post-hospital care research, it is incumbent upon
Medicare to fund research which would determine the effect of PPS on the
extent and nature of the need for home health care, both for sub-acute posthosptial care and for the frail elderly and the chronically ill, research
comparing the cost and quality of services provided by non-profit and
proprietary home health agencies, analyses on the effects on cost and quality of
care provided by vertically-owned home health agencies verus independent
providers, and evaluations of the cost effectiveness of Medicare reimbursement
rules for durable medical equipment (Leader, 1986).
While a number of pieces of legislation have been proposed to address
some of the identified concerns with the home health care sector (see Leader,
1986 or House Aging Committee for detailed discussions of each legislative
proposal), many areas of concern remain.

The major shift occurring in the

location of the delivery of care, from institutional settings to amoolatory care,
and the concern over increasing costs should not be allowed to over-ride the
e~ally

valid goals of quality and access to care for those in need.

It is

important for policymakers, reseachers, and program administrators to keep the
elderly beneficiary as central to the policy making process as are costs. It must
be remembered that the goal of PPS was not only to reduce the costs of
inpatient hospital care for the Medicare program while maintaining access to
and the quality of care for beneficiaries, but also to indude some method of
addressing the need for long-term care and the more efficient integration of
our social and health services system.
PPS and Future Cmt-Ccmtainment

There is ample reason to believe that the significant oodgetary savings
achieved in the first three years of PPS cannot be sustained (Brown, 1988b;
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Holahan & Palmer, 1988).

Recent analyses of the status of the Medicare

program (both the HI and SMI trust funds) indicate that the Medicare program is
still in deep finandal trouble (Holahan & Palmer, 1988). The conjunction of
continued rapid escalation of overall health care costs, the rapidly expanding
elderly population, and the increasing need for health care services among the
elderly has created another policy dilemma for the Medicare program (Vladeck
& Alfano, 1987). It is now believed that Medicare faces a "far greater fiscal

problem than did the Social Security Program a few years back" (Holahan &
Palmer, 1988, p. 53-54).
In 1982, the Trustees of the Social Security program issued a report
predicting insolvency for Medicare's Hospital Insurance Fund by 1987. In 1984,
the date was moved to 1991. In their 1985 report, the Trustees claim that the
hospital fund is solvent until 1998. Credit for these positive changes were
attributed to PPS, low inflation, and high employment levels. However, the
report also cautioned that the positive prediction assumed a hospital DRG-rate
freeze in 1986 and adjustments in rates in the future of no more than hospital
market-basket inflation plus one-fourth of one percent. To ensure solvency for
the next 25 years, the report states, either benefits will have to be reduced by
19 percent or payroll taxes increased by 24 percent (Finn, 1985).
In their analyses of the dimensions of the fiscal problem, Holahan and

Palmer (1988) condude that, even under optimistic assumptions and despite the
slight decreases in the rates of growth under PPS, the long-run picture for the
Medicare program looks bleak. Under optimistic assumptions, the total revenue
shortfall (that is, the amount of additional revenues and/or expenditure
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cuts necessary to maintain fiscal balance in the Medicare program) will total
over •.5 percent of GNP (or $27 billion) by the end of the 1990s. By the time the
"baby boomers'' are all past retirement age (2030), this annual fiscal shortfall
will be well in excess of 2 percent of GNP (or $117 billion annually).
Under pessimistic assumptions, the relative size of the fiscal gap is well
over twice as large as tmder optimistic assumptions (Holahan & Palmer, 1988).
While PPS may have slowed the rate of increase in inpatient hospital payments,
rates of growth in both the inpatient and outpatient components of Medicare
are rising faster than the general rate of inflation and still threaten the fiscal
solvency of the Medicare program.
Another upward pressure on costs involves the rate of increase in the PPS
payment levels. Medicare PPS rates were increased by the "market basket plus
.25 of 1 percent" in 198.5, were frozen for seven months in 1986 and allowed to

rise by just •.5 percent for the rest of the year. In 1987, the rate of increase
was just 1 percent (Holahan & Palmer, 1988, p. 67). This is in contrast to the 3
to .5 percent annual increase over the past 1.5 years. Holding growth rates so
close to the market basket will also begin to constrain physician's treatment
decisions and the application of medical technology.

Political problems are

sure to arise if this occurs. Furthermore, it private sector payers allow faster
rates of growth than Medicare, access to care will be affected as will the
quality of care. Costs may also be shifted to other third party payers and selfpay patients and states may begin to adopt all-payer systems in response.
Furthermore, the incentives inherent in PPS for early discharges are
shifting increasing amounts of care to post-acute care providers. While limited
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in the initial years of PPS due to restrictive Medicare coverage requirements
and constraints on the availability of services, the costs of this shift in care
appear to be growing substantially. PPS incentives also encourage unbundling
of services as in diagnostic testing prior to admission and the performance of
certain surgical procedures in outpatient settings. Both actions could increase
Medicare costs since many of these services are not covered by PPS.
Finally, the uninsured will bear the brunt of any resource allocation plans.
So far, HHS has resisted pressures to provide additional funds to hospitals
serving a disproportionate share of indigent patients even though a court order
forced HCFA to redefine disproportionate share hospitals in 1985 (Mdlrath,
198.5:1).

Moreover, access problems for the poor and elderly will arise if

payment rates to providers do not keep pace with costs. Thus, policies must be
developed that more equitably distribute provider payments across hospitals
while maintaining access to and the quality of care for vulnerable groups.
Although hospitals overall had their highest recorded profits in the first
three years under PPS and these were still higher than during the 1970s, this
trend appears to have slowed down. Higher operating margins may also reflect
a reduction in charity care as well as the shifting of care to fee-for-services
settings (ambulatory care, outpatient visits, and other non-inpatient services).
In addition, although hospitals are generally more profitable, the American
Hospital Association (AHA) reports that 18 percent of all hospitals experienced
revenue deficits in 1984.

Many of these hospitals were small, rural facilities

without much flexibility in planning their budgets and urban public hospitals
which treat a high proportion of the uninsured population (Guterman & Dobson,
1986).
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However, the main challenge to Medicare's fiscal integrity lies in the
interplay between demographics and costs. Demographic trends will aggravate
pressures on the program. Since 1960, the population aged 65 and over has been
growing twice as fast as the younger population; the group aged 75 to 84 has
grown 65 percent faster and the group 85 and over have grown 174 percent
faster.

In 1960, 16.7 million old people constituted 9.1 percent of the

population.

In 1980, 25.9 million elderly comprised 11.1 percent, and it is

estimated that the figure for the year 2000 will be 36.2 million (13.2 percent),
rising to 52.6 million (17.2 percent) by 2020 and more than 67 million by 2040
(Burke, 1988; Rice & Feldman, 1983).
These demographic trends mean increased demand for physicians' services
and large increases in hospital stays, nursing-home days, home health
expenditures and out-of-pocket costs to the elderly themselves which will
obviously strain Medicare's funding base.

The fund ration in the hospital

insurance part of the program (i.e., funds available at the start of a year
divided by disbursements during the year) declined from a peak of 70 percent in
1975 to 45 percent in 1981, triggering predictions that the trust fund would go
bankrupt by the late 1980s.

While PPS, lower inflation and diminished

utilization have helped ease the problem, "the demographic forecasts offer
little ground for complacence" (Brown, 1988b, p. 24).
Although the full consequences of PPS on access, quality and budgetary
savings are still uncertain, it is dear that PPS alone cannot control the rise in
health care costs.

One critic of the system called it an "incomplete" cost-

control device and noted that admissions and preventive care weren't included
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in the system and that the physician was really "out of the picture" (Meyer,
1984b, p. 98). A number of policy options have been proposed to address the
rapid and continuously expanding gap between expenditures and projected
revenues in the Medicare program.

Most observers agree with Hollahan and

Palmer (1988) when they state:
Maintaining fiscal equili bri urn in the program •••will
require some combination of intensified efforts to
control provider payments, increased financial burdens
on the elderly themselves and higher taxes on the under65 working age population (p. 65).
POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE MEDICARE PROGRAM

There are enormous political concerns involved with each of the proposed
reforms as well as corresponding pratical consequences. However, without a
more concentrated approach to health care cost containment, Medicare will
continue to have fiscal problems and access to care and the quality of health
care will be compromised for all of those groups who cannot pay for their care.
Although PPS directly impacts Medicare expenditures, it also indirectly affects
the Medicaid program. When the programs were enacted in 1965, policy makers
pictured a general division of labor in which Medicare would assist the aged
while Medicaid predominantly served the younger "welfare" poor (Brown,
1988b). However, due to the joint federal-state structure of Medicaid, which
allows great variation in eligibility standards, Medicaid today covers fewer than
half the poor (Brown, 1988b).

Groups usually excluded include two parent

families, the medically indigent, the unemployed, and the uninsured.
exacerbates the problem of uncompensated medical care for hospitals.

This
In

addition, because Medicare will pay for medical but not chronic care of the
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elderly, Medicaid has become the principal public source of funds for nursinghome care. The maintenance of the fiscal integrity of the Medicare program
has produced three broad themes, induding: 1) increased control over provider
payments, including capitation and rate setting proposals; 2) reduced benefits or
increased cost sharing; or 3) increased tax burdens on the working population
(Brown, 1988b; Holahan & Palmer, 1988).
Controlling Provider Payments
Controlling provider payments will be difficult and cannot be achieved
without some impact on the quality of care available to at least some elderly
and poor. As was discussed above, hospital payments are already below the
cost of living/CPI and it is difficult to believe significant savings can be
achieved in the future since costs are again beginning to rise.
projections of Medicare's fiscal

Moreover,

problems already incorporate optimistic

assumptions about the government's availabilty to control costs. In reality, the
government will be "lucky'' to get what it hopes for.

The question remains

lDlanswered as to how much more can be squeezed out of provider payments
(e.g., fat in the system). Continuing to hold Medicare hospital payment growth
to a minimum raises serious political and ethical questions as quality of care
begins to be compromised (Holahan & Palmer, 1988).
Physician DRGs. Physician DRGs, physician fee schedules, capitation and
national health insurance have all been proposed as ways to save on costs for
physicians' services.

Each of the proposals has been debated by policymakers

with great controversy and fanfare. However, effective lobbying efforts by
physicians' groups have, up to now, successfully contained federal efforts to
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implement any such payment control system for physician's services. Yet, some
form of amtrols appear to be on the horizon.

With strong opposition to

physician DRGs, alternatives, such as relative value scales, bundling services,
and capitation systems are being considered by HCF A and appear to have
general public support. As Congressman Ron Wyden (D, OR.) has stated, "the
Medicare legislation is like a gun without bullets. Without cost controls on the
attending physician,

who controls the volume of inpatient services, costs

cannot be controlled" (Spiegler & Kavaler, 1986, p. 519).
There is concern, however, that instituting provider controls will only
limit access.

Gabel and Rice (1985) cite their study of the impact of the

physician's fee freeze of 1984 in California, where services to Medicare
patients increased from 8 to 15 percent in one year.

They contend that

physicians countered the freeze by increasing the complexity and the number of
services delivered to patients. The researchers also found that physicians were
less likely to care for public program patients under restricted payment modes.
The authors suggest three options to control costs and volume while altering the
fee-for-service mechanism: one, increase reimbursement rates for

some

medical services while freezing or reducing payments for others; two, reduce
hospital admissions by freezing or cutting physician reimbursement for hospital
visits while increasing payment for office and home visits; and/or three,
contract selectively with groups of physicians to provide all medical care to
Medicare and Medicaid patients.
Other forces could influence the willingness of physicians to control costs.
For example,

the physician surplus has prompted doctors to form joint
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practices, join PPOs and HMOs, and to practice in underserved areas (Ginsberg,
1985b). However, Holahan and Palmer (1988) point out that this option factor is
limited by the fact that physicians are not as dependent upon Medicare as
hospitals for the majority of their income (3096 of physician's income is
Medicare related versus 40% of hosptial revenues).
Capitation. Capitation arrangements have been proposed as a way to curb
both physican and hospital costs, such as prepaid health plans. Both health care
management experts and investment analysts predict a larger role for
capitation schemes.

Indeed, when PPS was enacted it was hoped that PPS

would encourage the development of new forms of payment systems in the
private sector.

To illustrate, then HCFA administrator Carolyn Davis, in a

1984 speech, alluded to DRG-based PPS leading to "a pluralistic system with
the concept of capitation, either with episodic or voucher payments for
hospitals and physicians" (Rust, 1984, p. 2).

Stuart Altman, Chairman of

ProPAC, also forecasted a greater percentage of capitated systems by 1990
(Hospitals, 1984b).
Despite the optimism with which the HMO movement has been seen, less
than 3 percent of the Medicare population is currently enrolled in some form of
capitated arrangement and

there is much uncertainty about both the

accomplishments and the potential of HMOs and other variants such as
independent practice associations (IPAs) and preferred provider organizations
(PPOs) to contain costs. For example, there is little firm evidence on the costoontainment accomplishments of PPOs, their growth has been explosive. At the
end of 1984, there were 141 PPOs; by 1988, there were 646. Evidence on the
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impact of HMOs is more abundant but does not necessarily support the
contention that HMOs lower costs.

After more than a decade of "hope and

hype" concerning HMOs in 1988, only about 12 percent of the population was
enrolled in HMOs with membership highly concentrated in certain regions of the
country (Brown, 1988b, p. 36).
Furthermore, expanding the number of enrollees in these programs poses
enormous implementation problems, such as the difficulty of setting capitation
rates that accurately reflect the extremely diverse needs of the Medicare
population or policy questions as to whether membership in the plan should be
mandatory or voluntary. Finally, the limited availability of HMOs willing and
able to accept the financial risks of Medicare beneficiaries in pre-paid plans
may constrain the feasibility of this policy option (Brown, 1988b; Spiegel &
Kavaler, 1986).
National Rate Setting. National rate setting as a form of capitation on
physicians and hospital services has also been proposed, often in the form of
state-wide or national health insurance. Such systems, in effect, would yield
the greatest benefits to the public since total health care costs woUld be
controlled. Indeed, the PPS legislation mandated a report to Congress on the
concept of a national rate setting system by December 198.5. Moreover, while
many health care analysts and consumer groups supported PPS, they believed
that a single payer cost control program was doomed to failure because of the
potential for cost-shifting. They advocated that PPS should be the "forerunner"
of a national all-payers prospective payment system. If it was not, they argued,
many of the potential negative consequences of PPS (e.g., mergers and closings
of hospitals; deterioration of care), would certainly occur (Milch, 1984).
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While offering the potential for controlling costs without creating
incentives for discrimination against beneficiaries, this is a radical departure
from the current health care system and, unless carefully tailored to the
idiosyncrasies of the American health care system, would be difficult to
implement. Furthermore, the combination of public and private influences on a
"hybrid'' national health insurance program would most certainly limit its
potential to control costs. Finally, while many policymakers, advocates for the
elderly, and health care analysts support a universal health care system, it is
not dear that the political will is there to so fundamentally change the
American health care system.
Reduced Benefits and/or Increased Costs to Beneficiaries

A second group of policy options concerns reducing benefits, or more
plausibly, increasing costs to beneficiaries. It is believed that increased cost
sharing (e.g., higher deductibles and copayments) will reduce health care
utilization since people will be reluctant to spend money if the dollars come
from their own pockets. It is argued that financial participation on the part of
consumers will 1) influence demand while not discouraging essential services; 2)
will influence the choice of services (i.e., encourage lower cost ambulatory or
home care in preference to inpatient services); 3) will improve understanding of
services provided as well as their .value; 4) will permit patients to express their
preferences and priorities; 5) will contribute to accurate reporting of services
provided to the patient; 6) will provide essential financial resources when other
priorities dictate limitations on hmding by payers; and 7) will permit discretion
and flexibility (Health Care Financial Management Association, 1983).
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Reductions in benefits could take various forms, induding reductions in
the number of beneficiaries (raising the initial age of eligibility or retreating
from the program's universal coverage), restrictions in the scope of services for
which it will pay; cuts in payment per service (which, as was discussed above,
might reduce access by beneficiaries and strengthen providers' incentives to
increase the volume of services); or to make beneficiaries pay more out-ofpocket for their care (Ginsberg & Moon, 1984). In contrast to increased costsharing, the other approaches to cost containment do not appear to be
politically feasible in the near future. In fact, reductions i_n benefits appear to
be contrary to the current political dimate as evidenced in the recent passage

of Medicare's catastrophic illness coverage where Congress actually expanded
benefits and lowered the cost sharing targets of the program.
The more politically feasible approach, and one utilized by Congress in
the

passage

of catastrophic health, was an increase in beneficiaries'

contribution to their own health care coverage.

The greatest strength of

increased cost sharing is that it presumably discourages unnecessary care; the
greatest weakness is that it increases the costs for precisely those beneficiaries
who already have the greatest financial liabilities for their health care (Brown,
1988b). Although the elderly overall have had their financial situation improved
for the past 25 years, many elderly still suffer from considerable economic
hardship. Added to a very sizable group of poor elderly is a very large group
(nearly half of all of those 65 or older) that is not poor but not "financially
secure" (Holahan & Palmer, 1988, p. 72).
Looking toward the future, there is little evidence to suggest that the
elderly will continue to enjoy the relative gains in their financial situation that
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they have in the past. For successive new cohorts of retirees, benefits will no
longer rise faster than wages, and at the turn of the century, benefits will not
even keep pace with wages, as the increase in the age of eligibility to 67 for
full benefits contained in the 1983 Social Security amendments is gradually
phased in {Holahan & Palmer, 1988). While the elderly as a class should share in
any economic growth, with little prospect of the elderly's financial situation
improving markedly, it is difficult to argue that they can contribute very much
to Medicare's fiscal problems.
Shifting some portion of beneficiaries' health care expenditures to
Medicare recipients poses a sizable financial burden on the moderately well-off
and poor beneficiary. In 1984, the average out-of-pocket health care expense
for non-institutionalized elderly amounted to over 21 percent of income for
those with incomes between $5,000 and $10,000.

And since personally paid

health care costs have been rising faster than income, these figures are
increasing, especially for post-hospital and chronic care.

Furthermore, the

elderly now have only about 45 percent of their medical costs covered by
Medicare. Critics argue that if cost-sharing really were an effective deterrent
to utilization, its effects should be evident by now {Brown, 1988b). Finally, the
nearly one-fourth of all elderly requiring hospital care each year bear the
greatest financial burden for the program. Thus, increased cost shifting would
pose enormous hardship on an already burdened segment of the population. The
main point, say Holahan & Palmer {1988), is that under current Medicare
benefit policies, including catastrophic coverage, "a sizable segment of the
elderly population appears to be already severely strapped by health care
expenses" (p. 73).
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Other approaches to increasing beneficiary costs, such as increases in the
already-established SMI premium, instituting an hospital

insurance

(HI)

premium, and raising the age of full eligibility, do not offer the potential of
increasing efficiency in the use of health care services, since they are not tied
to utilization; but they do have the important advantage of not concentrating
the increased costs on those already shouldering a substantial burden. Rather,
these options spread the increase in costs evenly across all Medicare
beneficiares when such costs are not income-related or focus the increase
among higher-income beneficiaries when the costs are income-related.

For

example, an increase in the SMI premium was used to cover the catastrophic
health benefits. However, these approaches begin to undermine the traditional
"earned right" to hospital insurance fund benefits that is the foundation of the
Medicare program and leads to the political issue of "means testing." While I
believe this may inevitably be the road Medicare must take as a partial solution
to the cost problem, I do not believe it will be an explicit policy of means
testing.

The probable option will be some form of capitated system with

increased costs to beneficiaries with some income-related conditions for care.
Increased Taxation of the Working Population
As the above discussion suggests, large increases in Medicare revenues
will probably be required to aid in Medicare's financial solution. These revenues
will most likely have to come from other forms of taxation, including increases
in the financial burden of the working population and more aggressive changes
in provider reimbursement.

However, this latter option will result in

policymakers having to more explicitly define the cost-containment role of the
federal government and may mean a stronger presence of the federal
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government in the health care sector.

This increased role will have to be

determined by a tough political process and can result in one of two
conclusions:

one in which federal control is limited to the Medicare and

Medicaid programs but where the role is much larger than it is today. However,
this larger role in only two, albeit significant, payer systems in health care
could limit its effectiveness. Two, the development of a 'national' system of
cost control could be instituted. This option, at least at the present time and
with approximately 3.5 million Americans either under or not insured for health
care, appears to be more feasible than at any time in the past 2.5 years.

A

model such as the Canadian long-term care system, which has been able to
provide a desirable mix of community based services at a relatively controllable
cost of about 10 percent of the nursing home budget (Connolly, 1988). Overall,
Canada spent 8•.5 percent of its GNP on health care in 1983 as compared to our
10.8 percent for that year. However, besides flying in the face of the historical
antecedents of the U.S. health care system and our cultural abhorrence for
anything "socialist," the feasibility of adopting such a plan in the United States
is in question.

CONCLUSION

The policy choices involving continued or increased control of provider
costs, increased costs to beneficiaries or reduced benefits, and rates of
increases in taxation to the working population seem to be the choices now
facing the American government in its effort to conrol health care costs. The
form these choices take will mean either the continued "mainstreaming" of
Medicare patients with resulting increases in costs to Medicare or the
deliberate fostering of a "two-tier" health care system in which only the well-
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off or fully insured have access to the best care. Efforts to reduce provider
payment rates too far below the norm will eventually lead to reductions in the
amount and quality of services being provided to Medicare (and poor) patients.
No reductions will mean unacceptable increases in costs. Thus, policymakers
face the very difficult trade-offs between major reductions in provider
payments, with the very real potential for lessed access and quality of care, or
.continued growth in the Medicare program.
There are many significant forces increasing health care expenditures
other than the inefficient use of medical services. These forces are unaffected
by any efficiency gains produced by market competition or by health care
regulation.

Among these forces affecting market strategies are a growing

population; the increasing size of the oldest age cohort, which uses more
medical services and long-term care; the increasing medicalization of social
problems; and the growing AIDS epidemic.

Forces impacting regulatory

strategies include conflicting goals of much cost-containment legislation (e.g.,
health planning, certificate of need), the costs of implementing health care
regulation, and the limited and focused nature of most regulatory legislation
that ignored many of the ftndamental forces driving costs in the health care
system (e.g., physicians).
Medical care spending has not abated during the last decade. From 1976
to 1987, medical care spending increased by almost 80 percent above the level
of inflation and far exceeds the nation's growth as measured by GNP (Altman &
Rodwin, 1988). While there was a small decline in the rate of growth between
1984 and

1986, reflecting the cost-containment efforts of the federal

government (PPS) and private payers (employers, insurance companies), health
care costs have begun to rise again.
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Policymakers are now faced with a dilemma with Medicare similar to the
one they were with Social Security. However, as Holahan and Palmer (1988)
point out, the proposals to "fix" Social Security (including cuts in benefits to
slow growth) produced such a "political backlash in Congress that the President
was forced to withdraw them and appoint a bipartisan presidential commission
to'recommend an alternative course of action" (p.80). The result was the 1983
Social Security Amendments which introduced the Prospective Payment
System.
As this dissertation has tried to demonstrate, PPS has been only a
marginal success in terms of budgetary savings and it is still not clear what
effect it may be having on access to and the quality of care. Furthermore,
Medicare's problems will not be solved with just one solution. A combination of
the above proposals will have to be instituted if we are to even minimally
address the fiscal problems facing Medicare.

Further, this political process

must include all segments of society if it is to be successful. It is going to
require the fundamental rethinking of the underlying assumptions of Medicare,
and perhaps, all entitlement programs, and a better understanding of the
impacts of any policy changes will be necessary if we are to avoid the same
pitfalls experienced under the Prospective Payment System.
needed before the policy change, not afterward.

Research is

Finally, we must, finally,

overtly address how we as a society want to organize health care and how much
we want to pay for it.
Fuchs (1986) has identified three ways spending for medical services can
be controlled. One way is to improve efficiency in the provision and allocation
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of services; two is to reduce the prices paid for the materials and services used
in health care, which implies paying producers and providers less; a third way is
to reduce the volume of services provided or to shift the balance from high-cost
to low-cost services.

Both regulatory and competition strategies have

attempted to utilize these three methods to control costs. But, as we have seen
in the above discussion, the historical development of the American health care
system and the incremental nature of our legislative process have both impeded
efforts to effectively implement one or the other strategy. It does not appear
that PPS will be any more successful.
While the Prospective Payment System is shifting care away from the
inpatient to the outpatient and community care setting, this shift in care is
creating enormous demand for these other forms of care, many of which are
inadequately covered by insurance or Medicare/Medicaid and has resulted in
increased costs to consumers. Furthermore, cost-containment efforts have yet
to address the larger and more fundamental issue of financing long-term care,
both because of the increasing demand for greater coverage of these services
and the fact that these programs significantly impact state as well as federal
budgets. In addition, the true forces in health care costs, third-party payers,
have been unable to unite to effectively confront providers on the issue of cost.
Several years of reduced inflation and high corporate earnings appear to have
deflected attention away from health care cost concerns (Altman & Rodwin,
1988).

As opposed to the acute care system, the United States has never had an
explicit, coherent policy toward the organization and financing of long-term
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care. Rather, the system of care for the frail elderly and chronically ill has
evolved incrementally and disjointedly, "often as an after-thought or an add-on
to other pieces of health and social legislation" (Connolly, 1988, p. 3).

The

current system is heavily biased toward the institutionalization, medicalization
and fragmentation of the financing and delivery of health care system. As an
example, the main public programs supporting long-term care services are
Medicaid, Medicare, the nutrition and social services programs authorized under
Title III of the Older Americans Act (OAA), Title XX of the Social Security
Act, and the long-term care programs provided by the Veterans Administration
(VA).

As a result of these different sources of funding, existing social and

medical services rarely intersect and they are delivered in a piecemeal fashion.
This presents enormous problems of coordination.
The gaps in the programs supporting the delivery and the explicit nonpolicy toward long-term care have encouraged the growth of a largely
proprietary nursing home industry and is now encouraging a greater number of
proprietary home health agencies.

Based on the track record of the nursing

home industry, it is dear that policymakers need to be concerned about the
quality of care of an industry that is largely hidden from view and for which
there is little regulation.
Thus, how to design an acute and long-term care system that is
affordable, both now and in the future when the population in need of those
services is larger, remains a growing public policy issue. It is possible to design
public policies that balance the need to contain costs with the assurance of
continued access to care and the provision of quality care. But, to do so, we
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must explicitly address the larger social questions of the role of health care in
society, whether health care is in fact a "right" or a "privilege," and how much
we as a society are willing to pay to maintain the "best health care system in
the world'' and one that includes a comprehensive strategy of acute and longterm care financing and delivery.
If one were to speculate, based on the discussion presented in this

dissertation, on what the future of the American health care system would look
like, it might look something like this:

the role of the hospital in the health

care system will be much different from its historical role. In the first place,
hospitals have to become businesses if they are to financially survive. Much
more attention will be focused on the hospital's "bottom-line" and business
management techniques, such as strategic planning, finance and accounting,
marketing, and human resources issues, which will become extremely important
in the hospital's competitive position in the health care market. I believe we
will continue to see vertical and horizontal integration in the hospital sector,
with larger corporate systems providing a broader range of services (e.g., home
health care, hospice care, nursing home care, specialized services, etc.)
including services once reserved for the insurance industry (i.e., HMOs, PPOs,
etc.). In short, hospitals will have to merchandize themselves and move toward
utilizing capitated payment arrangements with a whole host of purchasers, not
just the government. The by-word for the successful hospital will be "total"
health care management rather than the traditional hospital management focus.
In terms of the larger system, hospitals will become cost centers as
opposed to the historical role of service centers as system-wide capitation
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systems are adopted.

Alternative delivery systems (e.g., ambulatory care

clinics, surgicenters, hospital satellite clinics) will increase and the system may
be financed under some form of national health insurance. HMO growth will
continue, spurred on by the continuing physician surplus and strict utilization
review procedures for care management.
Physicians, home health, and nursing homes will be financed, at least in
part, by capitated systems. Due to the surplus of physicians, graduate medical
education will no longer be funded and more and more new physicians will opt
for "corporate" medicine instead of private practice.

Competition for

ambulatory care patients among physicians, hospitals and alternative delivery
providers will increase with the result that physicians' incomes will continue to
decline.

Finally, the end of the fee-for-service system, particularly for

physicians, appears to be on the horizon.
In terms of public programs, DRG-based PPS, or capitated arrangements,
will spread to more state Medicaid programs as state governments attempt to
contol health care costs.

Medicare will continue to face dire financial

constraints but will move toward more capitated payment systems (i.e., HMO
enrollment for beneficiaries; provider fee schedules, etc.). Increases in costs to
beneficiaries, potential strict limits on current services, and a larger tax burden
for Medicare to be borne by the working population also appear imminent. It is
even plausible that a "capitated" national health program, for Medicare and
Medicaid, will be established.
For the beneficiary, greater participation and responsibility (both
financial and in terms of decision-making) will be required. As greater amounts
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of health care information are passed on to the consumer, health care decisionmaking will become a "team" process where the team includes the patient as
well as the providers.
There will be a greater need for vigilence concerning quality of care as
multi-faceted organizations enter into the health care arena and as costcontainment pressures encourage the provision of minimal, versus maximal,
care.

We must be careful not to let cost-containment become care-

containment.

Finally, it appears that policymakers are at last "ready" to

discuss the medically indigent problem as third-party payers continue to refuse
to accept the cost shift from government programs.

Thus, costs, not

policymakers, will continue to force change in the health care system. In 20 to
25 years, the United States health care system will look different. However, I

believe there will be one major factor that is consistent with the past; that is,
whatever form the future takes in health care, it will be done on an incremental
basis with the system incorporating minor changes over time, hopefully on the
basis of good information and thorough political debate. Furthermore, it will
not resemble the European model of national health care; it will still be a
hybrid of public and private programs pieced together to form the American
"whole."
The analysis presented in this dissertation attempted to evaluate the
impact of Medicare's Prospective

Payment

components of the health care sector.

System

(PPS)

on

specific

Attention has been paid to the

formulation of the PPS policy and to the strategy of its implementation. The
focus of this dissertation has been to examine a number of the predicted
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impacts of PPS in relation to original data gathered for this purpose and from
published studies regarding PPS implementation and its impact on quality of
care to the Medicare beneficiary.
There are a number of limitations to this dissertation.

First, the

feasibility of any evaluation of PPS is limited by the kinds and quality of the
data available, the cost of obtaining the data, the administration or ethical
barriers to their use, and by the lack of comprehensive and balanced measures
of quality of and access to health care. Second, attributing any observed effect
to PPS is constrained by several factors, induding the fact that because PPS
has been implemented universally among non-Federal oommunity hospitals, the
opportunities for comparison are limited. Another problem is that PPS is not
the only change underway in the U.S.

health care system.

Simultaneous

influences, which can often only be distinguished by the passage of time,
confound attempts to directly attrib.Jte many changes in the health care sector
to PPS. Finally, this dissertation is limited in its generaliza.bility to the larger
population of Medicare beneficiaries and therefore constitutes an important
preliminary step in the process of a comprehensive evaluation of the impact of
PPS on the quality of care. However, the pre/post analyses presented in this
dissertation do offer strong suggestive evidence about the impacts of PPS on
the discharge status of Medicare beneficiaries and subsequent changes in posthospital placement.

FUTURE RESEARCH
Two excellent analyses of the requirements to adequately evaluate the
impact of PPS on both inpatient and post-hospital care settings have been
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published recently.

The first is Medicare's Prospective Payment System:

Strategies for Evaluating Cost, Quality, and Medical Technology (OT A, 1985)
and focuses on research in the inpatient setting.

A central objective of the

OT A study was to identify critical evaluation questions that need to ·be
addressed with respect to PPS impacts on five important dimensions of health
system performance:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

expenditures and costs;
quality of care;
access to care;
technological change; and
clinical research. ·

For OTA, these questions arise from the incentives inherent in the
structure of PPS relative to cost-based reimrursement. New incentives leading
to alterations in the behavior or providers and patients will be brought about as
a result of a combination of three aspects of PPS: (1) it is a system of
expenditure control; (2) it pays hospitals by case rather than by day or by
service; and (3) it uses DRGs as the system of classifying patients for payment
. purposes.

The report points out that it will be difficult to disentangle the

effects of each of these three components of PPS from one another.

The

ultimate effects of PPS on the health care system will occur through effects on
the utilization and organization of health care services. However, changes in
the utilization and organization of health care services by themselves are
insufficient measures of the ultimate impact of PPS. Without detailed analyses
of how any observed changes in the utilization and organization of services
affect beneficiary health status and costs of health care, little can be said
about the extent to which PPS has achieved its objectives. However, the report
concludes that the evidence of PPS impacts thus far illustrates the lack of

305

linkages between measured effects (e.g., length of stay, admissions) and the
critical impacts (e.g., quality, access).
The second report, Post-Hospital Care: Efforts to Evaluate Medicare
Prospective Payment Effects Are Insufficient (GAO, 1986), focuses on the posthospital care environment.

Prospective payment methods are, in general,

designed to reduce the rate of increase in hospital costs by providing incentives
to providers to adopt more efficient practices, both in administrative
operations and in patient care. Because the PPS system is based on a fixed rate
per case, there are incentives to limit the costs of care for each patient by
reducing patients' length of stay in acute care facilities. One possible outcome
of reducing length of stay is that more patients will be discharged at ap earlier
stage of their recuperation and in need of post-hospital care than would have
occurred before the payment system was implemented. In addition, the fact
that only inpatient acute services are paid prospectively provides additional
incentives to use other services which are not paid prospectively, including
Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF) and Home Health (HH) care.

Together, these

related incentives could affect the following five health care outcomes for
which descriptive, change-over-time, and attributive studies are needed:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

patient's condition at hospital discharge;
the use of post-hospital services;
expenditures for those services;
access to those services; and
quality of care delivered by post-hospital
providers.

The GAO report assesses Health and Human Services research activities
as they relate to post-hospital sub-acute care and concludes that the level of
effort and resources devoted to developing appropriate information on post-
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hospital care is small relative to the overall need. Furthermore, many of the
studies are only preliminary or "feasibility" studies of evaluation options and
not well-organized, long term "attributive" studies.

Finally, the level of

expenditures for many of the descriptive and change-over-time studies are as
expensive as the necessary attributive research.
Both reports are excellent compendiums of current research on PPS and
are extremely critical of the Health Care Financing Administration's current
efforts to adequately fund evaluations of the impact of PPS. Consequently,
because these reports provide extensive analyses on the status of current
research efforts and needed directions, this section will focus on issues
specifically related to the question addressed in this dissertation: post-hospital
placement.

Pmt-Hospital Placement
The decreases in lengths of hospital stay, increases in patient transfers,
and increases in the use of outpatient care (both for surgery and for postdischarge followup) all require evaluations of the quality of care prior to
admission and the outcomes of care after discharge (OT A, 1985).

PPS's

emlflasis on reducing hospital use also calls for special attention to subsets of
patients most vulnerable to cost-containment efforts as well as on patients who
are never admitted, either because their conditions can be treated adequately
on an ambulatory basis or because their poverty or severity of illness makes
them undesirable.
In addition, study of the broader effects of PPS requires longitudinal
studies of panels of patients or cohorts of Medicare beneficiaries whose course
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of diagnosis, treatment, and recovery can be tracked through an entire episode
of illness wherever care was provided.

Patient outcomes such as physical

functioning, emotional well-being, and capacity for independent living as well
as effects on family members, are all critical dimensions of care to be
evaluated. Investigations are needed to determine how the outcomes of care
are changing in the post-PPS era, with evidence strong enough to link such
changes at least provisionally to PPS (OT A, 198.5).
Another important area of research is changes in access to post-hospital
care as a result of PPS.

Measuring access to care is a major problem.

Traditional measures, such as waiting lists, complaints to ombudsmen for the
elderly, information on problems recorded by discharge planners, while helpful,
are not likely to be available in a consistent form either across sites or for prePPS periods.

There are no other established measures for access to post-

hospital subacute care and no related measures that have been found which
could plausibly be adapted for this purpose.

Until basic measures for this

concept are identified, refined, and tested, systematic analysis of this issue
cannot proceed (GAO, 1 986).
Another area of needed research is the quality of post-hospital subacute
care. GAO (1986) identified three dimensions of quality of care discussed in the
literature: health outcomes, process measures and structural characteristics of
health care facilities. Process measures, which focus on the amount and types
of services provided) and structural measures, that is, measures of the adequacy
of physical plant and equipment, staff and organizational resources on quality
of care are integral parts of the certification process for many providers, but
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the relationship between them and health outcomes has not been established.
Global indicators of health care quality outcomes, such as deaths and hosptial
readmissions, are available and could be used for preliminary analyses but they
convey only limited and sometimes ambiguous information about the quality of
post-hospital services.
More direct measures of the quality of care in long-term care settings are
currently under development by HHS and others. However, this work largely
focuses on the general long-term care population and its relevance to posthospital subacute care is uncertain. Measures that have focused on the health
care outcomes of patients who are chronically ill or are suffering from
progressively serious or terminal conditions would not be important for the
post-hospital subacute patient.

In general, potential outcome, process and

structural measures of health care quality currently exist and continue to be
refined, but their application to post-hospital subacute care needs to be
validated through appropriate testing (GAO, 1986).
Furthermore, studies are needed to document the types of post-hospital
services provided to patients.

Outcome measure should include measures of

morbidity and mortality over an episode of illness, including hospital and posthospital care.

Studies are needed to examine the extent to which family

members and self-care are used and the effects of the demands for care on
family and informal care providers.

Finally, studies are needed to compare

need for post-hospital care and access to post-hospital care pre/post PPS. With
these and the other identified areas of needed research (e.g., GAO, 1986; OTA,
1985), a broader understanding of the impact of PPS on Medicare beneficiaries
and the health care system will be achieved.
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APPENDIX

PACIFIC HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, INC.
DEPENDENCY AT DISCHARGE CLASSIFICATION TOOL•

By: Patterson, Coe and Wilkinson
+6

+4

0

+2

ACTIVITY AND MOBILITY

In bed always, needs turning
assist; If able to transfer,
needs 2-person assist to
gerlchalr or commode

In bed mostly, needs !-person
assist to transfer or walk
a few feet, or is confined to
wheelchair or walker when
out of bed

wallcs around room, uses bathroom; may require standby
assist or walker

walks independently, ad
lib; uses hallway; uses
no assistance devices

BATHING AND HYGIENE

needs total oral hygiene
and bathing assistance

needs partial assistance to
complete bath but is able to
manage own oral hygiene;
washes at bedside

needs supervision or minor
assist for safety to bathe
or shower; washes most of
self If done in bed; may
need help with footcare
or pericare

Independent with bath or
or shower; washes In
bathroom

PROCEDURES

tube feedings; rriaJor sldn
care with medications
and/or wet/dry dressings;
Hickman or dialysis cath,
Intermittent urinary
catheterization; continuous
respirator; suctlonlngs

Indwelling urinary catheter;
ostomy care; complex dry
dressings or minor decubitus
care; speech therapy;
ambulatlon retraining;
frequent blood drawings
or x-rays
·

oxygen; nebulizer; simple
dry dressing; strengthening
exercises; sling; ace wrap
TED hose; IV site care;
occasional blood drawing

none

SIGNS AND

frequent urinary Incontinence without indwelling
catheterization; fecal
Incontinence; lower limb
paralysis; apbagla; comatose;
severe pain or confusion

moderate dizziness; pain;
nausea, fatigue, anxietY,,
or epresslon; generallzed
weakness, IBlSteadiness;
stress incontinence; upper
limb paralysis; severe
hearing or vision limits

minimal weakness; dyspnea on
exertion; occasional scattered
rales, slight ankle swelling;
mild confusion, disorientation,
dysarthria or anxiety

none

SYMPTOMS

Class I = 0- 'points
Class D = 6 • I I points
Class m = 12- II points
Class IV = 18- 24 points
Revised: 2/81

*Copyright Patterson, Coe, and Wilkinson, 1987
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